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CHAPTER I
CITY COUBCIL BLBCTIOH POLITICS

Those who seek public off ice in the city of Chicago are
drawn into the political arena for a variety of reasons.
Many want the opportunity to exercise political power and to
satisfy their personal ambitions.

Others seek office in

order to serve the public and to improve their communities.
Regardless of motivation, political ambition seems to define
Chicago politics.

In elections held between 1979 and 1995,

1,135 candidates ran for the 50-member city council. 1

More

importantly, the number of candidates who ran in 1995 (289)
was 122 percent more than the number who ran in 1979 (130). 2
Thus, interest in serving on the Chicago city council
appears to have become more intense over time.
Of the many candidates who seek local off ice, which
ones are the most successful?

Do incumbents dominate

election outcomes and, if so, why?

In what ways does the

political environment affect when candidates run for off ice?
How does campaign finance affect election outcomes?

The

1

This total excludes candidates who ran in special
elections.
2

The increase in the total number of candidates running
for alderman occurred despite their being no real change in
the average number of open seat contests in these five
elections. The average number of open seat elections was
6.2, with a standard deviation of 1.5.

2

purpose of this study is to assess these issues in local
politics by examining four aspects of city council
elections: the factors that determine election outcomes, the
advantages of incumbency, the behavior of candidates
challenging incumbents, and the role of money in local
election campaigns.
In order to answer these questions a dataset including
more than 700 Chicago city council candidates who campaigned
for alderman between 1979 and 1995 was collected.

Although

others have examined factors that explain election outcomes
(see Lieske 1989), this study adds to the literature by
studying a larger number of candidates over a longer period
of time than is found in most studies of city council
elections.

The determinants of when candidates' decision to

run for office and how money influences the local political
process, however, are two areas of the urban politics
literature that, to date, either have not been examined or
have not been examined very thoroughly.

As a consequence

this study will enable us to more fully understand local
politics and city council election dynamics.
The first section of this chapter discusses how city
councils and city council elections have been viewed in the
urban politics literature, with specific attention paid to
Prewitt•s (1970) work on San Francisco Bay Area cities.

In

this section I seek to set the context for a more political
understanding of city council politics.

The second section

3

discusses factors related to electoral success in city
council elections.

By way of comparison, I also discuss

findings of scholars who study congressional elections,
especially those relating to the advantages of incumbency.
This is followed by a review of explanations for the
incumbency advantage in legislative elections. A discussion
of

how the political environment influences decisions of

potential candidates to enter elections, with specific
attention paid to strategic politicians theory as developed
by Jacobson and Kernell {1983), appears in this subsequent
discussion.

The fifth section discusses the importance of

campaign finance in legislative elections.

The final

section offers a critique of local elections research and
suggests ways to extend the literature in this subfield of
political science.

This section also discusses the analyses

planned for subsequent chapters.

City Councils, Electoral Competition, and Democratic Theory

Electoral competition is an important topic because of
its linkage to notions of electoral accountability.
Democratic theory suggests that the fear of being voted out
of off ice forces incumbent officeholders to pay close
attention to the citizens they represent, while executing
their political duties {Schumpeter 1987).

Ignoring the

needs of one's constituents creates fissures within the
electoral environment and increases the probability that

4

strong candidates will emerge to face current officeholders
on election day.

The pressure of the next election

therefore forces incumbents to be accountable to voters.
While the present study does not directly assess the
correlation between constituent views and legislative
action, it does assess the antecedent condition of
accountability, or electoral competition.

This may seen

ironic insofar as city council elections and their
importance to ensuring electoral accountability have been
downplayed in the literature.

In a study of 87 Bay Area

cities, Prewitt (1970) argued that conventional notions of
the value of political competition for democratic systems
did not apply to local politics because of the peculiar
structure and environment within which local politics
occurred.

By and large the councilmen that he studied were

unfazed by electoral circumstances.

Fully 25 percent

reached off ice via appointment rather than after a tough
election contest and incumbents won 80 percent of the time
that they sought reelection.

Turnover among councillors

also occurred most frequently as a result of individual
council members deciding to retire voluntarily, rather than
being forced from office by an angry electorate.

Finally,

what distinguished city council members from other
politicians were a desire to perform one's civic duty, the
norm of volunteerism, and a lack of political ambition
(Prewitt 1970, 210-212).
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Due to the number of local governments in the United
States and their varied political structures and cultures,
drawing generalizations about particular aspects of urban
politics is difficult.

Prewitt studied cities in one region

of one state, all with similarly-reformed political
institutions.

Do these findings apply in other cities with

different political structures and different political
cultures?

Although Feld and Lutz (1972) reached conclusions

similar to those of Prewitt in their study of recruitment to
the Houston city council, Engstrom and Pezant (1975) showed
that competition for the New Orleans city council was highly
politicized and executed by politically skilled candidates
with clear political ambitions.

The statistics cited above

on the number of candidates who ran for the Chicago city
council between 1979 and 1995 suggest that this too is a
city that is fundamentally unlike the cities studied by
Prewitt.

This research also adds to current literature a

study of a midwestern city with a relatively unreformed
political system.

For these reasons, studying Chicago will

broaden our understanding of city council elections
specifically and local politics more generally.
Uncovering what determines entrance to and exit from
the Chicago city council is a central goal of this research.
One way to examine electoral competitiveness is to look at
factors shaping election outcomes.

Below I discuss the

major variables that have been identified in the literature
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as important to shaping election outcomes.

Election Outcoaes: Which Candidates Are Kost Coapetitive?

The broader question of electoral competitiveness has
been a special concern of legislative scholars for some time
(for a summary of the literature, see Jacobson 1992) and
only recently has become of interest to urban scholars (see
Lieske 1989).

Because incumbents comprise a large portion

of all candidates, this section begins with a discussion of
the incumbency advantage in city council elections.

From

there I focus on other factors that are expected to affect
election outcomes, the incumbency advantage, how the
political environment shapes candidates' decisions to run
for office, and the role of campaign finance in city council
elections.

The Importance of Incumbency in City council Elections

Like other legislative elections, city council election
outcomes are dominated by incumbents (Hagensick 1964; Howell
and Oiler 1981; Jamieson 1978; Kirlin 1975; Lieske 1989;
Pohlmann 1978).

A 1991 survey conducted by the

International City Management Association showed that 84
percent of incumbents were successful in their reelection
attempts (Desantis and Renner 1994,40).

A similar survey

conducted in 1975 showed that between 1962 and 1975
incumbent success rates increased to 78 percent from 72
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percent (Karnig and Walter 1977,66).

Thus, incumbents'

success in city council elections seems to be increasing,
much like incumbents in other legislative bodies who have
become more secure electorally (Mayhew 1974a).
In addition to increased electoral security, recent
surveys showed that incumbents were reelected most
frequently in cities with populations over 500,000 (90%),
compared with reelection rates of only 62.5 percent in
cities with populations between 250,000 and 499,000.

This

may be related to the value placed on city council seats in
these communities (Hagensick 1964).

Because of greater

prestige, incumbents may try harder to maintain their
positions on city councils in large cities than they do in
smaller communities.

Incumbents also were most successful

in cities with district election systems (61.6%) and in
cities with partisan election ballots (63.4%) (Desantis and
Renner 1994,41; see also Jamieson 1978,950-951).

A recent

study of the 1991 Chicago city council elections
demonstrated that incumbents realized a 19 point advantage
over their challengers (Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner
1995,44).
The value of incumbency is greater in nonpartisan
elections (which characterizes most city council elections)
as incumbents' name identification replaces the more
traditional party cue for voters.

Pohlmann (1978) studied

voting patterns in New York City between 1967 and 1975 in

8

order to uncover the relationship between partisanship and
incumbency in lower salience elections, such as those for
city council and state assembly.

He found that the power of

incumbency was greater in lower salience elections than in
high salience elections such as those for the U.S. Congress
(Pohlmann 1978,500; but see Hagensick 1964).

Incumbents'

power to ward-off strong challenge is buttressed further by
voters' propensity to evaluate incumbents individually,
rather than as part of the city council on which they serve
(Kirlin 1975,268).

Thus, generally unpopular councils may

not alter the political support that any individual council
member may receive.

Incumbency also is more important than

any campaign activity such as research, personal contact
with voters, mass and elite mobilization, and advertising
(Howell and Oiler 1981,155) that might also affect election
outcomes.
Other factors besides incumbency also have been shown
to be important in determining city council election
outcomes.

In discussing other variables that might

influence election outcomes, I pay particular attention to
factors that bestow legitimacy on individual candidates,
before discussing how campaign spending, racial factors, and
political parties might affect election outcomes.

The Role of Legitimation in city Council Elections
Incumbents are reelected most frequently because they
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are better known and higher profile candidates.

In addition

to incumbency, factors that enhance candidates' name
recognition and familiarity among voters are important
variables.

In this section I discuss these credentials and

how they affect election outcomes.
The first set of legitimating credentials is
candidates' background characteristics.

For example,

candidates with high status occupations (e.g., attorneys)
and experience in nonpartisan and civic organizations often
perform better in city council elections than candidates who
lack these experiences (Lieske 1989; Merritt 1977).

These

kinds of background factors permit candidates to develop
their communication skills and the professional contacts
necessary for waging effective political campaigns.
Candidates who hold prior elective offices or appointed
positions also realize electoral advantages over candidates
lacking such experiences (Merritt 1977).
Other studies of local elections have confirmed the
importance of these variables.

Byrne and Pueschel (1974)

studied Democratic and Republican county central committee
elections held in California between 1948 and 1970.

They

found that candidates' occupation, position on the ballot,
ethnicity, gender, and use of a nickname were important
predictors of candidates' share of the vote (Byrne and
Pueschel 1974).

In a survey of voters following local

elections in Lexington, Kentucky during the mid-1980s,
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Raymond (1992) found candidates' personal characteristics
(whether they were perceived as hard working and honest) and
background characteristics (job experience, volunteer
service, and education) were the single most important
predictors of the vote.

Next in importance were candidates'

name recognition, level of concern for the district, and
ideology (Raymond 1992,253).
As another source of legitimation, newspaper
endorsements also have been shown to be important predictors
of election outcomes.

Perhaps the most extensive study of

the effect of endorsements in determining local election
outcomes was conducted by stein and Fleischmann (1987) who
examined the effects of newspaper endorsements on city
council election outcomes in Dallas, Fort Worth, San
Antonio, Memphis, Peoria and Charlotte.

They found that

"those candidates receiving newspaper endorsements win at
least 68 percent of their races" (Stein and Fleischmann
1987,335; but see Raymond 1992).

News media endorsements

also were shown to be important predictors of the 1991
Chicago city council election outcomes in a multivariate
study conducted by the Chicago Urban League.

Candidates who

received endorsements from both of Chicago's daily
newspapers received an increase of approximately 10 percent
in their share of the vote (Lewis, Gierzynski and Kleppner
1995,44).
By far the most systematic examination of electoral
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competition in local politics was conducted by Lieske
(1989), who studied electoral outcomes in Cincinnati, a
nonpartisan city with at-large elections, between 1969 and
1977. He focused specifically on indicators of candidates'
legitimacy and acceptability for public office.

In

bivariate analyses, he reported that factors such as
incumbency, candidates' race, campaign spending, education
level, news media and party endorsements, and candidates'
occupational status were important predictors of total votes
received (Lieske 1989,158).

In multivariate models,

newspaper and partisan endorsements were critical predictors
of success for first-time candidates, while political
following, race, and ability to secure partisan and media
endorsements explained much of the variation in the outcomes
of races involving incumbents and experienced candidates
(those who had run at least once before) (Lieske 1989,163165).

Because incumbents had the largest political

followings among experienced candidates, they realized the
largest electoral benefits.
Those who study congressional elections also have noted
the value of legitimating credentials for candidates'
success.

All else being equal, the most successful

candidates are those with political experience and ample
campaign resources to spend on advertising for their
campaigns (Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1992).

Like council

elections, incumbency shapes many outcomes of congressional
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contests.

In races that do not involve incumbents,

c~ndidates

and candidates' abilities to communicate their

messages to voters shape election outcomes.
Besides background characteristics and media
endorsements, the literature also suggests that other
variables such as campaign spending, party endorsements, and
candidates' race might affect election outcomes.

Below I

discuss each of these variables in turn before proceeding to
a discussion of runoff elections, the political environment
and how it affects candidates' decisions to run for office,
and the role of campaign finance in elections.

Caapaign Spendinq

Campaign spending is an important determinant of
election outcomes because spending permits candidates to
communicate with voters about why they should be elected to
office.

It is far more effective (in terms of the number of

voters candidates can contact) than campaigning door-todoor.

Experience and credentials are less useful to

candidates if they cannot be promulgated to a wide audience.
Spending on advertising allows candidates to do this.
In study of ·partisan elections for a variety of local
and state offices, including the city council, in CharlotteMecklenberg, North Carolina, Arrington and Ingalls {1984)
found that candidate spending was a significant predictor of
vote outcomes.

This was found to be the case in various
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elections they examined even after controlling for
incumbency, race, gender, and party affiliation of the
candidates.

Candidate spending was more important for

predicting outcomes in district elections, while incumbency
was most important in at-large contests (Arrington and
Ingalls 1984,125).

A report prepared recently by the

Chicago Urban League on the 1991 Chicago aldermanic
elections also showed that spending was a significant
predictor of candidates' share of the vote (Lewis,
Gierzynski and Kleppner 1995,44).
Findings in the congressional elections literature also
show that candidates who move thoroughly advertise
themselves and their qualifications for off ice are likely to
attract more votes (Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1980).
Spending is especially important for challengers and
candidates running in open seat elections who do not have
the same amount of name recognition among voters as is
typical for incumbents.

The effect of incumbents' spending

is somewhat vague (Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1980).
While they receive and spend more than their challengers,
the effects of more money are not as great as for
challengers.

Factors Affecting Election outcomes: A summary

Both the literature on city council elections and the
literature on congressional elections point to the
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importance of experience in determining legislative election
outcomes.

Incumbents are the most widely known and

typically the most politically-experienced candidates in
these contests.

For nonincumbents, occupational background

and civic involvement often lend candidates a certain amount
of credibility with voters and other political elites.
These advantages often translate into success at the polls.
In addition to background factors, other variables such as
news media endorsements lend legitimacy to candidates and
their campaigns.

Voters use newspapers as important sources

of information about local politics.

News media

endorsements provide short-cuts for voters desiring to make
informed choices in what are typically low salience
elections. Similar to congressional elections, candidates'
spending also is a significant determinant of candidates'
share of the vote.

The more thoroughly candidates can

saturate their districts with information about themselves,
the more votes they will receive.
The next section focuses on the role of local political
parties in shaping local election outcomes and dynamics.
Because of reform institutions (e.g., nonpartisan ballots),
local parties play less of a role today than they did
earlier this century (Welch and Bledsoe 1988).

While their

role in local elections may be less important, it is not
altogether absent, especially in Chicago, a city that
historically has had a very powerful Democratic party
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influence in local politics.

Political Parties in Nonpartisan Election systeas
Political reformers sought to eliminate the role of
political parties in local governments.

In their opinion,

local politics was apolitical (White 1890) and therefore
should be rid of the influence of political parties.

Their

most enduring legacy has been the nonpartisan municipal
ballot.

This reform has had its effects on the nature of

local politics, candidate emergence, and the types of
candidates who win local office (Cassel 1985; Gilbert 1962;
Gilbert and Cleague 1962; Hawley 1973; Lee 1960; Robinson
and Dye 1978; Rogers and Arman 1971; Welch and Bledsoe 1988;
Williams and Adrian 1959).
A fundamental question in local politics is how
official designations of nonpartisanship affect the behavior
of local parties and political processes.

Nonpartisanship

has weakened parties but by no means has it resulted in the
complete absence of partisan activity in cities with such
ballot forms.

Nonpartisanship has resulted in varying local

political styles.

Dutton and Northrop (1978), for example,

found that reformed cities, in general, were more likely to
be characterized by strong group politics, but lacking
strong political parties.

In contrast, unreformed cities

had both high levels of political party activity and high
levels of group activity (so-called "coalition politics") .
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Not surprisingly, cities with partisan ballot
structures have been found to have the highest levels of
local party activity (Bledsoe and Welch 1987).

But Bledsoe

and Welch (1987) also found that party activity was lowest
in cities with at-large election systems and nonpartisan
ballots, that party activity was no greater in cities with
district systems than in cities with at-large systems, and
that among nonpartisan cities and those with larger
populations were more likely to have more active political
parties than those with smaller populations.

This is

clearly the case in Chicago where the Democratic Party has
been, and to some extent, remains, one of the most powerful
institutions in local politics.

Similarly, the Democratic

and Charter parties still play important roles in Cincinnati
politics, influencing the outcomes of city council elections
there (Lieske 1989).
For cities with active and influential party
organizations the center of the party's strength has been
the cadres of precinct organizations and party workers who
stimulate turnout and votes for the organization's
candidates.

Wolfinger (1963) showed that precinct

organizations and precinct captains had a significant effect
on charter reform in New Haven during the late 1950s.

"It

is just in this sort of low-salience election that political
machines are supposed to be most potent because their
workers encounter less sales resistance and because the
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lower turnout enhances the importance of their pool of
voters" (Wolfinger 1963,398; but see Katz and Eldersveld
1961).

In their study of 186 cities, Bledsoe and Welch

(1987,264) found that "voter turnout is significantly linked
to active parties," who also play a role in candidate
recruitment (Merritt 1977,739-749).
In an extensive look at the functioning of local
political parties, Crotty and his colleagues (1986) found
that parties in Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, and
Nashville, were very active in a variety of campaign
activities.

"Focusing on three critical areas of campaign

activity - voter registration, door-to-door canvassing, and
election-day get-out-the-vote drives - and comparing the
parties across urban areas, two things stood out: all of the
local parties engaged in each of the activities to a
significant degree; and the intensity of effort invested in
the individual activities is impressive, again higher than
might be assumed" (Crotty 1986,29).

Furthermore, the type

of group activity (political action committees, business and
labor groups) that one sees on the state and federal levels,
was conspicuously absent in these cities (Crotty 1986,28).
In summary, we see that nonpartisanship has had a
profound effect on city politics.

Campaigns and candidates

are more individual- or personality-centered in nonpartisan
cities than in cities with partisan systems, where parties
have greater control over who runs and over election
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outcomes.

Incumbents are advantaged in nonpartisan systems

as voters turn to other voting cues besides party to make
summary judgments on candidates' qualifications and
experience.

But, while nonpartisan cities generally have

lower levels of party activity than partisan cities, their
presence is only depressed, not completely absent.
Party organizations in nonpartisan cities assist
candidates with their campaigns, stimulate voter turnout for
endorsed candidates, and generally promote the party's slate
of nominees.

In addition to factors mentioned above, being

chosen by the party for official support also confers
recognition and credibility on candidates.

In low salience

elections, party endorsements represent significant
organizational advantages for endorsed candidates.

This is

especially the case in Chicago, which has a very weak
opposition party in the Republicans, and relatively weak
group influences (Adrian 1959; Crotty 1986).

The Democratic

party has dominated Chicago politics since the mid-1950s.
Thus, candidates running under the mantra of the Democratic
party in their wards should reap large electoral advantages
over other candidates who must organize their campaigns
without the infrastructure of opposition parties or interest
groups that might otherwise be influential in city politics.

Race and Ethnicity in Local Elections

Models of city council election outcomes and
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competitiveness also have considered the racial or ethnic
characteristics of

candidates.

In nonpartisan elections

where voters have few other voting cues, we might expect
candidate race to be an important predictor of the vote
(Arrington 1978; Murray and Vedlitz 1978; Pomper 1966).
Pomper (1966), in a study of nonpartisan and partisan cities
in New Jersey, found that in nonpartisan cities voters used
the ethnic and racial characteristics of the candidates as
voting cues instead of party affiliation, or issue positions
of the candidates.

"The goal of nonpartisanship is

fulfilled, as party identification does not determine the
outcome.

In the place of party, ethnic identification is

emphasized" (Pomper, 1966,90).

In an analysis of voting

patterns in nonpartisan and partisan elections, Arrington
(1978) also concluded that racial factors replace partisan
ones in elections using nonpartisan ballots.
even when overtly partisan campaigns were run.

This was true
"No change

toward a partisan voting pattern and away from racial voting
occurred until both a partisan campaign and a partisan
ballot were present" (Arrington 1978,260).

The effects of

race also have been shown to vary according to voters
socioeconomic status (i.e., the probability of choosing
candidates on the basis of their racial characteristics was
lower for voters with higher incomes) (Murray and Vedlitz
1978,38).
Several other studies also have concluded that
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candidates' race is an important predictor of councilmanic
election outcomes.

Lieske and Hillard (1984) studied city

council election outcomes in nonpartisan Cincinnati from
1969 to 1977.

Regressing vote proportions for black and

white candidates on race, class, and partisanship of voting
precincts, they found that the "councilmanic vote in
Cincinnati is highly structured along racial and partisan
lines" (Lieske and Hillard, 1984,553).

Similarly,

Vanderleeuw (1990) found that levels of own-race voting
varied over time and became most extreme as the largest
racial groups (in this case black and white) approached
equality in size.

In contrast to Vanderleeuw's conclusions,

a recent study of nonpartisan, at-large councilmanic
elections in Detroit showed that levels of racial voting
were high among white voters even after blacks became the
city's racial majority (Herring and Forbes 1994,444).
Studies of Chicago politics also have demonstrated the
importance of racial and ethnic voting in city politics
(Kleppner 1985).

In a study of mayoral elections between

1955 and 1979, Inglot and Pelissero (1993) found that
ethnicity affected voting patterns within the city's Polish
community.

Especially among the middle-class Polish wards

of the city's Northwest Side, ethnic voting improved the
electoral fortunes of Polish candidates running against
candidates backed by the machine.

Racial voting is clearly

less important in aldermanic elections than in citywide
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elections, due to the presence of majority race wards in the
city.
Candidates' race or ethnicity plays a considerable role
in determining election outcomes in local politics.

This is

due, in part, to the fact that there is often little
knowledge about candidates and what they propose to do once
elected.

And, although candidates' race or ethnicity

provides voters with minimal information, it can signal to
voters that candidates are in some way either like them or
unlike them in terms of goals, values, and experiences.

The

finding that candidates' race or ethnicity provides voters
with information about candidates can have powerful
influences on elections.

As Lieske (1989,169) concluded in

his study of Cincinnati: "In sum, there is nothing ••. to
alter our ethnocultural interpretation of urban electoral
politics.

If anything, the results of this research provide

support to a growing body of thought that is reinterpreting
American electoral politics within a framework of racial,
ethnic, and cultural conflict."

Because voters often choose

candidates on the basis of racial or ethnic reasons, it is
important to control for this variable in models of election
outcomes.

Runoff Elections

One feature that distinguishes city council elections
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from other legislative elections is the runoff . 3

In

nonpartisan elections all candidates compete against one
another at the same time, and the one who receives a
majority of the votes is declared the winner.

If no

candidate receives a majority, then the two top vote-getters
compete against each other in a runoff election.
Fleischmann and Stein {1987) examined nonpartisan city
council runoff elections in Dallas, Fort Worth, and San
Antonio, by testing three hypotheses about runoff elections
developed in studies of state and congressional elections. 4
First, that minority candidates are disadvantaged in runoffs
when facing white candidates.

Second, that primary leaders

lose runoffs as voters move to support the underdogs.
Third, that incumbents typically lose runoff elections
because being forced into runoffs shows incumbent weakness
and provides solid reasons for voters to ultimately reject
3

Although partisan runoff primaries in state and
congressional elections are more common in the South.
Bullock and Johnson, 1985.
4

See

In an attempt to explain the factors that affected
runoff election outcomes, Bullock and Johnson {1985)
examined primary runoffs for statewide, state legislative
and congressional races. They found empirical support for
the notion that incumbents were disadvantaged in runoff
elections. Examining the minority disadvantage hypothesis
in a variety of partisan runoff primaries held in
Mississippi during 1967, 1971 and 1975, Stewart, Sheffield
and Ellis (1995) found that black candidates who won the
first primary {the primary before the second runoff primary)
did not do so because a large number of white candidates
split the vote. Only when the first primary election
outcome was close and the black candidate led the field of
candidates, were black candidates disadvantaged vis-a-vis
whites.
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current officeholders in favor of new ones.
Their study found no support for the notion that
minorities or primary leaders lose most frequently in runoff
elections.

However, they did find that incumbents forced

into runoffs in district electoral systems did worse than
incumbents forced into runoffs in at-large systems.

They

also found that candidates backed by nonpartisan slating
groups did worse in runoff elections, on average, than did
those candidates without formal organization support
(Fleischmann and Stein 1987,383).
Wanting to test these hypotheses in a non-southern
setting, Bullock and Gaddie (1994) applied these hypotheses
to Chicago aldermanic runoff elections held between 1975 and
1991.

They found that primary leaders and incumbents fared

less well, vis-a-vis their southern counterparts in runoffs,
than did second place finishers and nonincumbents.

They

also found that female and minority candidates were not
systematically disadvantaged in runoff elections.
As this brief review has shown, studies of runoff
elections suggest a number of variables worthy of
consideration in any treatment of these contests in city
council elections: candidates' race or ethnicity, status as
primary leader, and incumbency.

In addition to these

variables, other factors such as candidates' political
experience, media and party endorsements, and spending also
should be controlled.

By testing fully-specified models in
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the Chicago case, one will be able to make more concrete
determinations about the dynamics of runoff elections.

Explaininq the Incumbency Advantaqe

As I have shown above, legislative elections, in
general, are not very competitive, despite theoretical
principles underlying the value of electoral competition for
democratic systems.

This is because incumbents are involved

in most of these contests.

In city council elections,

incumbents win reelection with great frequency and are
especially invulnerable in the country's largest cities.
Incumbency advantage has not been addressed by urban
scholars.

However, it has been one of the major issues in

the congressional elections literature.

In order to

illuminate possible explanations for the advantage of
incumbency in city council elections, I turn now to a
discussion of some of the reasons given by congressional
scholars for why incumbents are so invulnerable.
Numerous studies have offered alternative explanations
for the incumbency advantage in congressional elections.
Mayhew (1974a) coined the expression "vanishing marginals"
to describe how more incumbents were winning U.S. House
elections with high reelection vote percentages (i.e.,
greater than 55 percent).

He concluded that greater use of

taxpayer-funded ("frank") mail allowed incumbents to
campaign year-round by providing a means through which they
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could claim credit for district improvements and advertise
their performance in off ice at no cost, an advantage
unavailable to would-be challengers (Mayhew 1974a).

Others

argued that incumbents solidified their electoral position
by paying careful attention to solving constituents'
problems with federal agencies, and by providing other
constituency services (Fiorina 1977).

The ability of

incumbents to ensure safe congressional districts by
exercising influence over legislative redistricting also has
been advanced as a possible explanation for increased
incumbent electoral security (Tufte 1973; but see Cover
1977).
Congressional studies also have shown that incumbents
face few serious electoral threats because they face few
strong challengers (Jacobson 1987). 5

In support of this

notion, Abramowitz (1991) argued that politically-

5

Banks and Kieweit (1989,1000) have argued that the
reason weak candidates enter the electoral fray knowing that
they may eventually challenge an incumbent is because the
primary fight is less ·intense. Strong candidates (those
with prior elective off ice experience) avoid the
opposition's party primary knowing that the odds of
defeating the incumbent in the general election are slim.
This increases the odds that a weak candidate (facing other
weak candidates in the primary) will emerge victorious at
this stage of the electoral process. Losing the general
election to the incumbent is less troublesome for candidates
with little political experience because they are not
expected to win anyway. For experienced candidates a
general election loss is more devastating and shows
electoral vulnerability. Furthermore, unknown candidates
who perform reasonably well against an incumbent can
increase their chances of success in subsequent elections
(Banks and Kieweit, 1989,1013).
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experienced challengers with plenty of resources at their
disposal can cut into or decrease incumbents' electoral
strength.

He also found that incumbents' vote share is

significantly affected by unfavorable national party tides
and such factors as whether or not incumbents' records were
damaged by scandal at the time of their elections
{Abramowitz 1991).

Still others point to the value of past

electoral success and close attention paid by incumbents to
district opinion on policy matters (DeBoef and Stimson
1995), the value of fundraising (Epstein and Zemsky 1995),
and the role of campaign warchests in warding-off serious
challengers (Box-Steffensmeier 1996).
While incumbents enjoy large electoral advantages over
their opponents, challengers can overcome these initial
disadvantages by spending large sums of money advertising
themselves and their campaigns.

Challengers with political

experience also tend to perform better than political
amateurs.

Incumbents are hurt by unfavorable national

political tides that favor one party over the other.
Incumbents also are hurt by short-term political forces such
as scandal or a series of unpopular floor votes that
mobilize voters in support of the opposition.
While there is little agreement in the literature about
why incumbents are advantaged, several areas of inquiry have
been identified.

Because of official nonpartisanship in

Chicago, such factors as national political tides and short-
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term forces that might affect the popularity of one party
over another are unimportant in explaining the incumbency
advantage in city council elections.

Other factors such as

incumbents' institutional positions, seniority, scandal,
redistricting, political experience of the opposition,
opposition spending, and organization support, however, may
be important to explaining why incumbents enjoy large
electoral advantages.

The Political Environment and Decisions to Run for Office

At this point we are safe in concluding that elections
involving incumbents are relatively uncompetitive and that
open seat elections are much closer and hinge upon such
factors as candidate quality and candidate spending.

In

addition to these factors, the issue of when candidates
decide to enter particular races is a critical factor
shaping election outcomes.

If, for example, the weakest

candidates run against the most secure incumbents, turnover
in these seats is highly unlikely.

Similarly, if the

strongest candidates only run in open seat elections, these
will be the most competitive races.
In this section, I discuss how the political
environment influences when candidates run for office, an
important question if highly qualified candidates only run
in open seats or against vulnerable incumbents.

Because

congressional scholars have addressed this issue more
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thoroughly than urban scholars, I turn to that literature to
inform my discussion.
Incumbents' electoral positions in both House and
Senate elections are threatened most significantly when they
are faced by high quality challengers, who emerge when
incumbents appear vulnerable (Jacobson and Kernell 1983;
Lublin 1994; but see Squire 1989).

Incumbents attract high

quality challengers during periods of economic downturn
(when such downturn can be attributed to the policies of the
incumbent's party), presidential unpopularity (when the
president and the incumbent are of the same party), when
national party tides favor the opposition party, and when
the incumbent•s issue positions are inconsistent with
prevailing district sentiment (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher
1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).
Incumbents' electoral strength is decreased most
significantly when challengers behave "strategically,"
running when electoral circumstances favor their candidacies
(Canon 1993; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).

High quality

challengers (typically those with prior elective office
experience), attract more campaign contributions from local
organizations, individuals, and political action committees
than less qualified candidates (Jacobson 1980).

Because of

this, they can run more effective campaigns (Jacobson 1980).
"Strategic" behavior is exhibited on the part of both
candidates and contributors, neither of whom wants to risk

29

losing an election. 6

Incumbents' stronghold on election

outcomes can be loosened, and even broken, when competent
challengers decide to run.

Thus, in addition to candidate

quality and campaign expenditures, when challengers decide
to run for off ice is critically important to the
competitiveness of elections (Bond, Covington and Fleisher
1985; Canon 1993; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Lublin 1994).
Popular incumbents are almost always going to win,
regardless of their opposition.

Vulnerable incumbents,

while still more likely to win than challengers, are more
likely to lose when faced by highly qualified, politicallyexperienced challengers.
The urban politics literature has not really addressed
this issue in any systematic fashion.

Sheffield and Goering

(1978), however, in a study of school board elections, found
that incumbents ran unopposed more frequently than
nonincumbents, suggesting a certain amount of strategy on
the part of candidates to avoid races with incumbents.
Bledsoe (1993) in his study of city council careers, found a
relationship between incumbents' vulnerability and vote
share in subsequent elections.

Marginal incumbents, who won

their first election in close contests, were more likely to
6

Candidates are risk averse because losing might be the
end of their political careers. For contributors, the
difficulty of supporting a candidate who does not win is
that one's political access to the winning candidate may be
closed. Winning candidates are not always eager to open
their doors to those who supported their opponents in the
most recent election.
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be defeated in their reelection bids than incumbents who had
won their first election by large margins (Bledsoe 1993,8890).

One reason for this might be that vulnerable

incumbents found their opposition to be more skilled than it
would have been were they less vulnerable politically.
Interestingly, inter-election vote swings for
incumbents were more volatile in nonpartisan elections than
in partisan ones.

As Bledsoe (1993,90) states:

Nonpartisan councilors are more volatile in their
marginality than partisan councilors - they are more
likely to build on initially close margins and become
secure, and they are more likely to see what should be
secure margins evaporate and lose the next election.
Council members in legally partisan environments show
more stability over time.
He argued that in the more candidate-centered nonpartisan
contests, individual political entrepreneurs were more
likely to emerge and defeat incumbents.

One may reasonably

infer from this that in nonpartisan systems, candidates who
can build organizations and run effective campaigns, might
be better able

to defeat vulnerable incumbents.

In systems

more tightly controlled by political parties, incumbents are
more securely shielded from strong opposition.
In this section, we once again see how incumbency
shapes the political landscape.

Whether or not an incumbent

is in the race is a strong predictor of the kinds of
candidates who seek office.

Generally speaking, the

congressional literature shows that higher quality
candidates choose to run in open seat elections and against
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politically vulnerable incumbents (Bond, Covington and
Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).

On the local

level, incumbents who win with impressive margins increase
their share of the vote in subsequent elections more rapidly
than incumbents who win with less impressive totals.

In

other words, close elections for incumbents signal to the
political environment that incumbents are weak and capable
of being defeated.

The important point is that the most

politically experienced candidates make decisions to run for
office on the basis of strategic considerations, which
inform them about their chances of winning.

The Role of Money in Leqislative Elections

A fourth area of electoral competition in local
politics that I examine is campaign fundraising.

Campaign

fundraising is a critical part of most campaigns, be they
for local, state, or national office (see Sorauf 1988).

As

discussed above, how much money candidates are able to spend
to communicate with voters is directly related to number of
votes they receive on election day.

In order to spend

money, candidates must first raise money.

An overlooked and

under-researched area of the urban politics literature is
that of campaign fundraising.

Below I discuss the issue of

campaign finance in legislative elections.
Campaign spending is a critical campaign activity
because it permits candidates to communicate with voters
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about their qualifications for off ice.

Candidates

communicate with voters through television, radio,
newspaper, and billboard advertisements.

Congressional

scholars who have examined campaign finance point out that
candidates also spend money on direct mail, campaign
rallies, phone banks, and get-out-the-vote drives
(Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994,1109).

Through advertising,

candidates are able to promote positive images of themselves
and to define their opponents.

These factors ultimately

increase candidates' name recognition and chances for
political success (Abramowitz 1991; Green and Krasno 1988;
Jacobson 1980).
In addition to examining the relationship between
spending and votes, other analyses have examined the
dynamics of campaign fundraising.

These studies have

attempted to describe and explain the relationship between
campaign fundraising and the election cycle (Epstein and
Zemsky 1995; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994).

Because

Federal Elections Commission reports are disaggregated by
reporting periods (usually a period of months), it is
possible to understand the "flow" of fundraising during a
campaign and how this might vary among candidates.

Krasno,

Green and Cowden (1994), in a study of fundraising in 1985
and 1986, showed (not surprisingly) that incumbents raised
more money than challengers in every reporting period of the
campaign, especially directly before the election, and that
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incumbents could generate revenue quicker than other
candidates in response to well-financed challengers.

More

importantly, overall levels of challenger fundraising were
significantly related to the amount of money they could
generate early in their campaigns, suggesting that
contributors do not invest in hopeless candidates (Krasno,
Green and Cowden 1994).
Campaign fundraising also is an important campaign
activity in city council elections. 7

A report prepared by

the Urban League on campaign fundraising in the 1991 Chicago
city council elections, however, showed that fundraising
success was primarily a function of candidates' race,
political organization support, pre-election name
identification, and number of opponents.

While incumbents

outraised nonincumbents in dramatic fashion, this effect did
not show up in multivariate analyses (Lewis, Gierzynski, and
Kleppner 1995,45).

Other than this study, very little work

has been done on this issue in the urban politics
literature, despite its importance to cities such as Los
Angeles and New York that, in recent years, have moved to
reform their campaign finance systems for local candidates
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995,31-38).
In summary, campaign finance plays an important in
legislative elections.
7

Spending is a critical predictor of

Similar to campaign research, personal contact with
voters, mass and elite mobilization, and advertising (Howell
and Oiler 1981).
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election outcomes, while fundraising represents an important
campaign activity.

Who is able to raise the most money and

at what time during the campaign are two factors that will
likely affect election outcomes.

The urban politics

literature, however, has not examined these issues in any
depth.

overview of the study
As this review of the literature has shown, local
election outcomes and the outcomes of congressional
elections are shaped by many of the same factors.
Incumbency, candidates' personal qualifications for office,
political experience, and campaign spending all are
important predictors of election outcomes.

Local elections

and those for federal office, however, are different in a
number of respects.

They occur in different contexts, with

different rules that govern outcomes.

Nonpartisanship,

runoff elections, and the role of political parties are
central among these differences.
Two areas of inquiry that have received considerable
attention elsewhere but have received no attention in the
urban politics literature are (1) incumbency advantage and
how the political environment affects candidates' decisions
to run for office; and (2) the role of money in local
elections.

Furthermore, while there have been more attempts

in the urban politics literature to understand local
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election outcomes, these models, in general, have not been
fully specified.

In some cases, these models have not

controlled for particular variables such as campaign
expenditures or important background characteristics of
candidates (Howell and Oiler 1981), while others have
examined only small numbers of candidates (Lieske 1989).
In order to understand more fully local election
dynamics, scholars need to examine larger numbers of
candidates, test fully specified models, and utilize timeseries designs.

The aim of this research is to begin

bridging the gap between what we know about congressional
elections and what we know about city council elections,
while being sensitive to the obvious differences between the
two political settings.
To begin this process, Chapter Two establishes the
political context of Chicago city council elections and
presents the study's research design.

Using data collected

on city council candidates who ran for office between 1979
and 1995, Chapter Three presents an analysis of election
outcomes in both regular and runoff aldermanic elections.
Chapter Four examines the value of incumbency in shaping
election outcomes and patterns of candidate emergence in
local elections.

In Chapter Five, I examine fundraising in

local campaigns, by analyzing candidates' campaign
disclosure reports.

A concluding chapter addresses the

implications of the findings for our understanding of
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electoral competition in city council elections.

CHAPTER I I
RESEARCH DESIGN

As indicated in the preceding chapter, the central
purpose of this study is to understand more fully
competition in city council elections.

Electoral

competition is an important topic because of its linkage to
democratic theory, which suggests that elections in a
democracy ought to be free and fair and that voters should
be able to choose from among a wide range of candidates in
determining who their representatives will be.
The following discussion describes how this research
attempts to understand electoral competition in local
politics.

It describes the study's setting, research

methods, variables that will be used, and hypotheses to be
tested in subsequent chapters.

A final section discusses

the data that are used in this analysis.
areas are

~dentified

Four research

for analysis: predicting election

outcomes, incumbency advantage, the factors that predict
candidate emergence, and campaign fundraising in city
council elections.

Because the study focuses only on

Chicago, considerable .attention is given to that city's
history and political culture.

Below I present a

justification for studying Chicago city council elections
37
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and then I examine the literature on Chicago politics and
urban political machines.

Chicaqo Politics

Why study Chicago city council elections to understand
electoral competition in city council elections?

First, the

city's 50 city council seats are highly sought-after posts.
As mentioned in Chapter One, 289 candidates ran for alderman
in 1995 (an average of 5.78 per seat).

While I do not

analyze the motivations of aldermanic candidates, there are
several aspects of the job that might make it attractive for
would-be aldermen.

The salary paid to aldermen is one

possible reason for seeking the office.

Before the 1995

election, aldermen were paid $55,000 annually.

After the

1995 elections, the outgoing city council and the mayor
agreed to increase salaries for the new city council to
$75,000.

They serve four-year terms and, because the

position is technically part-time, do not have to relinquish
outside income.

Quite often this is the first elective

off ice for many aldermen, thus service on the city council
provides aldermen with practical experience in government
and politics and increases their name recognition with
voters, two factors that might be useful in election
campaigns for higher office.
Policy-related motivations for would-be aldermen also
are apparent.

Aldermen are largely responsible for ensuring
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that their wards get a fair share of city services and
development funds, therefore a certain amount of power and
prestige is conferred on these officeholders.

Although the

Chicago city council is typically a rubber stamp for the
mayor (Rakove 1975), it does have the legislative authority
to function as a powerful policy-making body as well
(Kleppner 1985,241-249).

Thus, in addition to the

individual factors that might entice someone to run for
alderman, there are policy-related reasons for running as
well.

For these reasons, competition for the office of

alderman tends to be intense (at least in terms of the sheer
number of candidate seeking the office), a prerequisite for
any study of electoral competition.
Second, both structural and cultural aspects of local
politics make Chicago a worthy setting for a study of
electoral competition.

Chicago is a fairly unreformed city

when compared to Cincinnati, the other major city whose city
council elections have undergone analyses similar to those
conducted here (Lieske 1989).

Cincinnati's city council is

elected in nonpartisan, at-large elections.

Because Chicago

uses a district format, the differences between these two
types of cities can be explored.

Cincinnati has reformed

political structures and no political machine activity of
note. 1
1

Chicago is reformed in only two ways: its city

Cincinnati does, however, have a number of political
party organizations that are active in city politics (see
Lieske, 1989).
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council elections are nonpartisan and they are held in offyears (years in which state and national elections are not
held).

As we will see below, Chicago also has a strong

history of political machine activity.

Thus, in general,

there might be interesting differences between what we know
about a reformed city and what will be learned about a
relatively unreformed city.
Third, there is a long history of understanding urban
politics through the lens of Chicago.

Chicago has been used

as a laboratory for understanding local government and
politics in countless studies of political machines,
bureaucracies, mayoral politics, and ethnic and racial
politics. 2

While these studies have covered almost all

aspects of urban government and politics, they have largely
excluded the politics of city council elections.

As I have

shown in Chapter One, only a couple of studies have been
conducted specifically on Chicago city council elections
(Bullock and Gaddie 1994; Lewis, Gierzynski and Kleppner
1995).

2

This study builds on these two works, as well as the

The following is a sampling of the literature that has
used Chicago as the setting for studies in these substantive
areas. On machine politics see Banfield (1961); Banfield
and Wilson (1963); Gottfried (1962); Gosnell{l968); Rakove
(1975); Allswang (1977); Guterbock (1980); and Erie {1988).
On bureaucratic politics see Mladenka (1980); Jones (1981);
Koehler and Wrightson (1987); and Mladenka (1989). On
mayoral politics see O'Connor (1975); Gove and Masotti
(1982); Holli and Green (1984); Kleppner (1985); and Holli
and Green (1989). on ethnic and racial politics see Zikmund
(1982); Pinderhughes (1987); and Inglot and Pelissero
(1993).
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work of Lieske (1989), who studied Cincinnati.

It does so

by examining the factors that shape election outcomes, by
looking at the value of incumbency and challenger behavior,
and by studying the role of money in local politics.
Furthermore, there have been no multivariate, time-series
analyses of Chicago aldermanic elections to date.
Below I discuss Chicago's political machine heritage.
As I demonstrate, the Chicago political machine is not a
monolithic, immutable force.

In fact, most agree that the

machine does not exist today (Granger and Granger 1987;
Grimshaw 1992).

In addition to changes to the political

machine, demographic changes and redistricting have altered
the Chicago political landscape in dramatic ways, especially
on the ward level where city council elections occur.

I

turn now to a discussion of machine politics in Chicago.

Political Machines and Election outcomes

Chicago is unique among cities because of its ability
to resist changes sought by political reformers.

As

mentioned, nonpartisanship in city council elections and
off-year council and mayoral elections are the only two
reform elements adopted by city leaders this century.
Although ballots are officially nonpartisan, local politics
in this city has been dominated by the Cook County
Democratic Party ("machine") for the past 60 years (see
Rakove 1975).
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Under the leadership of Mayor Richard J. Daley, the
machine was able to elect its slated candidates in citywide,
aldermanic, party committeeman, county, state and federal
elections with remarkable consistency.

Candidates running

with machine endorsement enjoyed the benefits of large
numbers of campaign workers, financial support, and the aid
of party elites (Guterbock 1980,226-227).

To a large degree

they still enjoy the benefits of voter registration drives,
door-to-door campaigning, and election day assistance from
the party organization (Crotty 1986,187).

The political

structure of ward committeemen and precinct captains that
made the Daley machine powerful is still in place, although
there currently is no clear leader among the party
hierarchy.
Political organizations derive their power from a
variety of sources.

Some have argued that machines maintain

power because of their ability to distribute particularized
benefits to supporters of machine-backed candidates (Merton
1949).

Others have argued that in addition to engaging in

this type of "exchange" behavior, machine leaders ensure
that benefits (offices, patronage jobs, constituent
services) are distributed widely to incorporate and appease
competing interest groups (Dahl 1961).

A more recent

treatment of machine politics suggested that machines stay
in power because of their ability to balance the supply of
divisible benefits with the number of demands placed on the
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organization (Erie 1988).
In general, the machine in Chicago is considered to be
in a state of decline, or even nonexistence (Grimshaw 1992;
Granger and Granger 1987; Kemp and Lineberry 1982; Kleppner
1985; Erie 1988).
substantial.

The evidence supporting this view is

Kemp and Lineberry (1982), for example,

posited that the Chicago machine relied upon a large number
of "deliverable" (high turnout, high degree of machine
support) and "controllable" (low turnout, high degree of
machine support) wards for its electoral domination.

As

they have demonstrated, however, in the 1977 special
election primary following Daley's death, the number of
deliverable wards decreased substantially at the same time
that the number of "renegade" (high turnout, anti-machine
vote) increased (Kemp and Lineberry 1982,11).

Beginning

with the 1967 general election, the number of deliverable
black wards also decreased.

Prior to this time, these wards

were critically important for machine success (Kemp and
Lineberry 1982,17).

As support from predominantly black

wards became less certain during the 1970s, the machine grew
more dependent on votes from white ethnic wards, which were
shrinking in number vis-a-vis minority wards (Kemp and
Lineberry 1982,23).
Grimshaw (1982,65) also has argued that the machine
lost black support in the late 1960s.

By the early 1970s, a

split in the city's politics along racial lines was evident.
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The machine could no longer assume unified black support,
nor could it appease the demands of the black middle-class
for equality in education, housing, and jobs, without the
risk of alienating its white ethnic voters, who preferred a
more conservative approach on matters of racial integration
and equality.

Because of increased minority power and a

smaller white ethnic presence in the city, the machine lost
its grip on party primary election outcomes.

Primary

election outcomes (in partisan elections) were critical to
the machine because in a one-party area, primary election
winners typically win the general election (Grimshaw
1982,71-85).
The Michael Bilandic and Jane Byrne administrations
that followed Daley further antagonized relations between
the machine and the black community.

Bilandic angered the

black community when he and aldermen Edward Vrdolyak (Tenth
Ward)and Edward Burke (Fourteenth Ward), convinced black
alderman Wilson Frost (Thirty-Fourth Ward), who was
President Pro-tempore of the city council, to support
Bilandic as Daley's successor, in exchange for becoming the
chairman of the city council's powerful finance committee
(Grimshaw 1992,150).

Byrne, who had won the 1979 mayoral

election with support from the discontented black, lakefront
liberal, and Northwest Side Polish wards, quickly lost
support from the black community when she sought,
unsuccessfully, to expand her political base to include more
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white ethnics.

Fearing a reelection fight with Richard M.

Daley in 1983, she began to place white ethnics in control
of Chicago public schools, public housing and the ward
redistricting process, three areas of city government where
blacks either had, or had wanted, to exercise more power.
In doing so, Byrne alienated herself from the coalition of
voters that comprised two-thirds of her winning coalition in
1979, blacks and lakefront liberals (Grimshaw 1992,160).
Anger in black and liberal wards in response to Byrne
administration policies, a massive voter registration drive
in the black community, and Richard M. Daley's bid for the
Democratic nomination for mayor in 1983, opened the door for
Harold Washington, a black congressman from the city's South
Side (Grimshaw 1992,164).
In addition to broad political changes that decreased
machine strength, the internal dynamics of the machine
changed in the aftermath of Daley's death.

The positions of

mayor and party chairman, unified under Daley, were
separated.

Bilandic, an alderman from Daley's own 11th Ward

became mayor, and George Dunne, an administrator and longtime party activist, became party chairman.

While Daley had

centralized his control over ward committeemen (and thus
over election outcomes in the wards), "the party
organization, under Dunne, became a much more decentralized
structure, with power devolving to the ward committeeman to
a degree unknown during the Daley years" (Rakove 1982,227).
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In addition, control of patronage shifted from the
organization to the mayor's office (Rakove 1982,227).

With

fewer resources to control and faced with an increasingly
powerful set of ward committemen, the centralized machine
that had existed under Daley lost control.

In the 1979

mayoral primary, the machine even failed to perform its
"gatekeeper" control over the election ballot, as Byrne
emerged and successfully exploited a natural disaster (the
blizzard of 1979) to win the primary election over incumbent
Mayor Bilandic (Kemp and Lineberry 1982,24).

Upon assuming

off ice, Byrne gutted the bureaucracy of its top-level
officials who controlled most of the policy expertise in the
city.

She was then forced to turn to lower-level party

operatives who "were unfamiliar with the dynamics, informal
relationships, and policies of the system that Daley had
created and Bilandic had retained" (Rakove 1982,232) for
policy and political advice.

This further increased the

power of the city council and ward committeemen at the
expense of the professional bureaucracy and the city's
business leaders (Rakove 1982,232-243).
During the 1980s, regular Democrats (those slated by
the leadership of the Cook County Democratic Party) lost the
mayoralty twice.

In the 1983 mayoral election, the machine

lost again as Democratic primary voters backed Harold
Washington, the city's first black chief executive, against
two white candidates, incumbent Mayor Byrne and the late
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Mayor Daley's son, Richard.
1987.

Washington was reelected in

"Thus, for some years, there has been more myth than

reality to the notion of the Machine's invincibility, and
there are solid reasons to suppose that its decade-long
decline is not going to be reversed" (Kleppner 1985,246).
In a recent interview, Richard M. Daley supported this
conclusion about the weakened Chicago machine "There's no
machine. There's nothing" (Kass 1996,17).
Despite these setbacks, a 1981 survey of party leaders
in Cook County suggested that politics on the ward level in
Chicago has changed very little over time (Crotty 1986).

In

particular, Democratic party leaders have been reluctant to
embrace new forms of campaigning - high technology polling,
telephone canvassing, and television appeals - preferring to
cling to "retail" politics, based on one-on-one contact with
voters (Crotty 1986).

Ward-level party officials have deep

community roots and are still very committed to maintaining
political control of their wards (Crotty 1986).

Thus there

may be reason to believe that these activists did not
suddenly disappear following the Bilandic def eat and
Washington's watershed victory in 1983.

In characterizing

the Chicago Democratic Party today, it is reasonable to
suggest that it represents a loose factionalism, composed of
50 separate fiefdoms (wards) controlled by ward committeemen
and aldermen.

In this respect it more closely resembles the

decentralized organization that existed prior to Daley being
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elected mayor in 1955, when he immediately moved to
consolidate both governmental and political authority in the
mayor's office.

The major difference between ward politics

today and ward politics prior to 1955 is that the current
ward committeemen do not have the same power and patronage
resources to divide among the party faithful (see Rakove
1982,217-218 for a description of the pre-1955 Cook County
political machine).

city council and ward Politics in the 1980s and 1990s

The election of Harold Washington in 1983, and the 1986
special elections that sent four new minority
representatives to City Hall, had profound effects on the
city council and ward politics. 3

During the 1983 election,

"an unprecedented number of new and reform-minded black and
Hispanic ward leaders were swept into off ice, clinging to
Washington's long coattails.

By 1987, over 80 percent of

the black aldermen in the council had been elected during
the Washington era, and nearly all of them had built their
political careers outside the machine" (Grimshaw 1992,182).
Despite these victories, in the early 1980s the council was
still controlled by white ethnic politicians determined to
block Washington's reform agenda.

They immediately moved to

assign loyal supporters to committee chairmanships, block
3

Between 1979 and 1995, the ward boundaries in Chicago
were redrawn six times (1981, 1982, 1983 (twice), 1986, and
1992).
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mayoral appointments, and pass their own budget.

Not since

Daley removed much of the policy-making authority from the
council in 1955 had the council exercised such power
(Grimshaw 1992,185).
White ethnic control of the city council and minority
control of the mayor's office ushered in a period of intense
political and racial fighting between the executive branch
controlled by Washington, and the city council, controlled
by 29 anti-Washington aldermen (25 of whom were
white) (Kleppner 1985,247-248).

This period is commonly

ref erred to as the "council wars."

Only as a result of

court-ordered redistricting and special elections in 1986
did this period end.

Following the special election,

reform-minded members of the council were joined by four new
minority members sympathetic to Washington's agenda.

The

balance of power in the council was split evenly, with 25
members supporting Washington and 25 members opposing him.
Because the mayor is entitled to cast tie-breaking votes in
the city council, the pro-Washington forces now controlled
the agenda and policy outcomes.

Thus the political

exclusion experienced by blacks and other minorities during
successive administrations in the late 1970s and early
1980s, and during the period of the "council wars,"
motivated blacks and other minorities in city council
contests as well as in citywide races.
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Redistricting.

As mentioned above, increased minority

presence on the city council resulted from a series of court
decisions that substantially re-worked the city's ward
boundaries, largely in favor of minority interests.

The

transformation of the city's ward boundaries reflected
profound demographic shifts that have occurred in Chicago
during the past 25 years.

For example, in 1970, 65.6

percent of Chicago's population was white.

By 1980 that

total had decreased to 42.9 percent and in 1990 whites
comprised only 37.9 percent of Chicago's population.

In

1970 blacks comprised 32.6 percent of the population, a
total that increased to 39.7 percent in 1980, and decreased
only slightly in 1990 to 38.5 percent.

Hispanics are the

only group that has seen a steady increase in their
percentage of the population, going from 7.4 percent in 1970
to 14 percent in 1980 and 19.6 percent in 1990. 4
For the most part, these demographic changes have only
slowly translated into greater minority representation in
the city council.

After the 1979 election, blacks and

Hispanics held only 32 percent of the seats in the city
council, despite being over 50 percent of the population.
By contrast, whites held 68 percent of the seats in the city
council, despite comprising only slightly over 40 percent of

4

This information was taken from the 1970 and 1980
Chicago Statistical Abstracts and from the Metro Chicago
Political Atlas-1994, Metro Chicago Information Center,
Northern Illinois University. p.6.
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the population.

After the 1983 election, whites still

controlled 64 percent of the city council, while blacks and
Hispanics held only 36 percent.
The relationship between population and seats began to
change after the 1987 elections, which were the first
regularly scheduled elections following court-ordered
redistricting and special elections in 1986.

Whites saw

their percentage of seats drop from 64 to 56, while blacks
and Hispanics saw their percentage of seats increase from 36
to 44.

These numbers remained constant after the 1991

elections, despite a third decrease in size of the city's
white population in as many decades.

As a result of the

1995 elections, the council is now majority-minority.
Blacks and Hispanics make-up 54 percent of the council
(roughly equivalent to their numbers in the population).
For the most part, between 1979 and 1995 what whites lost in
terms of seats, Hispanics gained.

Hispanics increased their

representation on the city council 14 percent, and whites
saw their representation decrease 22 percent.
These changes have dislodged the old guard, white
ethnics who dominated Chicago politics for most of this
century.

Now there are only seven aldermen on the city

council who were elected prior to 1980, all of whom are
white ethnics. 5 The distribution of white and minority
5

Edward Burke {Fourteenth Ward) was first elected in

1969; Theris Gabinski (Thirty-Second Ward) was first elected
in 1969; Burton Natarus (Forty-Second Ward) was first
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aldermen reflects settlement patterns in the city, with
blacks dominating the city's South and West Sides, and
whites controlling the city's North and Southwest Sides.

In

general, the relationship between the current Mayor Daley
and the city council is congenial, more closely resembling
the relationship between the first Mayor Daley and the city
council than anything else.

The city council has routinely

passed the mayor's budgets by overwhelming majorities.

Much

of this support is attributable to Daley's close work with
the aldermen in ensuring that their wards get a fair share
of city revenues (Kass and Kirby 1995). 6

Ward Politics.

The late 1980s represented a significant

turning point for minority representatives in ward politics
as well.

As.Grimshaw (1992,182) points out, "Only one-third

of the eighteen black committeemen elected in 1988 had been
put in office before Washington's election."
elected in 1971;
elected in 1973;
elected in 1975;
first elected in
first elected in
6

Minority group

Bernard Stone (Fiftieth Ward) was first
Richard Mell (Thirty-Third Ward) was first
Eugene Schulter (Forty-Seventh Ward) was
1975; and Patrick Huels (Eleventh Ward) was
1977.

It also is related to the fact that during the 1990s,
Mayor Daley has made 17 appointments to the council, thus
ensuring himself a certain amount of political loyalty.
Therefore, while there were dramatic political changes in
the city council, the governing relationship between the
mayor and council has been relatively calm, despite the fact
that the council was increasingly composed of minority group
members during this time. This stands in sharp contrast to
the early 1980s, when the executive and legislative branches
of city government also were controlled by different racial
groups.
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success in ward elections has profoundly affected the racial
composition of the city's ward committeemen.

In 1995, the

cook County Democratic Party, the chief organ for past
electoral domination, is still led by a long-time party
regular (Thomas Lyons), but only a bare majority of
Chicago's ward committeemen are white. 7

More importantly,

there are more political independents among the city's ward
committeemen than at any time before. 8

(A political

independent in Chicago is a Democrat who opposes machine or
regular Democrats.)

Ward committeemen today play the role

of independent power broker more often than party loyalist,
supporting candidates in their own and neighboring wards.
Candidates who are supported by high profile committeemen
also are not entirely beholden to them once they are
elected.

In the 1995 city council elections, committeemen

in the Second and Twenty-Ninth Wards supported challengers
to their incumbent patrons (Ryan 1995,2:1).

According to

Ryan (1995,2:1 and 2:6):
Such broken alliances have become increasingly common
in Chicago politics as former proteges find it easier
to break ranks with their mentors ..• That kind of tiff
was unheard of during the Democratic machine's vaunted
days of monolithic control. Then, the political lives
7

In 1995, 25 of the city's 49 ward committeemen were
white, 19 were black, and 5 were Hispanic. There was one
vacancy.
8

Current or former committeemen, such as Bobby Rush
(Second Ward), Dorothy Tillman (Third Ward), Toni
Preckwinkle (Fourth Ward), Luis Gutierrez (Twenty-Sixth
Ward), and Danny Davis (Twenty-Ninth Ward), are long-time
independent Democrats.
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of such ungrateful benefactors would have been abruptly
snuffed out.
Another important change in ward politics today is that a
majority of committeemen also are elected officials {19 of
whom are incumbent aldermen).

This is contrary to an

earlier period when committeemen stayed "in the background,
in control of the ward organization, its patronage, and its
perquisites but out of the public eye.

There they are not

subject to criticism by the mass media and reform groups
whose normal targets are public officeholders" {Rakove
1975,109).
Thus, as this section has shown, there have been large
changes in Chicago politics during the past forty years.
The Chicago political machine controlled election outcomes
during most of the period between 1931 and 1975.

The degree

of electoral control, however, began to decrease in small
amounts during the middle 1970s and accelerated during the
1980s with Washington's mayoral election victories and
minority group success in ward redistricting, city council
and ward committeeman elections.

Today, the party is

loosely organized at the county level.

Ward committeemen

are not beholden to party leaders and incumbent aldermen are
more independent from their ward's committeeman than ever
before {as mentioned, however, in many cases the positions
are held by the same person).

Individualized power is now

exercised in city council elections and ward politics,
rather than collective power being exercised through central
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party organs.

These changes are expected to affect Chicago

city council elections because now it might be easier for
relatively independent, unknown candidates to compete in
open seat races, to challenge incumbents, and to raise
campaign funds, than it was when the political machine was
organized and centrally directed.
Now that I have discussed the nature of Chicago
politics and some of the broader factors in the political
environment that have fundamentally altered the course of
politics in this city, I move to a general discussion of the
research methods used in the study and the models that I
will test in subsequent chapters.

The models presented

below reflect both what is known about local elections,
generally, and what is known to affect local election
dynamics in Chicago, specifically.

Data and Methods

This study examines candidates who ran in regularly
scheduled Chicago city council elections held between 1979
to 1995 and who received five percent or more of the vote. 9
The year 1979 was chosen as the starting point because that
was the first election for which reliable campaign

9

Because this study is concerned with competitive
candidates, I have limited it to only those candidates
receiving five percent or more of the vote in their
elections.

56

disclosure data were available. 1 ° Five elections {1979,
1983, 1987, 1991, 1995) are analyzed.

Below I develop

models to explain election outcomes, incumbency advantage
and candidate emergence, and the role of money in city
council elections.

Pre4ictinq Al4erm.anic Blection outcomes
The first area of inquiry that I address is election
outcomes.

The dependent variable is measured by taking the

percentage (share) of the vote won by each candidate.

Using

share of the vote won by each is a more suitable method for
measuring election outcomes than using total number of votes
received because it accounts for differences in voter
turnout across wards.

The literature reviewed in Chapter

One points to a number of independent variables that are
useful in predicting election outcomes.

These variables can

be broken down into four general categories: political,

financial, endorsements, and environmental.

Political Variables.

In general, we know that incumbents

typically win reelection.

This is due to their greater name

10

The law that governs campaign finance disclosure in
Illinois (P.A. 78-1183) went into effect on September 3,
1974 {State of Illinois Board of Elections, 1993:1). Data
from the 1975 elections are not included because many of the
candidates either failed to report, were not required to
report because they did not meet the minimum threshold for

reporting purposes, or their records were mishandled by the
State of Illinois Board of Elections, the unit of state
government responsible for implementing the act.
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recognition among voters, experience in office, ability to
claim credit for ward improvements, and greater access to
media.

In my analysis of election outcomes, I hypothesize

that incumbency will be the strongest predictor of electoral
outcomes.

The effect of incumbency was measured by

including a dummy variable coded 1 for incumbents and O for
nonincumbents.
Like incumbents, politically-experienced nonincumbent
candidates are expected to have greater name identification
with voters and thus are likely to win more votes than
political amateurs.

These highly qualified candidates

typically have volunteers or elite connections they can call
to work in their campaigns (i.e., to have an organization
they can mobilize) and to have greater experience raising
money for political purposes.

Lieske {1989), in his study

of Cincinnati city council elections, used a variety of
indicators of political quality such as candidates' achieved
status (e.g., professional occupation, education) and
experience in previous campaigns to measure candidate
quality (all of his measures were dummy variables).
In this study, nonincumbent candidates who had
experience in elective office (state legislator, Democratic
Committeeman) or some other high-level government position
(e.g., an appointed official in a public bureaucracy) were
coded 2.

Nonincumbents with other types of political

experience such as being a political aide, precinct captain,
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ward secretary, former alderman, former Democratic
committeeman, or a former candidate were coded 1.
Especially in Chicago, candidates with connections to ward
organizations or to ward voters might have an advantage over
candidates lacking such connections and experience.

Those

who lacked any political experience at the time of their
election were coded

o.

I expect a positive and significant

correlation between political experience and candidates'
vote share.

Financial Variables.
financial.

A second category of variables is

As the literature has shown, candidates who are

able to spend large sums of money in their campaigns are
able to make themselves and their qualifications for office
more widely known.

Being more widely known improves

candidates' ability to garner votes.

Among other things,

candidates use money to advertise themselves in the
newspapers, on radio and television, through direct mail,
and via billboard ads.

Advertising enables candidates to

overcome the disadvantages of obscurity (which is the
situation most nonincumbents find themselves in at the start
of a campaign).

Thus I included in the model a variable for

candidates' spending.

Candidates' spending for

nonincumbents was measured as the total of all spending from
the date they created their campaign committees through June
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30 of the election year. 11 For incumbents (and those who had
run in previous elections), campaign spending is the total
of all expenditures made from July 1 in the year of their
previous election to June 30 of their current election. 12
All spending was measured in 1995 dollars and is expected to
be positively correlated with candidates• vote share.

In

addition to candidate expenditures, total opposition
expenditures also was included to measure how effectively
candidates' opponents were able to campaign and advertise.
This spending is expected to be negatively correlated with
candidates• vote share.

Endorsements.

A third category of independent variables is

endorsements.

News media endorsements are likely to be

strongly related to election outcomes because in many cases
these might be the only publicity given to candidates'
campaigns.

Media endorsements often serve as convenient

cues for voters when evaluating candidates in nonpartisan
elections, when voters cannot rely on party cues.

The two

major daily newspapers in Chicago are the Chicago Tribune
and Chicago Sun-Times.

Candidates were coded O if they

received neither of these endorsements, 1 if they were
11

Even though the elections are over in February, I
assume that spending after the election through June 30 is
to cover costs associated with the aldermanic election and
is not being used to campaign for some other office.
12

All spending for other candidates and other elections
has been factored out.
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endorsed by one newspaper, and 2 if they received both
newspapers' endorsements.

Because endorsements from the two

major papers often overlap, this scale permits one to
measure the effects of media endorsements without
experiencing multicollinearity that would likely result if
the Tribune and Sun-Times endorsements were treated
separately.
A second type of endorsement is that which is conferred
on candidates from local political parties or political
organizations.

Lieske (1989) showed that candidates who

received either the Republican, Democrat, or Charter party
endorsements were stronger candidates than those candidates
who did not receive such support.

As discussed above, a

critical feature of Chicago politics is the ward political
organization.

Ward organizations endorse candidates in

local elections and then work to get voters to the polls, to
advertise their slated candidates, and, in general, to
thwart the opposition.

To measure the political value of

ward endorsements, a dummy variable was included with
candidates who received the organization endorsement coded
1, all other candidates

o.

Given Chicago's strong

Democratic party organization history, I expect a strong,
positive correlation between this variable and candidates'
vote share.

Environmental Variables.

A fourth category of environmental

r
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variables are important for understanding election outcomes
in both aldermanic and runoff elections.

Several aspects of

the political context that candidates find themselves in
might affect election outcomes.

one of these is the number

of opponents candidates have in their elections.

Because

all candidates for a seat on the city council compete
against each other at the same time (similar to a party
primary election), a candidate's vote share is likely to be
inversely related to the total number of opponents one
faces.

In order to determine the independent effect of this

possibility, I included a variable for total number of
opponents one has in an election.

Number of opponents is a

continuous variable ranging from one to seven.
Ward demographic factors also should influence
candidates' share of the vote.

As the literature has

suggested, voters often turn to other factors such as a
candidate's race or ethnicity in making their choices when
other voting cues such as party affiliation are absent
(Herring and Forbes 1994; Pomper 1966; Vanderleeuw 1990).
In order to control for this, I have coded candidates on the
basis of whether or not they were members of the minority
population in their ward at the time of the election.
Candidates who were in the minority were coded 1 and those
who were part of the majority population group were coded

o.

Because of the propensity of voters in nonpartisan elections
to use race or ethnicity as a voting cue, I expect minority
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candidates to be disadvantaged in these elections vis-a-vis
those candidates who are members of the majority population
group.

Pre4ictinq Runoff Election outcomes

Elections to the Chicago city council require a runoff
in cases where no candidate receives more than 50 percent of
the vote in the first election.

This system ensures that

the eventual winner has the support of a majority of voters
in the ward.

Runoff elections are different than regular

aldermanic elections because they pit the strongest two
candidates from the first election against one another.
They also are different than regular aldermanic elections
because voters pay greater attention to the runoff and
because candidates and campaigns are intensely focused on
winning the support from voters who supported other
candidates in the first election.

A third way in which

runoffs are different than regular aldermanic elections is
the length of time candidates have to campaign.

Runoffs

occur approximately six weeks after the first election, thus
candidates have a relatively short period of time to shop
for votes.

For these reasons, I expect the election

dynamics in these contests to be substantially different
than the dynamics of regular aldermanic elections.

Two

variables in particular, money and organization support,
should assume greater importance in these contests than they
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do in the earlier elections.

Below I develop a model to

predict the outcomes of these elections.
The outcomes of runoff elections are analyzed using
percentage of the vote won by each candidate as the
dependent variable.

The rationale for using share of the

vote won is the same one discussed above.

In general, it

shows how well each candidate performed in the election.
Analyses of the runoff election outcomes will test all
of the predictor variables described thus far (with the
exception of number of opponents and minority status of the
candidates, 13 plus two other variables that have been
identified in the literature as being important in
predicting outcomes of these elections.

In addition,

candidate spending was calculated differently in this model
than it was in the model of aldermanic election outcomes.
In this model, runoff election spending is the total
election spending through June 30 of the election year minus
all spending up to the date of the aldermanic election.

I

assume that pre-aldermanic-election spending produces a
higher share of votes only in the first election and not in
the runoff election.

Candidates with a large amount of

resources left over to spend in the runoff campaign can
flood their wards with advertising during this relatively

13

In these elections, number of opponents is constant
(each candidate has only one opponent). Ward demographics
are likely to be unimportant here as the runoff candidates
typically represent the ward's majority population group.
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short, but intense, campaign period much more effectively
than candidates with few resources.
In the preceding chapter it was noted that three
"myths" pervade the study of runoff elections.

One suggests

that incumbents lose when forced into runoffs because they
are perceived as weak, a perception which causes voters to
gravitate toward the nonincumbent.

A second suggests that

minority candidates lose in mixed-race runoffs because white
voters rally behind white candidates.

A third suggests that

the primary election leader loses in the runoff because
voters move to support the underdog. 14
Because Chicago's wards are racially and ethnically
concentrated, the second myth (minority loss) cannot be
tested adequately because most of these contests involve
candidates of the same race or ethnicity.
myths, however, can be tested.

The other two

In order to accomplish this,

a dummy variable was included in the model for the leader in
the first election and for the incumbent.

Both of these

variables are expected to be negatively correlated with
candidates' share of the vote.
In summary, election outcomes are expected to be
affected by factors that are specific to each candidate,
such as political experience or qualifications for off ice,
campaign spending, the ability to obtain critical media and
14

See Bullock and Johnson (1985); Fleischmann and Stein
(1987); Bullock and Gaddie (1994); and Stewart, Sheffield
and Ellis (1995).
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party endorsements, and a variety of environmental factors
beyond the immediate control of individual candidates {see
Table 1).

In addition to examining aldermanic elections,

this portion of the study also focuses on runoff elections.
By testing multivariate models of runoff election outcomes,
one can move beyond the descriptive analyses that dominate
the literature in this area.

Th• Incumbency Advantaqe and candidate Emerqence

An ever-present concern in electoral politics is the
domination of election outcomes by incumbents.

This is

problematic because of its relationship to democratic theory
and the notion that elections in a democratic system should
be competitive.

In theory, all candidates should start from

a level playing field and attempt to capture as many votes
as they can based on their ideas for how to improve either
the political process, policy outcomes, or both.

This

ensures that voters have equal information about candidates
and can make their decisions about who to vote for on the
basis of rational criteria.

Of course, election dynamics

rarely reflect this ideal.

The major factor that affects

the ideally competitive election is incumbency.

This

portion of the analysis considers in greater detail the
factors that affect incumbents' share of the vote.
The advantage of separating incumbents from
nonincumbents is that it enables one to explore the effects
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TABLB 1

Model of Blection outcomes, Chicago city Council Elections,
1979-1995
MODBL OP CANDIDATES' VOTE SHARB

I. Dependent Variable: candidates' share of the vote {both
aldermanic and runoff elections)
II. Independent Variables:
A. Political
1. incumbency {+)
2. Democratic Committeeman {+)
3. former Democratic Committeeman {+)
4. Republican Committeeman {+)
5. former Alderman {+)
6. current or former state legislator {+)
7. former candidate {+)
8. political aide {+)
9. political volunteer {+)
10. current or former ward secretary {+)
11. appointed official {+)
12. incumbent in the runoff {-)
13. aldermanic election leader {-)
B. Financial
1. candidate spending {+)
2. opposition spending {-)

c.

Endorsements
1. Chicago Tribune {+)
2. Chicago Sun-Times {+)
3. regular Democratic Organization {+)

D. Environmental
1. number of opponents {-)
2. candidate's minority status {-)

Note: The predicted direction of the relationship is in
parentheses.
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of variables that would be irrelevant in an analysis of
nonincumbents only.

Here, the dependent variable is

incumbents' share of the vote.

A second dependent variable,

incumbents' electoral margin (which can be either positive
or negative depending on if the incumbent wins or loses),
also is used to measure the competitiveness of elections
involving incumbents (see Abramowitz 1991).

To measure this

variable, the difference between an incumbent's vote share
and that of their closest competitor was calculated.

In

both models, the same independent variables will be
employed.

They are discussed below.

The literature suggests several independent variables
that are useful in understanding these specific election
outcomes.

For the sake of organization, the independent

variables can be divided into four categories: incumbentrelated, financial, endorsements, and environmental.

Incumbent-Related Variables.

Incumbent-related variables

include seniority, committee assignments, scandal, quality
of the opposition, and method of election.

Contrary to what

one might think, the literature on congressional elections
has consistently shown that incumbents with longer tenures
in off ice are at an electoral disadvantage (and thus at
greater risk of losing) compared to those who are just
beginning their careers or who are in the middle of their
careers (Abramowitz 1988, 1991).

Some incumbents are
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probably more adept at knowing when to retire, rather than
waiting to be strongly challenged or even defeated at the
polls.

In applying this theoretical principle to city

council elections, I hypothesize that as incumbents'
seniority increases, their share of the vote and electoral
margin will decrease.
A second incumbent-related variable measures the effect
of incumbents' institutional positions on their electoral
performance.

The congressional literature points to the

value of committee assignments for reelection purposes
(Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974b).

To test the effect of these

institutional factors on city council election outcomes, all
incumbents were coded according to whether or not they were
committee chairman at the time of the election.

One might

expect that being a committee chairman, especially

on high

profile committees such as Finance, Budget or Zoning, to be
a strong predictor of incumbent's share of the vote and
election margin.

Theoretically, one might expect that

committee chairmen are better able to steer local tax
dollars and development projects into their wards and to
claim credit for doing so, than rank and file committee
members.

They also might be able to be more effective

ombudsman for business interests in their wards.

I expect

committee chairmen to reap larger electoral benefits than
rank and file committee members.
A third incumbent-related predictor of these election
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outcomes is the question of whether or not the incumbent
candidate has been tainted by scandal.

As Abramowitz (1988,

1991) has shown, scandal was a significant predictor of the
vote in both House and Senate elections involving
incumbents.

Admittedly, the measurement of this variable is

subjective.

If, for example, incumbents were implicated in

a bribery scandal, then they were coded as having been
tainted by scandal whether they were eventually convicted of
illegal activity or not.

Petty campaign squabbling or

innuendo about corruption are not sufficient enough to
classify an incumbent as having been tainted by scandal.
This also is the type of factor that does not affect many
incumbents overall and when it is a factor, many incumbents
are affected at the same time.

For example, "Operation

Incubator," a 1980s federal investigation into bribery in
Chicago politics, resulted in numerous indictments of city
aldermen at about the same point in time.

Nonetheless, its

effect on incumbents' electoral success is expected to be
strong.

Using dummy variables coded 1 for incumbents

involved in scandal, O otherwise, I hypothesize that this

variable will be negatively correlated with incumbents'
share of the vote and electoral margin.
A fourth incumbent-related variable refers to the
quality of an incumbent's opposition.

As much of the

literature on election outcomes has shown, incumbents who
face high-quality challengers are more likely to experience
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tough reelection contests (Bond, Covington and Fleisher
1985; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978).

Challenger

quality was measured by including a variable for the most
experienced challengers in races against incumbents.

The

measurement of this variable is the same as that described
above for nonincumbent candidates generally.

Challengers

were coded O if they had no political experience at all.

If

they had experiences such as being political aides, precinct
captains, or political volunteers (among other variables),
they were coded 1.

If the most experienced challengers had

experience in elective positions or were high ranking
governmental officials, they were coded 2.

Experienced

challengers are expected to be more politically-effective
than those who have lower levels of experience, thus

I

expect a negative correlation between incumbents' vote share
and margin of victory in the face of stronger opposition.
A fifth incumbent-related variable is incumbents'
method of selection to the aldermanic post.
are initially elected to office.

Most incumbents

Others, however, are

appointed by the mayor to fill a vacancy on the council and
then run in the next regularly scheduled election for a full
term of office.

As mentioned above, there have been

numerous appointments to the city council during the time
frame under study, especially during the 1990s.

Thus many

incumbents are running as appointed candidates who have been
in off ice only a short period of time and should not be
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expected to enjoy the full advantages of incumbency in their
first aldermanic election.

To determine if this holds true,

appointed incumbents were coded 1, all others

o.

I expect a

negative correlation between appointed incumbents and their
share of the vote and electoral margin.

Financial Variables.

The financial variables include both

incumbents' spending and challengers' spending.

For

incumbents, this variable was measured the same way it was
described above.

All spending was adjusted to 1995 dollars

to account for inflation.

Challengers' spending in this

model was aggregated to indicate the total amount of
spending by all challengers.

While challengers spend money

to promote themselves, the practical effect is to decrease
an incumbent•s share of the vote and electoral margin since
most are targeting their actions toward def eating the
incumbent rather than other challengers.

Thus I expect that

as aggregate challenger spending increases, incumbents•
share of the vote and electoral margin will decrease.
Conversely, incumbent spending should be positively
correlated with incumbents• share of the vote and margin of
victory. 15
15

The effect of incumbents' spending on share of the
vote is an interesting theoretical question due to the
debate on this issue in the congressional literature (Green
and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978). Because this has not been

examined in the local politics literature, I hypothesize
that their spending will be positively correlated with their
share of the vote. The results of the analysis will
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Endorsements.

The endorsement variables are expected to

work the same way as described above.

Incumbents were coded

on the basis of how many news media endorsements they
received from Chicago's daily newspapers (0,1,2).
Incumbents also were coded 1 if they received their ward
organization's official endorsement.

The effect of both of

these variables is expected to be significant and positive.

Environmental Variables.

A final category of variables

relates to the environment of elections involving incumbent
candidates.

Similar to the general model of election

outcomes the number of challengers (amount of opposition) is
included as a control variable.
variable is redistricting.

One new environmental

Redistricting is expected to

affect only incumbents because they have a stake in old ward
boundaries.

By contrast, open seat candidates and

challengers have no stake in old ward boundaries and thus
are unaffected by any changes generated from redistricting.
Conceivably, the effect of redistricting on incumbents'
share of the vote could be neutral, depending on the number
of incumbents whose districts were made safer, rather than
less secure.

Practically, however, I expect that the

effects of a safer seat will not balance out the negative
effects wrought by an unfavorable redistricting.

Thus

determine the exact effect of incumbent spending in local
elections, and whether or not it operates the same way that
it does in House elections.
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incumbents whose districts were redrawn as a result of the
1980 or 1990 censuses, are expected to receive fewer votes
than those whose districts were not redrawn.
In summary, the ability of incumbents to win votes is
expected to be a function of certain variables specific to
them

such as institutional positions (e.g., committee

chairmanships), seniority, scandal, running as appointees,
and spending.

It also is expected to be vary in relation to

challenger quality and spending, media and party
endorsements, and environmental factors that affect
incumbents and challengers alike (see Table 2).
These models, however, do not explain candidate
behavior.

In the following section I propose models to

explain how the political environment affects decisions by
candidates to enter particular races.

I discuss how the

political environment affects nonincumbents generally,
before presenting a model to explain the emergence of
challengers.

The unit of analysis is the ward.

In both

cases, I focus on the number of candidates who choose to run
at any given time, as well as the political experience of
those candidates.

Predictinq Nonincumbent candidate Emerqence and
Candidate Quality

Chapter One discussed how candidates in legislative
elections make decisions to run for off ice on the basis of
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TABLE 2
Th• Incumbency Advantage and Challenger Behavior Models,
Chicago City Council Elections, 1979-1995
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE MODEL
I. Dependent Variables:
1. incumbents' share of the vote
2.
incumbents' electoral margin
II. Independent Variables:
A. Incumbent-Related
1. seniority (-)
2. committee chairman (+)
3. challenger quality (-)
4. method of selection (not appointed/appointed)
5. scandal (-)
B. Financial
1. incumbent spending (+)
2. aggregate challenger spending (-)

c.

Endorsements
1. Chicago Tribune (+)
2. Chicago Sun-Times (+)
3. regular Democratic organization (+)

D. Environmental
1. number of challengers (-)
2. redistricting (-)
CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR MODEL
I. Dependent Variables
1. challenger quality
2. number of challengers
II. Independent Variables: environment variables only.
1. redistricting (-)
2. machine ward (-)
3. open seat/non-open seat (-)
4. percent black in the ward (+)
5. percent Hispanic in the ward (+)

(-)
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TABLB 2 (continued)
Th• Incuml>ency Advantage and Challenger Behavior Models,
Chicago city council Elections, 1979-1995
CBALLBNGBR BBRAVIOR MODBL
I. Dependent Variables
1. number of challengers
2. challenger quality
II. Independent Variables
A. Incumbent-Related
1. previous election margin (+)
2. seniority (+)
3. scandal (+)
4. method of selection (not appointed/appointed)
5. cash-on-hand (-)
6. committee chairman (-)
B. Environmental
1. redistricting (+)
2. percent black in the ward (+)
3. percent Hispanic in the ward (+)
4. machine ward (-)

Note: The predicted direction of the relationship is in
parentheses.

(+)
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objective criteria.

In a general sense, these criteria

indicate to candidates their odds of winning.

For example,

more candidates may choose to run in open seat elections
thinking that their chances of victory are greater because
they do not have to face incumbents.

Or, more candidates

may choose to run against incumbents who are perceived as
politically vulnerable.

In other words, the more

politically-savvy candidates behave "strategically."
Does this idea, developed in the congressional
elections literature, apply in local elections?
this question,

To answer

I examine the behavior of all nonincumbents.

Two dependent variables are employed: total nonincumbents in
each race and political experience of the most experienced
nonincumbent in each race.

If more candidates run in open

seat races than against incumbents, then there would be
evidence to suggest that these candidates made their
decisions to run for off ice on the basis of some objective
criterion (e.g., absence of an incumbent on the ballot).

In

addition, knowing when experienced candidates decide to run
for aldermen is important because of all nonincumbents, ones
with experience are expected to be the most successful.
Moreover, it is important to know if experienced candidates
are more strategic in their behavior than candidates without
experience.

I first analyze all nonincumbents together,

before examining challengers specifically.
In looking at nonincumbents generally, I expect to find
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that more and better candidates run in wards that are
recently redistricted than in wards that are not.

I expect

this to be the case because the political environment in
redistricted wards is typically less stable, a
characteristic that should encourage candidates to run.
Another feature of wards, whether they can be characterized
as machine or independent, might affect the behavior of
nonincumbents.

Due to the ability of machine organizations

to control which candidates run for off ice in particular
elections, I expect to find fewer candidates running in
these wards.

Furthermore, of the candidates who do run, I

expect them to have less political experience than
candidates who run in non-machine (independent) wards.
Likewise, whether a seat is open or not should affect
both the number and quality of nonincumbent candidates who
decide to run for off ice.

Knowing how difficult it is to

defeat incumbents, candidates will likely avoid running in
these races.

In addition to these factors, I also control

for the demographic composition of wards {percent black and
percent Hispanic in each ward).

It might be the case that

more candidates run in majority minority wards than in
majority white wards.

Historically, the opportunities for

minorities to exercise political power in Chicago have been
limited.

Because the city's population has become more

black and Hispanic over time, I expect this to have some
effect on candidate emergence.

With the exception of the
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demographic characteristics, all of these predictors are
dummy variables.
In addition to examining the political factors that
might affect candidate emergence generally, I also examine
factors that might affect the behavior of political
challengers.

Chapter One demonstrated that high quality

candidates emerge to challenge incumbents when political
conditions show that incumbents are vulnerable (Bond,
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).
On the local level, national political circumstances will
have no effect (especially in a city dominated by one party)
on the quality of challengers or the number who emerge to
face incumbents.

Thus we turn to purely local factors

concerning incumbents themselves.
The dependent variables in this analysis are number of
challengers incumbents face in their reelection contests and
political experience of the most experienced incumbent
challenger in each race, measured according to the scale
identified above.

Both of these variables are continuous.

I expect that as an incumbent's vulnerability increases,
both the number and quality of challengers will increase.
The premise of this analysis is that strategic challengers
emerge to face weak incumbents.
How might one measure incumbent vulnerability?
Incumbent's previous election margin might be the first
signal to potential candidates that incumbents are
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vulnerable to strong challenges.

Thus as incumbents• margin

of victory in their previous election increases, both the
quality and number of challengers will decrease.

Similarly,

incumbent seniority might precipitate the emergence of a
highly qualified and large challenger pool.

Challengers

often charge that long-time incumbents are out of step with
district opinion or that they lack the energy to effectively
represent district voters.

Therefore, I hypothesize that as

an incumbent•s seniority increases, more and better

qualified candidates will emerge to challenge them.
Incumbents tainted by scandal and incumbents who were
originally appointed to office and who are in their first
election for the seat, also should attract a larger number
of well-qualified challengers than incumbents who are
scandal-free or who have already won the off ice in an
election.
A final incumbent variable is their cash-on-hand at the
start of the campaign.

Assuming that challengers make

decisions to run sometime during the summer or fall of the
year before the election, one might expect that the amount
of money an incumbent has on hand in July (the summer
finance disclosure report deadline is June JO) prior to the
election might have a deterrent effect on the quality and
number of challengers who emerge to face incumbents.

In

other words, incumbents with large campaign war chests are
better able to deter strong challengers than incumbents with
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fewer resources.

In order to test this proposition, I

included in the analysis the amount of money incumbents had
in their campaign accounts on July 1 in the year before the
aldermanic election.

I expect that as incumbents• cash-on-

hand at the start of the campaign increases, the quality and
number of challengers will decrease.
Redistricting also is expected to play a part in the
decisions by potential candidates to challenge incumbents.
Incumbents who are running for the first time under new ward
boundaries are more likely to face high quality challengers,
as well as a greater number of challengers, than incumbents
whose ward boundaries are not redrawn.

Redistricting often

gives a ward new voters that incumbents have not
incorporated into their base of support.

These new voters

may provide the support that strong challengers can exploit
to their advantage, forcing incumbents into runoffs or even
winning the election outright.

Thus I included a dummy

variable for redistricting to test the hypothesis that
redistricted incumbents are more vulnerable to strong
challengers than those whose ward boundaries have not
changed.

For reasons identical to those presented above, I

also control for ward demographic factors (percent black and
percent Hispanic in each ward) at the time of the election.
Having developed models to predict election outcomes,
and to explain the incumbent advantage and nonincumbent
candidate emergence (see Table 2), I now move to the third
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part of this analysis of Chicago city council elections.
Below I specify a model to understand competition for
campaign contributions in city council elections, a factor
that is critically important to how well candidates are able
to advertise themselves and put their qualifications for
office before the voters.

Examininq the Role of Money in City council Elections

With the exception of a Chicago Urban League study of
campaign finance in the 1991 Chicago city council elections
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995), there have been no
in-depth studies conducted on this topic in the urban
politics literature.

The analysis in Chapter Five addresses

this question in two ways.

First, I examine how candidates'

fundraising changes throughout the election cycle.

Does

fundraising become more intense immediately before the
election, or are candidates concerned with other campaign
activities (such as meeting voters or community groups) at
that time?

Second, I examine the variables that affect

candidates' ability to raise money for their campaigns.
Because finance data are somewhat more complete in years
later in the time frame, I analyze fundraising for 1987,
1991, and 1995 only.

Campaigns and Fundraising.

The first way that I examine

fundraising is by looking at the "flow" of campaign
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contributions within election campaigns.

A recent study of

House elections indicated, not surprisingly, that incumbents
held a fundraising advantage over nonincumbents in every
campaign reporting period between 1985 and the 1986 House
elections (Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994).

Because campaign

disclosure reports are required of city council candidates
at different times before the election, it is possible to
understand the specific points during campaigns that
candidates are most heavily involved in fundraising. 16 This
primarily descriptive examination of fundraising focuses on
differences between incumbents, challengers, and candidates
running in open seat elections, as well as candidates
required to compete in runoff elections.

Predicting Candidates' Fundraising.

This chapter also tests

a model of candidates' fundraising using candidates' total
contributions as the dependent variable.
examined at two points in time.

Fundraising is

The first time point is

December 31 in the year prior to the election.
time point is June 30 of the election year.

The second

By examining

fundraising at two points in time instead of one, it is
possible to gain a better understanding of how campaign
fundraising is affected by different variables during the

16

Because candidates are only required to report
spending on an annual basis (in early years) and a semiannual basis (in later years) it is not possible to analyze
the "flow" of spending in a similar fashion during 1987.
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election cycle.

In addition, by including all candidates

together I can compare incumbents to nonincumbents.

After

analyzing all candidates together I look specifically at
factors that might influence challengers' ability to raise
money for their campaigns.

I expect that candidates' total

contributions are largely a function of the various
independent variables already discussed, as well as some new
variables that will be outlined below.
When examining fundraising at the first time point, I
use incumbency, candidate's race or ethnicity, number of
opponents, and fundraising effort, as predictor variables.
If incumbents raise significantly greater amounts of money
than nonincumbents, this should be reflected in this
variable.

I hypothesize that incumbents will be able to

raise more money than nonincumbents for two reasons.

First,

they have probably developed more extensive contacts during
their tenure in off ice that allow them to raise more money
than nonincumbents, who are less likely to have developed an
extensive network of contributors.

Second, contributors are

expected to more readily back incumbents because of the
greater likelihood that incumbents will win reelection.
Candidate's ability to raise money also should be
related to their race or ethnicity.

Assuming that

candidates for local off ice raise most of their funds within
their own wards (see Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995),
it is likely to be the case that candidates running in more
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affluent wards will raise more money than candidates running
in less affluent wards.

Because black and Hispanic

candidates tend to run in wards that are less affluent than
white wards, I expect to find a negative relationship
between candidates• race and fundraising.
Number of opponents also should influence fundraising.
Since it is likely to be the case that candidates are
seeking funds from within their own wards, a candidate's
ability to raise money might be related to the number of
other candidates who are seeking funds from the same
sources.

Thus, I expect that number of opponents should

have a negative effect on candidates• fundraising.
Candidates' fundraising also should be a function of
the effort or time they devoted to this campaign activity.
In order to account for fundraising effort, I include a
variable that measures number of months candidates were
involved in fundraising prior to the election, using
information gathered from candidates' campaign disclosure
reports.

I expect candidates• fundraising to be higher

where candidates spend more time working on fundraising.
In addition to incumbency, candidate's race or
ethnicity, number of opponents, and effort, opposition
spending also should affect candidates' fundraising.
Spending, especially on advertising, is one of the most
visible signs to candidates about how well their opponents
are able to reach voters and to increase their own name
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identification.

As

this number increases, I expect

candidates to counter by raising funds more aggressively.
Finally, I test to see if fundraising that is done
early in campaigns relates to fundraising that occurs later.
In other words, is successful fundraising a cumulative
process, affected by the ability of candidates to raise
money early?

Krasno, Green and Cowden (1994) have found

that the ability of House challengers to raise money was
significantly related to the amount of money that they could
generate early in their campaigns, suggesting that
contributors were willing to give to candidates who could
"prove" their fundraising ability.

The same dynamic might

be at work here, as candidates build on fundraising momentum
generated early in the election cycle.

Thus I expect

fundraising totals (less the amount from the first reporting
period) of candidates to be positively related to the total
amount of money they are able to raise early in the
campaign.

Challengers' Fundraising.

After I examine the correlates of

fundraising for all candidates, I examine factors that
affect challengers' ability to raise money for their
campaigns.

In

doing so, I test all the variables that have

been identified above, as well as a measure of challenger
quality.

The ability of challengers to raise campaign funds

is expected to vary according to their political experience.
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The more politically experienced they are (based on the
political experience indicator I have used throughout this
chapter), the more campaign funds they are likely to
receive.

Caapaiqn Pundraisinq: A swnmary

Chapter five focuses on the dynamics of campaign
fundraising as it occura in the election cycle.

This is an

important topic because when candidates are able to generate
contributions often has a significant effect on election
outcomes.

If incumbents are the only candidates who can

raise large sums of money in the month before the election,
then this has profound implications for the competitiveness
of these elections.

If only politically-experienced

nonincumbents can raise large amounts of money immediately
before the election, then what are the implications for
citizen-politicians who lack real "political" experience,
but who nonetheless want to serve their wards as alderman?
In order to discuss these larger questions, one needs basic
information on campaign fundraising.

This analysis seeks to

provide that information.
In Chapter Five I also test a model to predict
candidates' total contributions (see Table 3).

The ability

of candidates to raise money for their campaigns is expected
to be related to a variety of factors, such as incumbency,
fundraising effort, political experience, opposition
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TABLB 3
Model of candidates• Total Contributions, Chicaqo city
council Elections, 1979-1995
MODBL POR ALL CANDIDATES
I. Dependent Variable:
1. candidates' total contributions
2. candidates' total contributions (minus
contributions from the first reporting period).
II. Independent Variables
A. Candidate-Related
1. incumbency (+)
2. fundraising effort (+)
3. candidate's race: black or Hispanic (-)
B. Financial
1. opposition spending (+)
2. early campaign contributions (+)
c. Environmental
1. number of opponents (-)
CHALLENGERS' PUNDRAISING MODEL
I. Dependent Variable
1. challengers' total contributions
2. challengers' total contributions (less first
reporting period receipts)
II. Independent Variables
A. candidate Variables
1. candidate quality (+)
2. fundraising effort (+)
3. candidate's race or ethnicity:black or Hispanic(-)
B. Financial
1. opposition spending (+)
2. early campaign contributions (+)
c. Environmental
1. number of opponents (-)

Note: The predicted direction of the relationship is in
parentheses.
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spending, number of opponents, and race or ethnicity.

I

also expect fundraising to be related to the ability of
candidates to generate funds early in their campaigns.

The

findings from this portion of the analysis will extend the
existing literature on local elections into an area of
inquiry that has been covered extensively by those studying
other legislative bodies such as the U.S. Congress.

Methods and Data Sources

This study uses both descriptive and inferential
statistical methods to reach conclusions about the politics
of Chicago city council elections.

Ordinary least squares

regression analysis is used to explain variation in the
study's dependent variables (see Tables 1, 2, 3).

This

statistical method allows one to test the effects particular
independent variables have on the dependent variable holding
constant all other independent variables in the model.
Ordinary least squares is useful in cases where the
dependent variable is continuous or scaled in ratio form
(i.e., when zero is a meaningful value).

Predicting

candidates' share of the vote is an example of a variable
that is continuous.

In any election, candidates can receive

between zero and 100 percent of the vote.

The regression

coefficients that are produced by ordinary least squares
represent the effect on the dependent variable of a one unit
change in the independent variable, holding constant other
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independent variables.
The data for this study can be broken down into five
general categories: candidates• background data, official
election returns, campaign finance, incumbent-related
variables, and ward demographics.

In general, candidates'

background data come from newspaper clippings files of
aldermanic elections held at the Municipal Reference Desk in
Chicago's Harold Washington Library.

These files are an

invaluable source of data on aldermanic elections because
they include information from Chicago's major daily
newspapers, as well as information from the hundreds of
community and neighborhood papers that exist in the city.
Information on candidates' background characteristics such
as occupational status, political experience, ward
organization connections, newspaper endorsements, and race
were gleaned from these sources.

The 1979 and 1983 election

return data also were gathered from the Municipal Reference
Desk's collection of official returns.

Election return data

for 1987, 1991 and 1995 were gathered from official returns
located at the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.
Campaign finance data were collected from the State of
Illinois Board of Elections, which houses the campaign
disclosure reports filed by all candidates running for
alderman whose expenditures or revenues exceeded $1,000 at
any point during their campaigns (State of Illinois Board of
Elections 1993,1).

The first step in collecting these data
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was to complete separate request forms for each candidate's
political campaign committee(s).

The completed forms were

then mailed to the State Board of Elections off ices in
Springfield, Illinois, where a member of the staff copied
the campaign disclosure reports.

In the end, more than

1,000 (4x6) microfiche cards were copied and delivered.
These cards contain both revenue and expenditure data on all
aldermanic candidates who entered elections between 1979 and
1995 and who were required by law to file reports.

In order

to ensure a complete set of records, an inventory was taken
of the campaign disclosure reports that I requested versus
the ones that I received.

Ultimately, there were only a few

disclosure reports that did not make it into the first box
of reports that were mailed to me in late September, 1995.
Finally, incumbent-related variables such as committee
assignments were collected from the Harold Washington
Library's collection of the official proceedings of the city
council.

Ward demographic data were collected from city

government reports based on official census data (City of
Chicago 1973, 1983, 1991, 1993; Election Data Services
1995).
The research design that I have presented in this
chapter is suitable for answering the following four
questions.

First, which factors determine election outcomes

in both aldermanic elections and runoff elections?
which factors undergird the incumbency advantage?

Second,
Third,
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which factors explain decisions by candidates to run for the
Chicago city council?

And, fourth, which factors predict

candidates' ability to raise campaign funds?

The following

chapter presents the analysis of election outcomes, in both
regular aldermanic elections and runoff contests.

CHAPTER I I I
DYlfAllICS AND COKPETITIOH IH CHICAGO CITY COUHCIL ELECTIOHS

This chapter is concerned with determining which
factors affect outcomes in city council elections.

It

presents descriptive, as well as inferential, evidence from
Chicago city council elections in an attempt to address this
issue.

The results of the analysis will broaden our

understanding of city council election dynamics and
competition for office.
The chapter is divided into several distinct sections.
The first section discusses the results of multiple
regression analyses performed on each election year in the
time frame and attempts to discern which factors (e.g.,
incumbency, spending, media endorsements) are most important
in predicting candidates' share of the vote.

The second

section presents results from regression analyses undertaken
on nonincumbent candidates, an important subset of all
candidates, which includes candidates who run in open seat
contests as well as those who challenge incumbents.

The

third section examines variation in city council election
dynamics vary between wards.

For example, do the same

factors predict election outcomes in majority black and
majority white wards?

Because there are no a priori reasons
92
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for thinking that the dynamics might be different, this part
of the analysis is somewhat more exploratory in nature than
the analyses that precede it.

The fourth section examines

runoff elections, which are required when no candidate
receives more than 50 percent of the vote in the initial
aldermanic election.

The final part of the chapter

summarizes the major findings and addresses the implications
of the results for our understanding of urban politics.
The analyses presented in this chapter are based on a
sample of 631 candidates who ran for the Chicago city
council in regularly scheduled elections held from 1979 to
1995.

All special elections were excluded.

I also excluded

all candidates who received less than five percent of the
vote in their elections.

There were both theoretical and

practical grounds for limiting the study in this fashion.
Theoretically, because I am interested in electoral
competition, it made sense to exclude candidates who were
not minimally competitive in their elections.

Of the

various reasons for seeking local office {see Bledsoe
1993,70-80), many do so simply for the publicity it gives
them and are not seriously concerned with winning.
Practically, it reduced to a manageable level the number of
observations for which I had to collect data.

As mentioned

in Chapter One, more than 1,100 candidates ran for the city
council during this period.
To begin the analysis I present below descriptive
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information on the nature of competition in Chicago city
council elections, by examining who wins and who loses these
races.

Following this I test multivariate regression models

to determine correlates of candidates' vote share in city
council elections.

Th• Nature of competition in Chicaqo City council Elections
Before testing multivariate models of candidates' vote
share in city council elections, it is instructive to know
when competition is absent from aldermanic elections.

This

will permit some basic understanding of city council
election dynamics and will inform the analyses that follow.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of wards in which only one
candidate was running (i.e., was unopposed) in each of the
five elections held between 1979 and 1995.

As one can see,

the least competitive election year was 1979.

In this year,

20 wards had only one candidate in the election.

Judging

from the number of wards with unopposed candidates, one
might suggest that the level of competition in Chicago city
council elections has increased over time, despite the
upsurge in the number of wards with unopposed candidates
during the 1995 election.
These numbers, however, do not describe patterns in who
wins and who loses these contests.

Of 137 opposed

candidates who won outright (i.e., were not forced into
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Figure 1. Percentage of Wards with
Candidates Who Ran Unopposed
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runoff elections), 117, or 85.4 percent, were incumbents. 1
Incumbents also dominated nonincumbents in terms of vote
share.

Figure 2 graphically shows the percentage of

incumbents receiving between 51 and 60 percent of the vote.
The percentage of incumbents falling within this category is
important because it indicates how difficult it is for
incumbents to win reelection.

In the congressional

elections literature, much has been written about the
decline in the number of marginal incumbents who win
reelection with 55 percent or less of the vote.

Today, most

House incumbents win with vote shares far in excess of this
total, leading many to the conclusion that House elections
are hopelessly one-sided affairs favoring incumbents (see
Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974a; Fiorina 1977; Ferejohn 1977;
Jacobson 1987).
As one can see, there is no clear pattern to the
percentage of incumbents winning reelection with between 51
and 60 percent of the vote (a umarginal" reelection
percentage for incumbents) in Chicago city council
elections.

Incumbent electoral security was threatened most

severely in 1979, 1983 and 1995, but less so in 1987 and
1991.

It is reasonable to speculate that incumbents in 1979
1

Logistic regression analysis performed on each
election year confirmed the dominance of incumbency in
predicting who wins Chicago city council elections. In
1979, incumbency alone correctly predicted 86 percent of the
cases. Between 1983 and 1995, incumbency alone correctly
predicted over 95 percent of the winners and losers in these
contests.
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Figure 2. Candidates Who Received
Between 51 and 60 Percent of the Vote
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were less able to control election outcomes in the aftermath
of the Cook County Democratic Party's general political
demise.

Decreased machine efficiency in aldermanic

elections probably opened-up the political system within
wards to more independent candidates {i.e., those not
aligned with county Democrats).

Because ward boundaries

were redrawn before the 1983 and 1995 elections, it is
likely that redistricting had an effect on incumbents'
electoral security in those years, forcing many into the
marginal category.

The general picture to emerge, however,

is that incumbents are safe bets to win reelection, very
much like incumbents running for reelection in other
legislative bodies.
Figures 3 and 4 more dramatically display the incumbent
advantage in these contests.

Figure 3 shows the percentage

of incumbent and nonincumbent candidates who received less
than 50 percent of the vote in their elections.

Nearly 100

percent of nonincumbent candidates in each election received
less than 50 percent of the vote, and thus were unable to
claim victory in the first election.

Figure 4, which shows

the percentage of candidates who received greater than 60
percent of the vote, displays almost the exact opposite
pattern.

Incumbent candidates have clearly dominated the

field of candidates winning 60 percent or more of the vote
in their elections.

Overall, incumbents tend to cluster

near the high-end of the vote scale, while nonincumbent
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Figure 3. Candidates Who Received
50 Percent or Less of the Vote
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Figure 4. Candidates Who Received
60 Percent or More of the Vote
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candidates generally fall in the low-end (below 50 percent
of the vote) •
Incumbent candidates are clearly at an advantage in
city council elections.

The advantage, however, is

difficult to evaluate precisely.

on the one hand, the

number of wards with unopposed candidates, has decreased in
every election since 1979 with the exception of the 1995
election when it increased, but did not come near the 1979
total of 20.

The percentage of incumbents winning with

"marginal" vote percentages has not gone below 30, and
reached peaks of over 40 percent in both 1983 and 1995,
suggesting that in these two elections, a greater percentage
of incumbents faced difficult reelection battles.

On the

other hand, the percentage of wards with unopposed
incumbents winning with 60 percent or more of the vote
increased steadily between 1979 and 1991, only to fall
dramatically in 1995, from 62 percent to 48 percent of all
opposed incumbents running for reelection.

Predicting candidates' Share of the Vote

To precisely gauge the incumbent advantage and to more
broadly understand the factors that are important for
predicting success in Chicago city council elections, I
present and test a series of multiple regression models.
Multiple regression allows one to understand the effect
particular variables have on the dependent variable, holding
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constant other factors that might also affect how candidates
perform in elections.

The model presented in Chapter Two

highlighted the importance of three categories of variables:
candidate's political experience, media and party
endorsements, and campaign spending.
is candidates' share of the vote.

The dependent variable

The unit of analysis is

the individual candidate.
As described in Chapter Two, the analysis below is
designed to test the following hypotheses:

Political Experience.

Political experience is expected to

be a critical factor in predicting how well candidates
perform in their elections.

Of all the different types of

political experiences one might have, incumbency is expected
to be the most important.

In addition to incumbency, I have

included in the model of nonincumbents a variable that
measures other types of political experience.

For example,

candidates who held other elective office are typically
better known among voters than candidates lacking such
experience, and therefore are expected to be more
competitive in their elections.

I have coded nonincumbents

according to the amount of political experience they had at
the time of their elections.
experience at all were coded

Those with no political

o.

Nonincumbents who had

experience as political aides, political volunteers, former
ward committeemen, former aldermen, or former political
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candidates were coded 1.

Incumbent committeemen, current or

former state legislators, and upper-level political
officials (e.g., appointed officials) were coded 2.

I

expect a strong and positive correlation between
nonincumbent political experience and share of the vote
received by these candidate.

Political and Media Endorsements.

I expect a strong,

positive correlation between Democratic Party ward
organization endorsements and candidates' share of the vote.
In addition, candidates may also be endorsed by one, or
both, of the city's major newspapers. Because media
endorsements (a) lend credibility to candidates and (b)
increase their name identification among voters, I expect a
strong and positive relationship between this variable and
candidates' share of the vote.

Campaign Spending.

As

candidate spending increases,

candidates' share of the vote should increase as well.

I

also expect a strong, negative correlation between
opposition spending and candidates' vote share.

Both

candidates' spending and opposition spending were measured
in 1995 dollars and converted into thousands of dollars to
ease interpretation of regression coefficients.

In

addition, as the literature has shown, there is often a
diminishing marginal return between campaign spending and
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candidates' share of the vote (see Jacobson, 1978).

Because

this relationship violates the linearity assumption in
multiple regression analysis (see Berry and Feldman 1985,5153), I used the natural log of both candidates' spending and
opposition spending in thousands of dollars as opposed to
the actual figure for these two variables.

The natural log

of spending corrects for the nonlinear relationship between
spending and votes.

Environmental Variables.

In addition to the variables

described above, a number of control variables were utilized
in the analysis.

The most important of these is expected to

be the number of opponents candidates face in their
elections.

On average candidates face approximately three

opponents (2.82) (data not shown).

As this number

increases, I expect candidates' vote share to decrease, as
each candidate in the race detracts from other candidates'
vote share.

I have also included a variable denoting

whether or not candidates who ran for alderman were running
as members of the minority population in their wards, to
control for the propensity of voters to support own-race
candidates.

In order to account for this possibility, all

candidates were coded on whether or not their race or
ethnicity matched that of the majority population in their
wards.

Non-majority race candidates were coded 1 and

majority race candidates were coded

o.

I expect minority
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candidates to receive fewer votes than majority candidates.

Pindinqs
Bivariate Correlates of candidates• vote Share

Table 4 presents results of bivariate correlations
between model variables and candidates' percentage of the
vote.

Bivariate correlations are important because they

indicate strength of relationships between independent and
dependent variables.

The independent variables are

categorized in four ways: candidate's experience (political
and professional); financial variables; endorsements; and
political environment.

Of the many candidate experience

variables, incumbency is the strongest predictor of
candidates' vote share.

In addition to incumbency, whether

or not candidates were the incumbent Democratic Committeeman
at the time of the election, also seems to be an important
predictor of the vote.

With few exceptions, none of the

other experience variables are significant in the bivariate
case.

Contrary to other research (for example, Lieske

1989), candidates' occupational status appears to have no
influence on election outcomes.

In all of the election

years shown in Table 4, professional occupation is
negatively signed, contrary to my expectations.
Candidates' political experience, therefore, seems to
be important factors in election outcomes.
experience variables are the same, however.

Not all
As expected,

TABLB 4
Bivariate correlations between candidates• vote Percentage and Hodel variables,
Chicago City Council Blections, 1979-1995
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

1979

1983

1987

1991

199S

Candidates' Experience
Incumbent

.S8**

.70**

.77**

.78**

.79**

Democratic committeeman

.37**

.40**

.Sl**

.49**

.4S**

Former alderman

.02

.OS

Former Democratic
Committeeman
Precinct captain

-.oo

-.01

-.06

-.04

-.04

-.08
-.11

.02

-.06

-.01

-.04

Ward secretary

-.03

.17

-.OS

-.OS

Former candidate

-.2S

-.06

-.lS

-.12

-.09

State legislator

.09

-.oo

.OS

.01

.09

Political volunteer

-.18

.03

-.07

-.07

-.08

Political aide

-.07

-.OS

-.02

-.09

-.OS

-.lS

-.03

.lS

Appointee

.04

Professional occupation

-.09

-.17

-.20

-.21

-.12

Community activist

-.lS

-.11

-.07

-.09

-.OS

Minority status

-.23

.11

-.14

.lS

.06

,_.
0
O'\

TABLE 4 (continued)
Bivariate Correlations between candidates• Vote Percentaqe and Model variables,
Chicaqo City Council Elections, 1979-1995
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

f inanQial Ya~iables

Spending

.46**

Opposition spending

-.28*

.53**

.54**

.51**

.62**

-.25**

-.45**

-.44**

-.35**

Endorsements
Media

.41**

.51**

.62**

.71**

.73**

Democratic Party

.70**

.66**

.72**

.72**

.68**

-.56**

-.45**

-.47**

-.51**

-.43**

fQlitiQal

EnYi~Qnment

Number of opponents
Number of cases

79

134

133

159

126

Note: ~~ means that there were no candidates with this type of experience.
*p = .01 (one-tailed test).
**p = .001 (one-tailed test).

......
0

-..J
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elective office experience is the most important experience
to have.

More importantly, candidates with ward-level

elective office experience appear to benefit greatly from
their experience.

Incumbent aldermen and incumbent

Democratic Committeemen are the two most important elected
officials in city wards.

This experience, and name

identification among ward voters, appears to pay dividends
at the polls.

Candidates with other types of political

experience do not appear to benefit from it to any
significant degree.

In many instances, the sign of the

coefficients are not in the expected direction and, when
they are correctly signed, they are not significant.
Financial variables -- candidates' spending and
opposition spending -- are in the expected direction and
significant at the .001 level.

Consistent with my

hypotheses, this indicates that campaign spending is an
important predictor of election outcomes.

In addition to

spending, candidates who are endorsed by local media and
their ward's Democratic party organization benefit from the
exposure they get from this and from the legions of party
workers who support the organization's candidate on election
day.

Candidates' vote share also appears to vary inversely

with the number of candidates in the race.

This stands to

reason; more candidates in the race should decrease each
candidate's vote share to a certain degree.

Finally, being

part of a minority group in one's ward also does not appear
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to hurt candidates' chances of success in city council
elections.
Bivariate correlations, however, do not show the effect
that these variables have on candidates' vote share holding
other factors constant.

They do provide some guidance,

however, in sorting out exactly which variables ought to be
included in multivariate regression models.

For example,

the bivariate analysis shows that incumbency and Democratic
Committeeman variables should be controlled for in models
predicting election outcomes.

Similarly, candidates'

spending, opposition spending, endorsements (both those
given by media sources and local Democratic organizations),
and number of opponents, are probably good indicators of
election outcomes as well.

Because candidate's race is a

theoretically important variable, it is also included in the
models that follow despite the lack of significance for this
variable in the bivariate case.

Multiple regression can

determine if these relationships are indeed significant or
if they weaken (i.e., are spurious) when other factors are
controlled.

Multivariate Model Findings
Table 5 displays results of multiple regression models
for each election year.

The results show that all of the

significant factors mentioned above, remain significant when
controlling for alternative explanations of vote outcomes.

110
overall, the models perform exceptionally well; none
explains less than 65 percent of the variation in
candidates' share of the vote.

Incumbency status exerts a

significant and positive effect on candidates' share of the
vote.

In each election year, incumbents realize an increase

in their share of the vote of nearly 20 percentage points,
significant at the .001 level.

Candidates who are also

their ward's Democratic Committeeman also appear to benefit
from their experience, although the effect is less
consistent and less powerful than that for incumbency.
These findings and those presented above for the bivariate
model suggest that there is a clear hierarchy among types of
political experience, with incumbency located at the top.
As hypothesized, candidates' spending is a strong and
significant predictor of candidates' share of the vote in
each election; as candidates spend more in their campaigns,
their vote share increases.

Opposition spending also

behaves in the predicted direction, but its effects are much
less consistent than those shown for candidates' spending.
In only three of the five years (1979, 1983 and 1991) is
opposition spending significant and negatively correlated
with candidates' share of the vote.
Because high multicollinearity existed between
incumbency and Democratic organization support, 2 the
2

Incumbency and Democratic organization support are
strongly correlated and highly significant (.64, p = .001).
In none of the election years does the bivariate
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Democratic organization endorsement variable was excluded as
a predictor variable from the analysis shown in Table 5.
The other type of endorsement, from media sources, however,
was included in the model and is a very strong predictor of
the vote in all the elections except 1979.

That media

endorsements are not significant for 1979 is likely due to
the fact that the 1979 analysis is based on about 40 percent
fewer cases than is shown in the other cross-sectional
analyses.

It may also be related to the fact that the Cook

County Democratic Party machine probably had more control
over election outcomes in 1979, as voters looked to the
organization more than to the media for guidance in who to
select.

In general though, as candidates move from zero

endorsements to one endorsement, and from one endorsement to
two endorsements, they receive a fairly substantial increase
in the share of the vote.

Voters obviously rely heavily on

cues given by local print media late in the campaign season
in making their choice for alderman in their ward.
In addition to these variables, number of opponents is
a significant predictor of candidates' vote share.

As

hypothesized, candidates' vote share decreases as this
number increases.

Each additional candidate in the race

results in a vote share increase of over three points.

This

finding indicates that electoral environment is an important
relationship between incumbency and Democratic organization
support drop below .52 (p = .001). In 1991, the
relationship reached its peak at .70, (p = .001).

TABLE 5
can4i4ates• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council Elections, 1979-1995, by Election
Year, (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

Incumbent

.179***
(.37)

.204***
(. 42)

.197***
(.37)

.205***
(. 41)

.215***
(. 43)

Democratic Committeeman

.093+
(.14)

.105***
( .17)

.079*
( .12)

.054*
(. 08)

.039
(. 06)

Spending

.023***
(.31)

.013**
( .16)

.020***
(. 24)

.011***
( .13)

.019***
(. 22)

-.018***
(-.18)

-.021***
(-.14)

Opposition spending
Media
Opponents
Minority

-.013*
(-.16)
.022
(.09)
-.050***
(-.30)
-.058
(.10)

-.006
(-.06)

-.009
(-. 07)

.070***
(.29)

.045**
( .16)

.071***
(. 27)

.063***
(. 23)

-.040***
(-.29)

-.033***
(-.24)

-.037***
(-.24)

-.031***
(-.18)

-.031
(-.03)

-.044
(-.05)

-.035
(-.02)

.043*
(. 06)

Intercept

.393***

.288***

.316***

.340***

.271***

Adj. R2

.65

.73

.75

.80

.76

F-value

21.848***

53.260***

57.640***

91.308***

57.579***

Number of cases
79
134
133
159
126
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized regression
coefficients in parentheses. +p = .10; *P = .05. **P = .01. ***P = .001.

......
......
N
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part of city council elections and that variables largely
beyond the control of individual candidates (like number of
opponents) have discernable effects on election outcomes.
Somewhat contrary to expectations (but consistent with
findings in the bivariate model), whether or not candidates
are minorities in their wards has little effect on election
outcomes.

In fact, being in the minority in 1983 appears to

have helped those candidates.

That this variable is not

more important in predicting election outcomes is related to
the fact that few non-majority race candidates run in these
elections due to large amounts of racial segregation in the
city and the presence of super-majority wards.

In addition

to these factors, many of the candidates who run in wards
with demographics that put them in the minority happen to be
white incumbents seeking reelection.

While no minority

represents a majority white ward, white incumbents
historically, and in the present context, do represent
majority black wards. 3
The analysis of the five separate elections suggests a
clear pattern among the variables.

Examining the

standardized regression coefficients in Table 5, one can see
that incumbency is the strongest predictor of the vote,
followed by number of opponents, media endorsements,

3

Larry Bloom (Fifth Ward), a white incumbent,
represented a majority black ward from 1983-1995. Thomas
Murphy (Eighteenth Ward), also a white incumbent, represents
majority black residents on the city's Southwest Side.

114
campaign spending and the dummy variable for Democratic
committeeman.

These variables were predicted to be the

strongest variables in the model and, indeed, that is what
the regression models for each election year indicate.
The pooled regression model presented in Table 6 tells
a similar story.

Pooling the cases allows for greater

variability among the predictors and permits one to make
broader claims about the findings than is possible through
the type of cross-sectional analyses presented in Table 5.
The results in Table 6 confirm much of what was found when
looking at each election year separately.

Incumbency is

again the strongest predictor of candidates' share of the
vote.

Incumbent candidates realize a 21 percent advantage

over nonincumbents.

Number of opponents also is significant

and inversely correlated with candidates' vote share.

Media

endorsements, candidates' spending, and opposition spending,
also are significant and in the predicted direction.

The

least influential of the significant predictors is
Democratic Committeeman, which reflects the inconsistent
nature of the relationship between this variable and
candidates' vote share found above.

Likewise, the minority

race variable also is not significant.

With no exceptions,

the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients
are nearly identical with those presented in the analysis of
each election year.

This suggests that these variables are
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'l'ABLB 6

candidate•' vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City council
Blectiona, 1979-1995, Pooled Model (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Incumbent
Democratic Committeeman
Spending
Opposition spending
Media
Opponents
Minority

b
coefficient
(standard
error)
.209***
(.013)

.42

.073***
(. 015)

.11

.016***
(.002)

.20

-.014***
(-.002)

-.13

.057***
(. 006)

.21

-.037***
(-.003)

.25

.010
(. 018)

Intercept

.313***

Adj. R2

.75

F-value

272.548***

Number of cases
***P = .001.

standardized
coefficient

631

.01
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robust predictors of city council election outcomes.
overall, the model explains 75 percent of the variation in
candidates' vote share.
The analyses presented here confirm most of the
hypotheses developed in Chapter Two and tested above for
candidates' share of the vote in city council elections.
Incumbency, spending, media endorsements, and electoral
environment variables such as number of opponents, all are
significant predictors of election outcomes.

The most

important variables are those that enhance candidates' name
identification among voters.

Obviously, being an incumbent

politician in the ward (alderman or Democratic Committeeman)
enhances the possibility that one will be recognized (and
recognized favorably) by voters on election day.
and media endorsements play a similar role.

Spending

Spending and

endorsements give candidates exposure from which they might
not otherwise benefit.

candidates• Share of the Vote in Races that Involve
Incwal:>ents
Including all candidates together in the same model may
understate the effect of incumbency (and thus the incumbency
advantage) in predicting election outcomes.

Because many of

the races included in Table 5 and Table 6 do not involve
incumbents (i.e., are open seats), the size of incumbents'
electoral advantage may be decreased somewhat.
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Table 7 shows results of an analysis of those races
that involve incumbents.

In this model, I expect to see the

value of incumbency increase vis-a-vis the results in the
tables discussed above.
fact, the case.

The results show that this is, in

The size of the coefficient associated with

the incumbency dummy variable is larger in Table 7 in four
of the five elections studied.

According to the results of

this model, incumbents' electoral advantage over challengers
never drops below 20 points and reaches a peak of 24 points
in the 1995 elections.

In other respects, the effects of

these variables are very consistent with what is shown in
Table 5 and Table 6.
Candidates who are their ward's Democratic Committeeman
at the time of the election realize an increase in their
share of the vote (although the effect is not significant in
the 1991 and 1995 elections).

Candidates' spending,

opposition spending, and media endorsements, also have
significant effects on candidates' vote share.

As is noted

above, minority candidates are not disadvantaged in these
elections.

In fact, in four of the five elections, the sign

of the coefficient for minority candidates is positive,
although this variable is not significant in any one year.
This analysis lends validity to the claim made above that
the reason minorities are not disadvantaged in these
elections is because many of the minority candidates happen

TABLE 7

candidates• Vote Percentage in Races that Involve IncUllbents, Chicago City Council
Elections, 1979-1995, by Election Year (OLS)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

Incumbent

.220***
(. 51)

.238***
(. 51)

.203***
(. 39)

.204***
(. 41)

.242***
(. 50)

Democratic Committeeman

.112*
( .19)

.066*
( .11)

.085*
( .12)

.039
(. 06)

.044
(. 07)

Spending

.016**
(. 22)

.012**
( .14)

.019***
(. 22)

.011**
( .12)

.013**
( .15)

-.021**
(-.27)

-.014**
(-.14)

-.019***
(-.20)

Opposition spending
Media
Opponents

.006
(. 02)

-.070***
~033***
(-.33)
/ / (-.22)

Minority
(

Intercept
Adj. R2

.061***
(. 25)

·;ri/
.
)

/424***
I

~1

.054
(. 07)

-.022***
(-.14)

.002
(. 02)

.048**
(. 16)

.081***
(. 30)

.070***
(. 26)

-.036***
(-.20)

-.035***
(-.01)

-.038***
(-.19)

-.040
(-.03)

.060
(. 05)

.113
(. 05)

.282***

.320***

.329***

.231***

.79

.77

.84

.82

~~~

F-value

20.351***

60.632***

56.788***

100.219***

72.329***

109
132
108
Number of cases
57
115
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized regression
coefficients in parentheses. *P = .05. **P = .01. ***P = .001.

.......
.......
00
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to be incumbent aldermen who typically win reelection.
Next I examine a model to explain nonincumbent
candidates' vote share to determine, in particular, the
relationship between being endorsed by the ward's Democratic
Party organization and candidates' vote share.

Bonincumbent Candidates

As mentioned above, because of the high correlation
between incumbency and ward organization support, it was
statistically difficult to accurately measure the separate
effects of the ward organization support variable on
candidates' share of the vote. 4

As discussed in Chapter

Two, the Democratic Party in Chicago, via its subunits
located in the city's wards, has been critically important
to the success or failure of many candidates over time.
This is still expected to be the case, despite the fact that
the centralized political party that existed under Mayor
Richard

~aley does

Lineberry 1982).

n:Jexist today (Erie 1988; Kemp and

~~~)ossible

to speculate, however, that

the effect of this variable will weaken over time as we move
away from the machine's heyday in the 1970s.

4

There is also a strong relationship between incumbency
and being the ward's Democratic Committeeman (.50, p = .001)
and being endorsed by local media (.49, p = .001). While
these levels of collinearity are high, they are not too
strong to drop from multivariate models, in which some
covariation between independent variables is expected to
exist.
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In order to understand the effectiveness of ward
organizations and the effect their endorsements have on
candidates' share of the vote in Chicago city council
elections, I performed an analysis similar to the one
discussed above for challengers, controlling for election
type (i.e., whether they were running in an open seat
election or were facing an incumbent).

By including

candidates for open seats and challengers in the same model,
one is able to examine candidates for open seats who,
combined, are too few in number during any election year to
analyze separately.

The results of the analysis are

presented in Table 8.
overall, the models perform well, predicting a large
degree of the variance in candidates' share of the vote.
Reading across the top row of coefficients, one can see that
having the support of the Democratic ward organization has a
profound effect on how well candidates do at the polls.

The

size of the unstandardized coefficient is stable, positive,
and significant at the .001 level in each of the four
elections between 1979 and 1991.

Candidates who receive the

backing of the Democratic organization in their wards can
expect an increase in their share of the vote in the range
of 15 to 18 percent.

The effect of the organization support

variable, however, drops precipitously in the 1995 election.
Reading down the 1995 column, one can speculate why this
might be the case.

In 1995, candidate's political

TABLB 8
Honincuabent Candidates• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council Elections, 1979-1995

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Organization support

1979

1983

1987

1991

.183***
(. 41)

.232***
(. 53)

.146***
(.37)

.166***
(. 41)

Election

-.030
(-.09)

-.033+
(-.10)

Political experience

-.022
(. 08)

.002
(. 01)

Spending

.020***
(.34)

.008*
( .13)

Opposition spending
Media

-.001
(-.02)
.054**
(. 25)

-.003
(-.05)
.074***
(. 41)

-.066**
(-.20)
-.001
(-. 01)
.016***
(.33)
-.006
(-.10)
.008
(. 03)

Opponents

-.053***
(-.39)

-.026***
(-.27)

-.036***
(-.47)

Minority

-.020
(-.04)

-.025
(-.04)

-.021
(-.03)

-.003
(-.01)

1995
.024
(. 06)
-.069**
(-.21)

.025*
( .14)

.063***
(.32)

.012***
(. 25)

.015***
(. 27)

-.007
(-.06)

-.001
(-. 01)

.038**
( .19)

.049**
(. 20)

-.027***
(-.31)

-.029***
(-.29)

.012
(. 02)

-.033
(-.04)

Intercept

.333***

.244***

.332***

.234***

.268***

Adj. R2

.74

.71

.51

.57

.53

F-value
Number of cases

22.217***
61

32.246***

13.955***

20.627***

14.244***

104

100

121

94

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standardized coefficients in parentheses.*p =.OS. **p =.01. ***p =.001 • ......
N
......
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experience had its largest effect on election outcomes,
decreasing (in part} the importance of ward organization
support for nonincumbents in the 1995 election.

Political

experience that increases candidates' name recognition and
practical government experience are more beneficial than
those experiences that do not have this effect.
Election type (open seat versus one involving an
incumbent} also exerts a significant and negative effect on
candidates' share of the vote, suggesting that nonincumbents
who challenged incumbents in 1987 and 1995 were at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis candidates running in open seat
elections.

The effect of this variable is confounded

somewhat by the fact that nonincumbents running in open seat
elections are included with challengers.

In the years for

which election type is significant, the percentages of
nonincumbents challenging incumbents reached peaks of 83.4
percent and 80.8 percent, respectively.
Media endorsements and number of opponents also behave
in predictable ways.

With the exception of the 1987

election, media endorsements have a positive and significant
effect on candidates' vote share.

Next to organization

backing, number of opponents is the strongest and most
consistent predictor of the vote.

Each additional opponent

produces a decrease in candidates' vote share of
approximately three to four percent, similar to the analysis
of all candidates.
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As hypothesized, candidate spending also is a strong
predictor of the vote, although it is not as powerful as
either organization support and number of opponents.
overall, the variables that increase one's name recognition
and credibility among voters -- organization support,
campaign spending, media endorsements -- are strong
predictors of the vote.

A candidate's political experience

and the type of election in which they are participating
have inconsistent effects on the vote.

In the case of open

seats versus those against incumbents, nonincumbents do
worse in elections that involve incumbents (i.e., the sign
of the coefficient is always as hypothesized).

Candidates'

political experience is both positive and negative
throughout the time frame, but only in two of the five
elections is it significantly related to candidates' vote
percentage.

Clearly, the more important variables for

nonincumbents are those that confer legitimacy on them
(media endorsements and party backing) and those that permit
them to advertise themselves and their campaigns to wider
audiences (i.e., campaign spending).

In addition,

candidates' vote share is unaffected by race or ethnicity.
In general, the results reported above indicate that
being endorsed by the ward's Democratic organization has an
effect on nonincumbent candidates' vote share similar to the
effect incumbency status has on candidates' vote share when
all candidates (incumbent and nonincumbent) are examined
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together.

Somewhat unexpectedly, actual political

experience has only a small effect on how well these
candidates perform.

The surest way for nonincumbent

candidates to reach off ice appears to be through
endorsements (both political and media), spending, and being
strategic, or running for office when seats become open,
rather than trying to unseat incumbents.

Elections in Majority Black and Majority White wards

As shown, candidates' race or ethnicity has little
effect on candidates• vote share.

This was true in the

bivariate case and in multiple regression models.

Including

all candidates together, however, may mask important
differences among wards whose populations differ
demographically.

In order to determine if differences exist

across wards with different concentrations of voters, I
divided the sample of candidates into two groups based on
majority population in their wards.

In one group are

candidates who ran in wards with a majority (51% or more)
white population and in another are candidates who ran in
wards with a majority black population. 5

I tested a

regression model on these subsamples of candidates that
included incumbency status, spending, opposition spending,

media endorsements, number of opponents, and minority status

5

There were too few Hispanic candidates to run
regression analysis.
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variables.

candidates' share of the vote is the dependent

variable.
Table 9 presents the results of the analysis for the
majority black wards.

The model explains a substantial

percentage of candidates' vote share in each election year.
Incumbency status again is the most significant predictor of
candidates' share of the vote.

Spending, media endorsements

and number of opponents also are significant predictors,
although not in every election year.
Table 10 presents the results of the analysis for the
majority white wards.

Like majority black wards, incumbency

is the most important predictor of the vote in these
elections.

Number of opponents appears to be a more

consistent predictor of vote share in majority white wards
than it was found to be in the majority black wards.

This

suggests that the fewer white candidates who run for the
city council are able to garner a larger share of the vote
vis-a-vis the average black candidate, which is, in fact,
the case.
In comparing factors that predict candidates' vote
share in majority white wards to factors that predict
candidates' vote share in majority black wards, it is
apparent that incumbency status is a slightly more important
predictor of the vote in majority black wards than it is in
majority white wards.
highly significant.

Nonetheless, in both cases, it is
Overall, however, there are no

TABLB 9

candidates• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council Blections in Majority Black Wards,
1979-1995, by Blection Year (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

1979

1983

1987

1991

199S

Incumbent

.248***
(. S6)

.243***
(.SS)

.24S***
(. 4S)

.241***
(. S4)

.232***
(. 48)

Spending

.018+
(. 26)

.019***
(. 2 3)

.020**
(.22)

.007
( .10)

.OlS*
( .17)

-.037***
(-.26)

-.016
(-.11)

Opposition spending
Media
Opponents
Minority

-.012
(-.lS)
.003
(. 01)

-.021*
(-.lS)
.046**
(. 20)

.034
(. 11)

.048**
( .19)

.078**
(. 29)

-.033***
(-.22)

-.048***
(-.22)

-.033
(-.21)

-.018*
(-.14)

-.034
(-.11)

-.oss

.OS8
(. 09)

-.071
(-.04)

(-.11)

-.007
(-.OS)

.072
(. 09)

.140
(. 08)

Intercept

.3S2***

.2SS***

.387***

.309***

.260***

Adj. R2

.60

.77

.81

.72

.74

F-value

9.328***

43.410***

48.180***

36.961***

33.487***

Number of cases
3S
76
66
86
69
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized regression
coefficients in parentheses.
*P = .OS. **P = • 01. ***P = .001.
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TABLB 10

candidates• Vote Percentage, Chicago City Council Elections in Majority White Wards,
1979-1995, by Election Year (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

1979

1983

Incumbent

.183***
(.37)

.233***
(. 49)

.191**
(.38)

.184**
(.38)

.199**
(. 41)

Spending

.032***
(.37)

.007
( .10)

.020*
(.24)

.015*
( .15)

.033+
(. 23)

-.012***
(-.15)

.002
(. 03)

-.012+
(-.16)

-.029**
(-.21)
.085**
(.33)

Opposition spending

1987

.045+
( .16)

.078**
(. 34)

.056+
(. 20)

Opponents

-.066***
(-.36)

-.087**
(-.36)

-.032**
(-.32)

Minority

-.031
(-.05)

Media

-.13
( .10)

1991

-.046*
(-.23)

1995

-.026
(-.24)
.076*
(. 28)
-.063*
(-.19)

.045
(. 03)

Intercept

.401***

.399***

.307***

.385***

.334***

Adj. R2

.67

.59

.62

.82

.81

F-value

15.671***

11.892***

14.702***

38.695***

46
51
Number of cases
44
41
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standardized
regression coefficients in parentheses. +p = .10; *P = .05. **P = .01. ***P

19.716***
23

=

001.
,_.
N
-..J
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differences between what it takes to get elected in majority
black wards and what it takes to get elected in majority
white wards.

Incumbency, spending, media endorsements, and

number of opponents are significant predictors of outcomes
in both majority black and majority white wards.

These

findings reinforce the importance of legitimation, by
political organizations and local media, advertising, and
experience, for candidate success in city council elections.
A final electoral context is that of the runoff
election.

In Chicago's nonpartisan city council election

system, wards that do not produce a majority winner are
required to hold runoff elections between the top two votegetters to determine the winner of the seat.

Below I

discuss outcomes in runoff elections, testing new variables
shown in the literature to be important predictors of the
vote in these kinds of elections.

Runoff Elections
Runoff elections for the Chicago city council are held
when no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote
in the initial aldermanic election held approximately six
weeks prior to the runoff.

Because they pit the top two

vote-getters from the first election against one another,
these elections are hotly contested and closely watched by
local political elites and voters.
Two questions addressed in studies of runoff elections
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are pertinent to this research.

The first relates to the

idea that the leading candidate from the first election
suffers in the runoff election as voters rally around the
underdog.

The second suggests that incumbents are

disadvantaged in runoff elections because of their perceived
weakness in not being able to beat back strong challengers.
According to the hypothesis and some empirical findings,
voters then seize the opportunity to defeat an incumbent by
supporting the nonincumbent (see Bullock and Gaddie 1994;
Bullock and Johnson 1985; Fleischmann and Stein 1987;
Stewart, Sheffield and Ellis 1995).
Bullock and Gaddie (1994) studied runoff elections in
Chicago in order to compare findings from a northern,
industrial city to findings of other scholars who studied
runoff elections in southern cities.

They found that both

candidates who led the primary field and incumbents won
their runoff elections less frequently than was found to be
the case in studies of runoff elections in southern cities.
The research presented here does not attempt such a
comparison and, in fact, asks a separate question.

That is,

what effect might these variables, in conjunction with
spending, 6 media endorsements, and party support, have on
candidates' share of the vote in runoff elections?
Presumably, if there is a relationship between being the
6

Both spending variables have been adjusted to reflect
only spending that was reported immediately following the
first election through the end of the reporting period.
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leader in the first election or being the incumbent, and
winning or losing in runoff elections, then there might be a
relationship between these factors and candidates' share of
the vote in these contests.
Table 11 presents the results of the multiple
regression model of runoff elections held in .Chicago between
1979 and 1995.

Because so few candidates compete in runoff

elections during any one cycle, it was necessary to pool the
observations into a single data set to run regression
analysis.

For the sake of parsimony, only incumbency,

organization support, media endorsements, both spending
variables, and a dummy variable for election leader were
included in the model.
Contrary to expectations, the findings indicate that
candidates who lead the field in the first election are not
disadvantaged in runoff elections.

In other words, voters

are not moving toward the underdog during the subsequent
election.

In addition, judging from the size of the

standardized coefficient for the election leader variable,
this is the single strongest predictor in the model.
Incumbents, however, do not benefit from their
incumbency status when forced into runoffs.

The sign and

size of the coefficient for incumbency suggest that the
value of incumbency fades quickly when they are challenged
hard in first elections.

Challengers who succeed to such an

extent as to force incumbents into runoffs do appear to
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TABLB 11
candidates• Vote Percentage, Chicago City council
Runoff Elections, 1979-1995, Pooled Model (OLS)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

b coefficient
(standard
error)

standardized
coefficient

Incumbent

-.012
(. 014)

-.07

Organization support

.031*
(.014)

.20

Media

.025*
(. 007)

.27

Spending

.012***
(.004)

.16

Opposition spending

-.005*
(.003)

Election leader

.053***
(.013)

Intercept

.422***
(.014)

Adj. R2
F-value
Number of cases

*P = .05.
**P = . 01.
***P = .001.

.36
11.038***
109

-.16
.33
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benefit from shifting momentum in their campaign.

In this

sense, the idea that incumbents are disadvantaged in runoffs
is confirmed.
An overall impression of the findings from the model
of runoff elections is that the variables have a less
powerful effect on candidates' vote share than they did in
the analyses of the initial aldermanic election.
is a case in point.

Incumbency

The coefficient for incumbency is about

19 points lower than that reported in almost all the models
discussed above, which partly explains the decrease in the
ability of the model to predict candidates' vote share.
With only two candidates in the race, and considerably
greater amounts of media attention to these elections, the
need for voters to rely on cues given by incumbency status,
organization support, or media endorsements, decreases.
Other factors, such as how candidates stand on issues,
candidate character, and assistance from voters and
volunteers from neighboring wards, while difficult to
measure, might be important for understanding these
elections.

Discussion

When examining all candidates simultaneously or
examining a subset of nonincumbent candidates, the foregoing
analysis delivers a consistent message: success in city
council elections is a function both of being widely known
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and having one's candidacy legitimized by outside sources.
Incumbency, media endorsements, campaign spending, and
Democratic party support all work to separate certain
candidates from the rest of the pack.

In very predictable

fashion, incumbent candidates are able to separate
themselves from other candidates most effectively, and thus
to outperform them in elections.

Incumbents, especially in

nonpartisan elections such as those for the Chicago city
council, have credentials and a set of experiences that
increase their vote-getting ability.

Being more widely

known, they are able to attract votes in ways nonincumbents
cannot.

Media endorsements also are an outside source of

legitimation for candidates that increases their ability to
attract votes.

Setting aside the troublesome statistical

issue of whether media endorsements improve candidates'
overall chances of success or whether those making the
endorsement simply pick the likely winner, candidates who
gain this type of exposure do very well at the polls.
In addition to incumbency and media endorsements,
spending also enhances candidates' ability to garner votes.
The main purpose of campaign spending is to increase one's
name identification among voters and to explain to voters
why one would be an effective public servant.

As the

findings presented above show, this certainly is the case.
Candidates who are able to more-thoroughly advertise
themselves, reap electoral rewards that poorly-funded
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candidates do not.

Candidate spending is significant even

in an environment with a strong political party that is able
to advertise and work for particular candidates, and where
districts are relatively small (55,000 to 60,000 residents),
thus decreasing the need for broad-based, mass appeals.
In addition to these factors, being endorsed by the
Democratic ward organization improves the chances of success
for candidates.
advantage.

In this regard, incumbents enjoy a two-fold

First, they have a certain amount of legitimacy

and stature within their wards because of their positions as
incumbent office-holders.

They have governmental experience

and name identification that separates them from
nonincumbents.

Second, because incumbents often are

officially endorsed by their ward's Democratic organization
(in many instances they also are their ward's
committeeman), 7 they have political credibility conferred on
them as well.

Presumably, party elites have evaluated

incumbents' tenure in office and have deemed it worthy of
official recognition and support.

The positive message

disseminated by incumbents themselves and ward organizations
percolates through the electorate and is driven home to
voters on election day as organization workers mobilize getout-the-vote efforts in support of the party's candidate.

7

The bivariate correlation between being the incumbent
alderman and the ward's Democratic Committeeman are as
follows: .36** in 1979; .52** in 1983; .61** in 1987; .53**
in 1991; and .50** in 1995 (** p = .001).
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The relative effect of being endorsed by the ward
organization is much clearer in the analysis of
nonincumbents.

As stated above, the ability of the Cook

county Democratic Party to "deliver" wards for the party's
candidates in citywide races has decreased substantially
over time.

The ability of individual Democratic

organizations to deliver votes for candidates in their
wards, however, has not decreased over time and is very
clearly a factor in these elections (with the exception of
1995).

In the four elections held between 1979 and 1991,

endorsement from the ward's Democratic organization paid
dividends at the polls.

on average, endorsed candidates

could expect to receive a 15 percent boost in their share of
the vote as a result of this important party endorsement.
As I have shown in the analyses of all the candidates,
the issue of credibility and name familiarity are critical
to the success of city council candidates.

When looking at

nonincumbents, candidate's political experience was a
significant predictor of the vote, but only in the 1991 and
1995 elections. Before 1991, political experience mattered
little in predicting nonincumbents' vote share.

It is

possible that the political environment in wards is opening
up to highly-qualified candidates who may or may not be
associated with the Democratic organization.

The lack of

significance for the organization support variable in the
1995 analysis of nonincumbents suggests that experienced
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candidates did well in their elections.

Only time will tell

if organization support is no longer significant for
nonincumbents, or if the 1995 findings were merely an
aberration.

The variables with the greatest and most

consistent effect on the vote are those that enhance
candidates' credibility and familiarity among voters organization support, media endorsements, and spending.
These are not the only variables that have a
significant effect on the vote, however.

Included as a

control variable, number of opponents was a consistent
predictor of candidates' vote share.

It was, without

variation, negative and statistically significant.

Although

perhaps less theoretically interesting than the variables
described above, that number of opponents is a significant
predictor of candidates' vote share highlights the
importance of electoral context in local politics.

To a

certain degree the fate of individual candidates is beyond
their control and dictated by decisions of individual
candidates to enter the political fray in their wards at
different points in time.
Another important finding that emerged from this
analysis was the lack of significance for candidates' race
in determining city council election outcomes.

Much of the

literature suggests that candidates' racial or ethnic

background is an important cue for voters in nonpartisan
elections (Herring and Forbes 1994; Pomper 1966).

In other
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words, voters refer to this feature of candidates when
deciding how to cast their ballot because of the paucity of
information on what candidates stand for or their
qualifications for office.

The major reason race was not an

issue in Chicago city council elections held between 1979
and 1995, is that district segregation often precludes the
emergence of candidates whose racial or ethnic background
varies from that of the ward's majority population.

White

candidates run in predominantly white wards; black
candidates run in predominantly black wards; and Hispanic
candidates run in predominantly Hispanic wards.

Of the

minority candidates who do run, many are their ward's
incumbent alderman, thus helping to negate the issue of
racial voting.
The findings presented in this chapter both supported
and contradicted the literature on city council elections.
Consistent with the literature (Desantis and Renner 1994;
Karnig and Walter 1977; Lieske 1989), incumbents were shown
to dominate election outcomes, both in terms of who wins and
who loses, and in terms of candidates' vote share.
Incumbents won 85.4 percent of the time that they sought
reelection.

Political experience, campaign spending,

opposition spending, news media endorsements and support
from local political organizations were significant
predictors of the vote, which is what one would expect based
on current literature.

In addition, ufixed" factors in the
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campaign (Howell and Oiler 1981,155), such as number of
opponents, was a consistent predictor of how well candidates
did in their elections; a finding that is also consistent
with the literature.

In general, however, the findings

reported in this chapter were consistent with only one
component of Lieske's (1989,167) theory of legitimacy, which
"explicitly assumed that the distribution of the candidate
vote totals is largely determined by three factors: (1)
their cultural acceptability for public office; (2) their
social standing within the community; and (3) the political
mechanisms and processes that legitimate or bestow group and
institutional approval on them."

Having already discussed

the importance of factors that confer legitimacy or lend
credibility to candidates, below I describe why the first
two components of his theory do apply in the case of
Chicago.
In two major respects the findings in this chapter
depart from the literature.

Lieske (1989), for example,

found that candidates' achieved status in life and political
experience paid dividends at the polls, controlling for
other factors, such as incumbency, party support and media
endorsements.

Candidates from high-status occupations

(lawyers, businessmen) and candidates with "political
followings" (based on votes received in prior campaigns)
could expect to receive more votes than candidates from lowstatus occupations or candidates who had never sought
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political office before.

My findings indicate something

quite different for Chicago on these two dimensions.
Bivariate correlations (see Table 4) between candidates'
occupational status and vote share, and between candidates'
status as former political candidates and vote share, did
not reach conventional levels of statistical significance to
warrant inclusion in the multivariate models presented
above, a clear departure from Lieske's findings on
Cincinnati.
This difference is most likely related to the type of
election system found in each city and expectations placed
on local politicians from voters.

Electorates in cities

with at-large election systems, such as Cincinnati, are
likely to value different types of qualifications for
off ice.

For example, they might be more concerned about

electing the most qualified person for the position, in
terms of background and training, who can

advocate for the

needs of the entire city, rather than choosing a political
insider, who might have more parochial interests to serve.
In Chicago, because of its district election system, how
effective one is on the city council (and in city council
elections) has little to do with articulating an overall
vision for the city and everything to do with ensuring that
one's ward receives its share of city services and
improvements.

In this city, where political connections are

paramount, it might be that voters choose candidates based
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on who they believe will be most effective as alderman,
rather than candidates with the most impressive resumes.
Indeed, in many aldermanic campaigns, the major issues are
simply who will be most effective in bringing home the
ward's share of city services and who will be a full-time
aldermen, on call round-the-clock for ward residents in what
are technically part-time positions.

Stressing one's

background could be a liability in a city where aldermen can
earn two salaries, one from the city and the other from
private pursuits, and where voters expect full-time
attention.

Finally, in a city as politically pragmatic as

Chicago, voters are not going to waste votes on candidates
who have lost once or twice before, the same type of
candidates that Lieske's (1989,165) argues will keep "the
support of at least three of every four voters who cast
ballots for them in a prior campaign."
In another departure from the literature, candidates'
race or ethnicity also mattered little in predicting
election outcomes, thus contradicting Lieske's (1989,167)
theory about the importance of candidates "cultural
acceptability for public office."

One should expect

candidates' race and ethnicity to matter more in at-large
elections where candidates run citywide.

In district

elections, most of the candidates share the same racial or
ethnic identification.

In order to account for the

propensity of voters to use race or ethnicity as a cue in
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voting, I coded candidates on the basis of whether or not
they were running as minorities in their wards.

In all of

the analyses, whether or not they involved incumbent
candidates, minority candidates were not significantly
damaged electorally due to their minority status.
Now that I have shown which factors are most important
in predicting success in city council elections, it is time
to examine more thoroughly the questions of why incumbents
are advantaged to the degree that they are, and which
factors are important for understanding why candidates
choose to challenge incumbents at all.
addressed in Chapter Four.

These questions are

CHAPTER IV
IHCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE ABD CABDIDATE STRATEGY
IN CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS
Understanding which candidates have the upper-hand in
city council elections is important because advantage
translates into votes received on election day.

More

importantly, the questions of who is advantaged and what
factors affect electoral competition affect the extent to
which public officials are held responsible to the people
that they serve.

In this chapter, I explore the nature of

competition for off ice by focusing on two aspects of city
council elections: incumbency advantage and candidate
emergence.
As the findings in Chapter Three demonstrate,
incumbents enjoy a clear advantage over their opponents.

In

this chapter, I examine more thoroughly the factors that
undergird this advantage in Chicago city council elections.
By focusing on incumbents, I am able to test the effect that
variables specific to incumbents and their electoral
circumstances have on their ability to garner votes on
election day.

The analysis will provide information about

the nature of competition in city council elections that
involve incumbents and will increase our understanding of
142
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the precise nature of the incumbency advantage.
A related question deals with challengers' decisions to
oppose incumbents.

Given the enormous advantages of

incumbency, why does anyone oppose them when they seek
reelection?

The second part of the chapter explores this

issue by examining political circumstances in which
candidates emerge to run for office.

I first examine all

nonincumbent candidates to see if any general patterns exist
that might explain when candidates run for the city council.
I then move to a more in-depth analysis of the emergence of
incumbent challengers. 1

This is an important facet of city

council elections because most elections involve incumbents.
By examining candidate emergence I seek to understand the
electoral conditions that encourage or discourage candidates
from entering city council races.
Knowing when candidates decide to run for off ice,
however, is different than knowing when highly qualified
candidates run for office.

In order to explore this issue,

I examine factors related to the emergence of high quality
challengers.

Examining challenger political quality may

also shed light on the advantage incumbents have in city
council elections.

For example, if we know that incumbents

are consistently challenged by politically inexperienced

1

Throughout this discussion, nonincumbents who
challenge incumbents are referred to as challengers. By
definition, therefore, all other nonincumbents ran for open
seats.
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candidates, or that the quality of opposition makes no
difference to how well incumbents do on election day, this
moves us forward in terms of understanding why incumbents
rarely fail to be reelected.

Both topics -- incumbency

advantage and candidate emergence -- have received only
slight attention in the urban politics literature.

Bxplaininq Incumbency Advantaqe and Challenqer Behavior

After controlling for spending, media and political
organization endorsements, and number of opponents,
incumbents maintain a 20 point advantage against their
challengers.

While it is clear that incumbents realize an

electoral boost simply because they are current
officeholders, it is unclear why this is the case.
Consistent with aspects of democratic theory, the
literature that informs this analysis suggests that
understanding the incumbency advantage is important for
reasons of "electoral accountability" (Abramowitz 1991,35).
Several competing explanations have been offered by those
who study congressional elections for why incumbents in that
legislative body are difficult to defeat.

For example, some

have suggested that the incumbency advantage is rooted in
the system of perquisites (e.g., franking privilege) and
institutional power (e.g., committee positions), which
members of Congress exploit to enhance their reelection
prospects (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974b; but see Cover 1977).
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others have argued that the weakening of partisan
identification in the electorate (Ferejohn 1977) and the
increased presence of gerrymandered districts favoring
incumbents (Tufte 1973), have improved the ability of
incumbents to withstand electoral competition.

Related to

these explanations are those suggesting that incumbents
insulate themselves from electoral competition by
cultivating loyalty from their constituents via personal
services (Fiorina 1977).

More recent examinations of this

subject have focused on the lack of quality opposition to
incumbents (Jacobson 1992), differences between incumbents
and challengers in how much they spend on their campaigns
(Abramowitz 1991), and how media exposure affects
incumbents' ability to win votes (Goidel and Shields 1994).
Thus, while there is a clear recognition of the incumbent
electoral advantage, there is little agreement as to why it
exists in the first place.
This chapter tests similar explanations for the
incumbent advantage in local elections.

For example, it may

be the case that incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage
because of a lack of viable or high quality opponents on
election day.

If incumbents regularly face candidates who

do not provide serious alternatives to voters, then this
should improve the ability of

incumbents to compete.

An

alternative explanation might be that incumbents use their
institutional positions (e.g., committee chairmanships) to
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satisfy the interests of their constituents, thus further
solidifying their base of political support in the
community.

From their positions within the council,

incumbents may be able to more effectively satisfy
constituency concerns.
I also examine how redistricting, scandal, incumbent
seniority, and method of achieving office (election or
appointment) affect election outcomes.

In addition to these

factors that are more specific to incumbents, I also examine
how

incumbents• spending, opposition spending, media and

political organization endorsements and number of opponents
affect the ability of incumbents to win votes.
Related to why incumbents enjoy a distinct electoral
advantage is the practical question of why anyone would want
to challenge an incumbent, given how hard it is to defeat
one.

Because choices about when to challenge incumbents may

alter election outcomes, it is important to explore the
circumstances in which nonincumbent candidates make that
decision.

The literature on congressional elections is

informative.

It has suggested that the strongest

challengers (i.e., those with the most political
experience), emerge to face incumbents when circumstances
indicate that they (incumbents) are politically weak (Bond,
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983;
Lublin 1994; Squire 1989).

Research has indicated that the

best challengers emerge when national and local political
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conditions improve their chances of winning.

Research also

has shown that the most experienced challengers avoid
running against incumbents with large amounts of cash-onhand to fund their reelection campaigns (Box-Steffensmeier
1996).
In this chapter, I apply this theory to local
elections, relying both on personal factors related to
incumbents and more historical or political factors
affecting their wards.

Because there is little relationship

between urban and national political outcomes, only local
factors are considered.

In addition to examining the

conditions that affect how many candidates emerge in these
contests, I also focus on predictors of challenger quality.
Below I present the results of my analyses of
advantage and candidate emergence.

incumbency

Following that is my

analysis of candidate emergence.

Findings
Incumbency Advantage in Local Elections

The electoral advantage of incumbents in city council
elections is very clear.

Figure 5 shows the percentage of

opposed incumbents who won reelection in the first
aldermanic election, thereby avoiding runoff contests.
Incumbents have won reelection more than 60 percent of the
time in the last three aldermanic elections (1987, 1991, and
1995).

Not only are incumbents winning at very high rates,
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they also have enjoyed a fairly steady increase in average
vote margin over the five elections held from 1979 to 1995.
In other words, the distance between incumbents' vote share
and vote share of their closest competitors has increased,
suggesting that the competitiveness of these elections has
decreased over time.
While these patterns identify a clear pattern, they do
not explain why incumbents are electorally advantaged to the
extent that they are.

Table 12 presents results from the

estimation of two multiple regression models predicting
incumbents• share of the vote.

The equation estimated in

Model 1 is designed to show the effects of variables that
were not tested in models presented in Chapter Three.
For example, incumbents were coded on the basis of
whether or not they were city council committee chairmen at
the time of the election.

As mentioned, committee

chairmanship may provide incumbents with an institutional
base of power that they can use to enhance their reelection
prospects.

Incumbents also were coded on the basis of

whether or not they were appointed to off ice by the mayor
and were therefore running in their first election.

The

expectation here is that appointed incumbents are more
vulnerable politically than those who have been around for a
number of years and have won at least one election to the
office.

In addition, I have included a dummy variable for

redistricting, which indicated whether or not the election
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Figure S. Incumbents' Average Vote
Margin and Percent Who Win
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TABLB 12

Incual:>ents• Vote Percentaqe, Chicaqo City Council
Blections, 1979-1995 (OLS)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Challenger Quality

-.086***
(. 015)

-.020
(. 014)

Committee Chairman

.006
(.029)

-.015
(.023)

Appointed

-.055
(.043)

.032
(.035)

Redistricting

.010
(.023)

.004
(. 018)

Seniority

.002
(.003)

.002
(.002)

Scandal

-.075+
(.042)

.023
(.034)

Spending

.010*
(. 005)

Opposition Spending

-.026***
(. 005)

Media

.060***
(. 012)

Opponents

-.051***
(. 008)

Organization Support

.076***
( . 02 3)

Intercept
Adj. R2
F-value

.608***
(. 028)
.17
7.103***

.577***
(.039)
.59
20.70***

Number of cases
176
150
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unopposed incumbents
are excluded. +p = .10; *P = .05; ***P = .001.
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was held under new ward boundaries. I expect that
incumbents• vote share should decrease under new and
untested district boundaries.

Finally, I control for the

effects of scandal by including a dummy variable coded 1 for
incumbents tainted by scandal at the time of their election
and o otherwise. 2

As another indicator of vulnerability,

scandal should be negatively associated with incumbents•
vote share and incumbents• vote margin.
The two variables that are not dummy variables are
seniority and challenger quality.

Seniority is simply

number of years incumbents had served on the city council at
the time of the election.

I expect more senior councilors

to be perceived as politically vulnerable because of their
susceptibility to attack from political newcomers.
Challenger quality also should be negatively associated with
incumbents• vote share and vote margin.

In quantifying

challenger quality, I have used the political experience
score of incumbents' strongest or highest quality
challenger, using the measure of nonincumbent political
experience developed in earlier chapters. 3

The most

2

This is necessarily subjective. In determining which
incumbents were tainted by scandal, I tried to focus only on
very serious charges (e.g., indictments) or allegations that
were recurrent during the course of the campaign.
3

There were two instances where incumbents faced-off
against one another because of redistricting. These were
Joseph Bertrand against Larry Bloom in the Fifth Ward (1983)
and Carol Bialczak against Mike Wojcik in the Thirtieth Ward
(1995).
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experienced challengers are expected to perform better than
others because they are probably more widely known to the
electorate and to important political elites.

They also are

expected to be somewhat more politically sophisticated, and
therefore better able to run more effective campaigns than
candidates who lack this experience.

Being known to the

electorate (even if only moderately) should peel votes away
from incumbents.
Overall, Model 1 explains 17 percent of the variation
in incumbents' vote share and shows that challenger quality
is the most significant predictor variable.

Incumbents who

face politically experienced challengers see their vote
share reduced by 8.6 percent.

Contrary to expectations,

however, none of the other new predictor variables are
significant at the .05 level.

The scandal variable,

indicating whether or not the incumbent was tainted by
scandal at the time of the election, however, is in the
expected direction (negative) and significant at .10.
Model 1, however, is intentionally underspecified in
order to show how the new predictor variables affect
incumbents' vote share in a multivariate model, and to make
comparisons between it and Model 2.

Because none of the new

predictor variables are significant in Model 1, there is
little reason to believe they will be significant after
adding several other predictor variables.
that this is the case.

Model 2 shows

This model adds variables (e.g.,
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spending, media endorsements, Democratic organization
support, and number of opponents} shown in Chapter Three to
be important in predicting candidates' vote share generally.
overall, Model 2 explains a much greater proportion of the
variation in incumbents' vote share {59% compared to 17%)
and considerably reduces the effect of challenger quality.
This model indicates that the incumbent advantage in city
council elections is related to the same factors that
predict candidates' vote share in the first place, and that
incumbents do well in their elections despite the quality of
their opposition.

In other words, factors such as spending,

and endorsements from local media and political
organizations undergird incumbents' electoral performance in
the same way they bolster candidacies of nonincumbents.
With the exception of challenger quality, none of the new
predictor variables even behave as anticipated.
These findings indicate that one way for challengers to
compete seriously with incumbents is to spend large sums of
money advertising themselves and making voters aware that
they are viable alternatives to incumbents. 4

Unfortunately

for challengers, average opposition spending during the time
frame is only $34,747, compared to average incumbent
spending, which is $78,624.

Figure 6 shows the disparity

between average incumbents' spending and average opposition

4

0pposition spending is the total amount of money spent
by all nonincumbents in races involving incumbents.
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spending.

While average incumbent spending was actually

lower than average challenger spending in the 1979, it has,

in every election since then, doubled and nearly tripled
average opposition spending.
A second way to explore incumbency advantage in city
council elections is to analyze incumbents• vote margin.
Instead of explaining vote share, this analysis tries to
explain the distance between incumbents' vote share and that
of their nearest competitor (in some cases, the dependent
variable is negative, which means that someone other than
the incumbent finished first in the aldermanic election).
This dependent variable is different from vote share because
it measures the competitiveness, or closeness, of elections
involving incumbents.

Table 13 shows the results from two

models designed to predict incumbents' vote margin.
Results from Table 13 are very consistent with results
from Table 12.

In Model 1, none of the new variables

significantly affect incumbents' vote margin, with the
exception of challenger quality and, overall, the model
predicts less than 10 percent of the variation in
incumbents' vote margin.
fully specified equation.

Model 2 presents results from a
The predictors added to model 2

behave as expected and are statistically significant (the
exception being number of opponents, which, although
negatively signed, is not significant).

The model performs

reasonably well with an Adjusted R2 of .46.
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Figure 6. Average Incumbent and
Opposition Campaign Spending
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TABLB 13

IncUllbents• Vote Marqin, Chicaqo City Council Elections,
1979-1995 (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Challenger Quality

-9.995***
(2.367)

-2.992
(2.304)

Committee Chairman

4.595
(4.445)

-.731
(3.780)

Appointed

-3.133
(6.533)

4.287
(5.801)

Redistricting

1.867
(3.494)

.440
(3. 002)

.083
(.388)

.144
(. 351)

-4.264
(6.483)

7.944
(5.519)

Seniority
Scandal
Spending

1.961**
(. 753)

Opposition Spending

-4.479***
(.802)

Media

10.161***
(. 351)

Opponents

-.826
(1.320)

Organization Support

14.011***
(3.695)

Intercept
Adj. R2
F-value

33.462***
(4.351)
.09
3.870***

12.679*
(6.449)
.46
13.337***

Number of cases
176
150
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unopposed incumbents
are excluded. *P = .05; **P = .01; ***P = .001.
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TWo findings from Model 2 are noteworthy, especially when
compared to the same model in Table 12.

First, number of

opponents has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the
closeness of these elections.

This relationship runs

counter to the analyses from Chapter Three and from Table
12.

Thus, while number of opponents affects incumbents'

vote percentage in general terms, it has little effect on
the distance between incumbents and their nearest
competitors in terms of vote share.

This finding suggests

that incumbents cannot be defeated by forcing them to
compete with large numbers of challengers and that number of
opponents has only marginal influence on the closeness of
these elections, despite the fact there is a relationship
between number of opponents and incumbents• vote share.
Table 13 also shows that organization-supported
candidates are distinctly advantaged.

This is the single

most important predictor variable and indicates that
incumbents backed by the Democratic organization in their
wards realize a 14 point edge over their closest rivals.
This finding lends considerable empirical validation to a
claim made in the previous chapter that one of the major
reasons why incumbents are such formidable opponents is due
to their ability to secure support from the Democratic
political organization in their wards.
These two analyses show that the incumbency advantage
in Chicago city council elections is a function of
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organization backing, media support, and campaign spending.
Incumbents' advantage can be lessened somewhat by large
amounts of opposition spending, all else being equal.

It is

rarely the case, however, that opposition spending
approaches that of incumbents.

In fact, the trend is in the

opposite direction; incumbents' spending has increased over
time, while opposition spending has remained fairly constant
(and at considerably lower levels).

Considering the

advantage incumbents have over nonincumbents, under what
circumstances do any candidates seek to unseat them?

The

analyses that follow provide some answers to this question.

candidate Emergence and Candidate strategy

Before examining the conditions or circumstances that
affect challenger emergence, it is important to understand
circumstances in which nonincumbent candidates run for the
city council in general.

This is distinct from questions

about why candidates seek office (i.e., what are their
personal motivations?) and questions about candidate
recruitment (Bledsoe 1993; see also Kazee and Thornberry
1990).

Instead, this part of the analysis applies the

"strategic politicians" theory developed by Jacobson and
Kernell (1983) to local elections.

By looking at the

question in this way, I am able to shed light on how the
political environment shapes candidates• decisions to run
for office.
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In addition to examining the total number of candidates
who might seek off ice in particular wards in given
elections, I also try to predict the emergence of high
quality nonincumbent candidates.

This is accomplished by

taking the score of the most politically-experienced
nonincumbent in the race as the dependent variable.

The

unit of analysis is the ward.
Five independent variables are used to predict number
of candidates running in each ward: redistricting, machine
ward, open seat/non-open seat election, and two demographic
factors, percentage of the ward that is black and percentage
of the ward that is Hispanic.

As mentioned above,

redistricting is a dummy variable coded 1 for wards that
were redistricted and that were holding their first election
under the new boundaries and o otherwise.

I expect a

positive correlation between redistricting and number of
candidates.

It is my hypothesis that candidates will

consider their chances for victory to be greater under new
ward boundaries and therefore run more frequently in these
situations.

Machine is a dummy variable coded 1 for wards

that were considered machine wards at the time of the
election and O otherwise. 5
5

Due to the ability of machine

There are 26 wards that I have defined as machine
wards. Machine wards are those that, historically, have
been loyal to the Cook County Democratic Party. Most, but
not all, are machine wards throughout the time frame. Some,
because of changes in ward boundaries brought by
redistricting and/or changes in political control, were only
considered machine wards in certain election years.
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ward political organizations to control access to the ballot
and competition for office (Kemp and Lineberry 1982; Rakove
1975), I expect a negative correlation between the machine
ward variable and number of candidates.

Open seat/non-open

seat is a dummy variable coded 1 if there was an incumbent
running in the election and O if the seat was open.

I

expect fewer candidates to run in wards where incumbents are
seeking reelection and more candidates to run in open seat
elections.

Candidates who behave strategically will wait to

run in open seat elections rather than risk challenging
incumbents, where they are almost sure to lose.

Finally,

because more candidates run in minority wards (see Chapter
Three), I have included measures in the model for the size
of wards' black and Hispanic populations.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 14.
The model explains 27 percent of the variation in number of
candidates who run in Chicago's wards.

Redistricting has no

effect on candidate emergence, and the sign of the
regression coefficient is negative, contrary to my
hypothesis.

It is possible to speculate that instead of

encouraging candidates to run, redistricted boundaries serve
to insulate from competition incumbents who run for
reelection in the vast majority of city council elections.
Machine wards have a significant and negative effect on
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TABLE 14

IJUm))er of candidates by ward, Chicago City council
Blections, 1979-1995 (OLS)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

b coefficient
(standard error)

standardized
coefficient

.oo

Redistricting

.013
(.167)

Machine

-.571**
(.194)

-.18

-1.153***
(. 253)

-.25

Percent Black

1. 582***
(.270)

.41

Percent Hispanic

.936+
(. 492)

.12

Intercept

3.540***
(.307)

Open Seat/non-Open
Seat

Adj. R2
F-value

.27
19.602***

Number of cases
250
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
+p = .10; **P = .01; ***P = .001.
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number of candidates.

In machine wards, .57 fewer

candidates enter city council races.

In addition to wards'

machine status, the most important variables are whether
elections involve incumbents, and size of the black
population.

Judging from the sign of the regression

coefficient, more candidates choose to run in open seat
elections and more candidates run in wards with higher
percentages of blacks.

Elections involving incumbents have

1.2 fewer candidates than do open seat contests.

These two

findings reflect a) strategic behavior on the part of
candidates to run in open seat contests; and b) the more
politically open character of elections in wards with
greater concentrations of blacks (number of candidates being
a measure of political openness).
There also seems to be a general tendency for higher
quality candidates to run for open seats as well.

Table 15

shows the results of a regression model predicting
nonincumbent candidate quality.

The dependent variable is

coded 0,1, or 2 and indicates the level of political
experience of the most experienced nonincumbent candidate in
the race.

The results indicate a strong and negative

relationship between races that involve incumbents and
nonincumbent political quality.

The quality score for the

most qualified nonincumbents in races against incumbents is
lower by .72, when compared to the most qualified
nonincumbents in open seat races.

Similarly, the most
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qualified nonincumbent candidates avoid running in machine
wards that, in addition to being represented by long-time
incumbents, also are more likely to be tightly controlled by
party organizations that will more than likely put their
support behind candidates loyal to the party, rather than
behind the most qualified candidates.
The results also suggest that nonincumbent candidate
quality is related to number of black residents in wards.
Wards with higher concentrations of blacks are more likely
to experience elections with at least one highly qualified
nonincumbent candidate.

It is possible to speculate that

this is related to two factors.

First, because more

candidates tend to run in black wards generally, the
probability of one of those candidates being politically
experienced is higher.

Second, because ward redistricting

that occurred during the time frame resulted in many new
black wards, this probably presented the first opportunity
for many qualified nonincumbent candidates to run for the
city council.

Based on evidence showing that more

candidates run in wards with high concentrations of black
residents, it is reasonable to suggest that city council
seats in these wards are more highly sought-after than seats
in predominantly white wards.

The value placed on these

posts and the competition for off ice in black wards also
appears to encourage the emergence of at least one (maybe
more) well-qualified candidate(s).
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TABLB 15
Ronincumbent Candidate Quality, Chicaqo City Council
Blectiona, 1979-1995 (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

b coefficient
(standard error)

standardized
coefficient

Redistricting

-.018
(.088)

-.01

Machine

-.296**
(.102)

-.19

-.724***
(.133)

-.31

Open Seat/non-Open
Seat
Percent Black

.438**
(.142)

Percent Hispanic

-.047
(.256)

Intercept

1. 307***

.23
-.01

(.162)
Adj. R2
F-value

.19
13.009***

Number of cases
250
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
**P = .01; ***P = .001.
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llWll:>er of candidates and candidate Quality:
A suaaary of Findinqs
In general, evidence suggests that candidate emergence
in city council elections is mainly a function of political
and demographic circumstances.

Wards with traditional

machine organizations and incumbent aldermen seeking
reelection have fewer candidates (and fewer well-qualified
nonincumbent candidates) running in them.

By contrast,

wards with high concentrations of black residents tend to
have aldermanic elections contested by more candidates.

In

addition, there is a greater chance that at least one
nonincumbent candidate will be

politically experienced in

wards with higher concentrations of blacks, than in
predominantly white or Hispanic wards.

Nonincumbent

candidate quality also appears to be related to political
circumstances.

Higher quality nonincumbent candidates tend

to emerge in open seat elections, where their chances of
victory are greater, rather than in elections involving
incumbents.
These analyses have demonstrated patterns in the
behavior of nonincumbent candidates.

However, because

elections that involve incumbents characterize most city
council elections, it is useful to examine the behavior of
candidates who challenge incumbents.

Because their behavior

might affect the competitiveness of city council elections
involving incumbents, it will be informative to determine if
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challengers' behavior is random in nature or more
systematically geared toward defeating incumbents.

In order

to provide an answer to this question, the analyses that
follow examine the number, and political experience, of
challengers who face incumbents in city council elections.

Challenger Emergence

Based on findings presented above, the number and
political experience of nonincumbent candidates is related
to political and demographic factors.

The evidence suggests

that nonincumbent candidates pref er to run in open seat
elections, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of running against
incumbents.

In addition, the most politically experienced

nonincumbents also prefer to avoid incumbents.

Because

election outcomes are often dictated by the individuals who
decide to run for office {see Lieske 1989), determining when
challengers choose to run against incumbents is an important
question.

In order to answer this question, I examine a)

the number of challengers who emerge to face incumbents; and
b) the political experience of those challengers.
The assumption here is that "strategic" challengers are
those who emerge to face vulnerable incumbents.

For

example, incumbents might be vulnerable in years when their
ward boundaries are new.

Conversely, challengers might

avoid running against powerful committee chairs, or against
incumbents with large campaign war chests {i.e., cash-on-
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hand) to spend on their elections. 6

As discussed above,

challengers might also make decisions to run against
incumbents based on incumbents' previous election vote
share.
The results of the analysis predicting number of
challengers by ward are presented in Table 16.
are shown.

Three models

Model 1 tests the same variables that were used

in predicting candidate emergence, shown in Table 14 and
Table 15 {redistricting, ward status as independent/machine,
open seat/non-open seat, percent black, and percent
Hispanic).

This model explains 19 percent of the variation

in number of challengers.

Consistent with earlier analyses,

challenger emergence is shown to be a function of ward
demographic factors such as percent black and percent
Hispanic.

Contrary to expectations, however, whether the

ward is a machine ward or not is unrelated to predicting
number of challengers.

This is most likely due to the fact

that incumbents who ran unopposed were excluded from the
analysis.

Many of the city's machine wards are controlled

by incumbents who regularly face no opposition.

In three

elections {1979, 1983, 1987), Fred Roti {First Ward) faced
no opposition.

It was not until he went to prison on a

corruption charge, and his ward boundaries were redrawn,
that competition returned to the First Ward.
6

Likewise,

Cash-on-hand is the amount of money incumbents
reported having in their campaign finance accounts on July 1
in the year prior to the election.
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Edward Burke of the Fourteenth Ward faced no opposition in
each of the five elections under study here.

Of the

remaining machine wards, this aspect of ward politics
appears to matter little in deterring incumbent opposition.
Model 2 adds the other variables hypothesized to
influence challenger behavior.

Overall, this model adds

little to the explanatory power of Model 1 (only 1 percent
more in explained variation).

Again, ward demographic

factors are the most important variables predicting
challenger emergence.

None of the factors related to

incumbent vulnerability or strength are statistically
significant at the .05 level, although ward status as
machine and scandal do reach the .10 level of significance.
The only variable that is not in the predicted direction is
seniority.

I expected more senior incumbents to be

perceived as politically vulnerable because of their time in
office.

These incumbents have more identifiable public

records that challengers can run against, might be
vulnerable to challenger arguments that "it's time for a
change," and might be perceived as out-of-touch with
district sentiment.

This, however, is clearly not going on

in Chicago, as more senior members of the city council
attract fewer challengers relative to their more junior
colleagues.
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TABLB 16

lfUaber of Zncumbent Challenqera, Chicaqo City council
Blectiona, 1979-1995 (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Machine

-.206
( . 2 04)

-.442+
(. 245)

-.369
(.228)

Redistricting

.035
(.171)

-.046
(.175)

-.046
(.174)

Percent Black

1.397***
(.267)

1.107***
(. 281)

1.305***
(.280)

Percent Hispanic

1. 206*
(.509)

1.135*
(. 546)

1.133*
(.529)

Seniority

-.011
(.021)

-.000
(. 020)

Committee Chairman

.216
(.214)

.197
(.222)

Scandal

.618+
(.327)

.521
(.328)

Cash-on-Hand

.004
(.004)

(.004)
(.004)

Vote Percentage1

-.007
(. 005)

Appointed Incumbent
Intercept
Adj. R2
F-value

.988**
(.326)
1.677***
(.235)
.19
11.040***

1.978***
(.336)
.20
5.326***

1.565***
(.282)
.22
6.312***

Number of cases
177
154
169
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Unopposed incumbents
are excluded.
1
In the incumbent's previous election.
+p = .10; *P = .05; **P = .01; ***P = .001.
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In Model 3 I have substituted incumbents' status as an
appointee for incumbents' vote percentage in the previous
election as a sign of political vulnerability.

In cases

where vacancies occur on the city council, the mayor has the
power to appoint new council members subject to council
approval.

I expect appointed incumbents to attract more

challengers because, due to their limited time in office,
they are less likely to have developed the type of
constituency loyalty that elected incumbents typically have
achieved.

Although the overall explanatory power of the

model improves little, the incumbent appointee variable is
correctly signed (positive) and statistically significant.
Appointed incumbents attract approximately one more
challenger than do elected incumbents. 7

Challenger Quality
As shown above, the political experience of incumbents•
challengers is related to how well incumbents perform on
election day, even if only marginally.

They are better able

to mount credible campaigns than those challengers who lack
experience.

Thus, it is important to know if decisions by

politically experienced challengers to seek office are based
on perceptions of incumbents• political strength in the
ward.

7

It should be clear that these appointees are competing
in their first election for the office.
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Table 17 presents results of analyses that explain
challenger quality.

The assumption of this analysis and the

models tested here is identical to the analysis presented in
Table 16.

Higher quality challengers are expected to emerge

when incumbents are vulnerable and will avoid challenging
incumbents who appear difficult to unseat.

The unit of

analysis is wards in which incumbents are seeking
reelection.
Model 1 presents results of the regression analysis
using machine, redistricting, percent black, and percent
Hispanic as predictors of challenger quality.

The quality

of challengers in machine wards is clearly lower than that
found in non-machine wards.

Experienced political

candidates therefore appear to make a negative judgment
about the probability of their own success in these kinds of
wards and act accordingly.

This table also indicates that

none of the other predictors are significant and, overall,
the model predicts only 8 percent of the variation in
challenger quality.
Model 2, by contrast, is a fully specified equation
that includes the other indicators of incumbent
vulnerability and

strength.

This model performs

considerably better than Model 1, although percentage of
explained variation (R2 ) not overwhelming (18%).

Again, the

quality of incumbent opposition in machine wards is
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'l'ABLB 17

Challenger Quality, Chicago City Council Elections,
1979-1995 (OLS)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Machine

-.359**
( .130}

-.413**
(.157}

-.465***
(. 144}

Redistricting

-.045
(.109}

-.018
(.112}

-.038
(.110)

Percent Black

.233
(.267)

.102
( .180)

.176
(.177)

Percent Hispanic

-.196
(.325)

-.003
(.348}

-.168
(.335}

Seniority

.018
(. 013}

.002
(. 013}

Committee Chairman

.020
(.137)

-.025
(.140)

Scandal

.038
(. 209}

.122
(. 208}

Cash-on-Hand

-.002
(.003)

-.002
(.003)

Vote Percentage 1

-.010***
(.003}

Appointed Incumbent
Intercept
Adj. R2
F-value

-.296
(.206)
.833***
( .150)
.08
4.915***

1.346***
(. 215}
.18
4.617***

.894***
(.178}
.11
3.195***

Number of cases
177
154
169
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
In the incumbent•s previous election.
**P = .01; ***P = .001.
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generally lower than that found in independent (non-machine)
wards.

The only indicator of incumbent vulnerability that

is significant is incumbents' vote share in their previous
elections.

As this percentage increases, challenger quality

in the subsequent election decreases.

This is in marked

contrast to the findings presented in Table 16, where it was
shown that incumbent vulnerability (as indicated by their
previous vote share) was not significant in predicting
number of challengers.

The findings indicate that

incumbents who did poorer than their colleagues in their
previous elections tend to face higher quality challengers,
although not greater numbers of them, a finding that is
consistent with my hypothesis.
Model 3 attempts to determine if being an appointed
incumbent affects the quality of challengers who emerge to
face incumbents.

Holding constant all other predictors and

excluding incumbents' previous vote share (appointed
incumbents do not have a previous vote share), this model
indicates that it does not.

Judging from the findings

presented in Table 16 and Table 17, appointed incumbents
might face a greater number of challengers than incumbents
who have won an election, but they do not necessarily face a
better crop of challengers.

This may have do with the fact

that these aldermen are appointed by incumbent mayors, and
thus can typically rely on mayoral endorsements and support
in their first election battle, a fact that higher quality
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challengers might consider when making decisions about when
to run for office.

challenqer Emerqence an4 Challenqer Quality: A summary
The findings reported here suggest that challenger
emergence is mainly a function of ward demographics.

More

challengers emerge in black and Hispanic wards than in white
wards, and there is evidence to suggest that more
challengers emerge to face appointed incumbents who are
running in their first election for their seats.

The

findings also show that higher quality challengers are
strategic in two ways: a) they do not challenge incumbents
in machine wards; and b) they tend to challenge incumbents
whose support in the ward appears soft (based on previous
vote share).

Comparing Table 16 and Table 17, the evidence

shows that political candidates make decisions to challenge
incumbents on the basis of some indicators of incumbent
vulnerability and not others.

Discussion
This chapter has sought to uncover the basis for the
incumbent advantage in Chicago city council elections and to
predict candidate emergence in these contests.

The findings

indicate that the basis for the incumbent advantage is
organization backing, campaign spending, and media
endorsements.

None of the other factors specific to
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incumbents or their unique political circumstances appear to
affect outcomes in these elections.

These findings are

consistent when predicting both incumbents• vote percentage
and incumbents' vote margin.

Incumbents' electoral

advantage also is only marginally affected

by the quality

of opposition, a finding which represents a clear
theoretical departure from other studies of legislative
elections (see Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).
The basis for the incumbent advantage in city council
elections is an important issue that gets to the heart of
questions related to representation and competition in city
council elections.

This analysis has provided some answers

to why incumbents dominate local election outcomes.
question is: what are challengers to do?

The

The analyses

presented above indicate that the most promising thing that
challengers can do to decrease the size of the incumbent
advantage is to spend money, a finding that is consistent
with studies done on U.S. House elections (see Abramowitz
1991).

While this is one possible way to make aldermanic

elections involving incumbents more competitive, the down
side is that average opposition spending (by all incumbent
challengers) lags far behind average incumbent spending, a
fact which is unlikely to change anytime soon.

Knowing the

difficulty of unseating incumbents, and more than likely
satisfied with the status quo, contributors give to
incumbents in far greater amounts than they do to
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challengers (see Chapter Five).

Thus we are likely to

continue to see the most competitive races taking place in
open seat elections.
The second part of this chapter was devoted to learning
more about factors related to candidate emergence,
especially in races against incumbents.

In general, the

findings indicate that more candidates run in minority wards
than in white wards, in open seat elections, and in nonmachine or independent wards.

That more candidates run in

minority wards is likely related to two factors: Harold
Washington's 1983 and 1987 campaigns for mayor and the
political activism that they spawned, and minority group
success in ward redistricting battles.

Washington's mayoral

campaigns, combined with hostility toward both incumbent
Mayor Jane Byrne and President Ronald Reagan, mobilized
black voters and activists in dramatic fashion.

In addition

to increasing the size of the black electorate, Washington's
political movement also educated black activists in how to
run effective campaigns for local office (Grimshaw 1992,168169).

Minority activism was likely encouraged further as a

result of minority group success in ward redistricting
battles, which increased the number of city council seats
for which black and Hispanic candidates would be
competitive.
The creation of majority minority wards in the late
1980s and early 1990s may also have encouraged more
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candidates to run in the 1991 and 1995 elections.

Because

of ward redistricting success, there has been little time
for incumbents in these wards to solidify their electoral
base and to entrench themselves in office.

As the

coefficient for incumbent seniority suggests, challengers
are not going after long-term incumbents, preferring instead
to challenge newer members.

These newer members tend to be

black and Hispanic, and to represent black and Hispanic
wards. 8
Candidate emergence also is a function of whether seats
are

open or involve incumbents seeking reelection.

This

stands to reason as one would expect candidates who are
serious about winning to avoid running against incumbents.
Machine wards also had a negative effect on the number of
city council candidates who ran for off ice in these wards
during the time frame.

This, however, is most likely an

artifact of the few machine wards that, throughout much of
the time frame, featured only the incumbent alderman running
for reelection.

When the sample of candidates is restricted

to incumbent challengers (excluding unopposed incumbents),
the findings suggest that whether wards are independent or
not has little direct effect on number of challengers and
8

In the 1991 elections, 59 percent of black incumbents
and 100 percent of Hispanic incumbents had served five years
or less, compared to 38 percent for white incumbents. At
the time of the 1995 elections, 53 percent of black
incumbents and 100 percent of Hispanic incumbents had served
5 years or less, compared to 43 percent of white incumbents.

178

that the most important variable is minority population
size.

In addition to this factor, incumbents who were

appointed to office (and running in their first elections)
tend to attract larger numbers of opponents than incumbents
who reached off ice via the normal election route at least
once before.

It is likely the case that within wards, there

are several individuals who desire office and who think they
should be considered to fill appointments.

Knowing that the

odds of defeating entrenched incumbents are long, they run
in the first election following an appointment, when the
appointed incumbent is still relatively unknown to voters.
The political character of wards and incumbents•
previous election vote share, however, while having little
effect on number of challengers, do have discernable effects
on the quality of opposition that emerges to challenge
incumbents.

Regardless of how challenger quality affects

incumbents• vote share, the expectation that politically
experienced candidates base their decisions to run on
measures of incumbent vulnerability is born out.

Higher

quality candidates tend to emerge against vulnerable
incumbents and to avoid running in machine wards.

Research

on city council careers indicates that marginal incumbents
are twice as likely as electorally secure incumbents to
remain marginal five years after their initial election
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(Bledsoe 1993,89). 9

Based on the findings from Chicago city

council elections, this may be due to the fact that higher
quality candidates are more likely to run against vulnerable
incumbents than they are to run against safe ones.

Thus we

see a certain amount of strategy and calculation on the part
of city council candidates when deciding to run for local
off ice, a finding that is consistent with results from
studies of other types of legislative elections (see Bond,
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson and Kernell 1983;
squire 1989).
In all of the analyses contained in Chapter Three and
Chapter Four, the ability to spend money has been shown to
be of great value in determining outcomes and dynamics in
city council elections.

Related to this question is what

factors affect the ability of candidates to raise campaign
money in the first place.

Chapter Five examines variation

in campaign fundraising and how one might characterize
fundraising patterns within election years.

9

Bledsoe's (1993,89) research also showed that a
majority (54%) of incumbents who were considered vulnerable
after their first election had increased their electoral
margins to comfortable levels five years later. For
incumbents who had won their first election with comfortable
margins, 76 percent remained electorally safe five years
later.

CHAPTER V
CAMPAIGN PUHDRAISING IN CITY COUNCIL BLBCTIONS
In previous chapters I have shown that campaign
spending is a critical variable in predicting candidates'
share of the vote in Chicago aldermanic elections.

This is

true both for incumbents and nonincumbents, and indicates
that how extensively candidates are able to advertise
themselves to the electorate is important for improving name
identification among voters and increasing the number of
votes candidates receive on election day.

Candidates spend

money to advertise themselves via billboard and media ads,
to print and produce campaign leaflets, and to raise money.
Most studies dealing with campaign finance have focused
on candidates for national office (Alexander 1992; Jacobson
1980; Sorauf 1988), while others have examined campaign
fundraising in the states (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992;
Dow 1994; Huckshorn 1985; Redfield 1995).

Very few

scholars, however, have examined fundraising in local
campaigns.

The reasons for this are unknown, but it might

be related to the fact that there is no one source of data
on city council campaign finance.

While the research

presented in this chapter does not make use of a
comprehensive database on local campaign finance, it does
180
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utilize data on candidates who ran in the last three (1987,
1991, and 1995) Chicago aldermanic elections.

Because city

councils off ice often constitutes a starting point for those
wanting careers in politics (Bledsoe 1993, 169-173), 1 the
findings presented in this chapter will provide an important
addition to existing literature.
Campaign fundraising is examined instead of spending
because spending is typically viewed as an independent
variable, rather than as something to be explained.
Explaining fundraising is more theoretically important than
explaining spending because candidates cannot spend what
they do not have.

And, as the linkage between

spending and

votes becomes clearer (Arrington and Ingalls 1984; Jacobson
1980; Lieske 1989), this campaign activity (fundraising)
assumes greater relevance for candidates' success.
Understanding which candidates (incumbents, challengers, and
those running in open seat elections) are best able to raise
money for their campaigns, therefore, is an important
question because of its linkage to electoral competition.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze campaign
fundraising by city council candidates.
look at three questions.

Specifically, I

First, what are the differences in

fundraising among candidates and how might one characterize
the pattern of fundraising during the election cycle?
1

In addition, as Bledsoe (1993,156) points out, many
councilors in large cities view the city council as a step
up the political ladder, rather than as a step down.
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Second, what factors explain variation in candidates'
ability to raise money for their campaigns?

And third, what

effect does early fundraising success have on subsequent
efforts to raise money?

The answers to these questions will

provide needed insights into the ability of candidates to
compete in the drive to raise money for their campaigns.

It

will also provide needed insights into the dynamics of
campaign fundraising and how this varies among candidates.
I specifically examine the 1987, 1991, and 1995 Chicago
aldermanic elections. 2

Chicago is a particularly useful

place to study patterns in campaign fundraising due to the
size of its city council (50 members) and because of the
availability of campaign finance data. 3

These two factors

enable one to analyze variation in fundraising for a large
number of candidates over time.

While scholars have

examined many aspects of city council campaigns including
campaign research, advertising, and mass mobilization
{Howell and Oiler 1981; Raymond 1992), the issue of
fundraising has largely been ignored.
The chapter proceeds in four sections.
literature relevant to this research.

Below I discuss

The second section

presents descriptive data on campaign fundraising in the
2

Because the 1991 and 1995 campaign disclosure reports
require more extensive reporting of campaign contributions,
I spend the most time in this chapter looking at these
elections.
3

Chicago city council candidates were first required to
file campaign disclosure reports in 1975.
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1987, 1991 and 1995 elections and breaks down candidates'
campaign spending reports by reporting periods to determine
when candidates are most active in soliciting funds.

Using

these data and research findings in the literature as
guides, I develop and test a model to explain variations in
candidates' fundraising, the results of which are presented
in the third section.

The final section discusses the

chapter's implications for our understanding of campaign
fundraising in city council elections.

Campaign Fundraisinq

As mentioned above, campaign fundraising is an
important strategic element of campaigns because of the
relationship between spending and votes.

While the effects

of campaign spending in determining candidates' vote share
in national elections are well-known (Abramowitz 1991; Green
and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1980), less work has been done on
this question as it relates to local elections.

The limited

number of studies that have been done, however, indicate
that candidates' ability to spend money to enhance their
name recognition pays-off electorally.

Arrington and

Ingalls (1984), for example, found that campaign spending
was a significant predictor of vote outcomes in local and
state legislative elections in North Carolina.

Campaign

spending also was shown to be a significant predictor of
total votes received, even after controlling for candidate
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qualifications, political following, and race in a study of
Cincinnati city council elections (Lieske 1989,158).
similarly, in a study of the 1991 Chicago aldermanic
elections conducted for the Chicago Urban League, Lewis,
Gierzynski, and Kleppner (1995,44) found that campaign
spending was second in importance only to incumbency in
predicting candidates' vote percentage.

In general,

campaign spending bridges the gap between candidates and
voters and helps to educate the public about candidates'
platforms and qualifications for off ice.
With the exception of the Chicago Urban League's
research (which also looked at fundraising), however, there
have been no in-depth studies conducted on the topic of
fundraising in the urban politics literature.

In the Urban

League study, fundraising was shown to be mainly a function
of candidates' race, political organization support, preelection name identification, and number of opponents
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995,45).

Somewhat

surprisingly, however, incumbency was not found to be a
significant predictor in a multivariate model of total
contributions, although incumbents were shown to dominate
nonincumbents in terms of average levels of fundraising
(Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner 1995,25).

Other treatments

of fundraising in local politics have been primarily
journalistic in nature and have focused on mayoral
elections, rather than city council contests (see Sorauf
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1988,291-292).
Fundraising in state and national elections, however,
has received considerably more attention due in large
measure to the availability of campaign finance data, which
became available on the national level in 1972 (Alexander
1992; Jacobson 1980).

Several studies inform the research

presented in this chapter.

For example, the ability of

candidates to raise campaign money has been linked to the
quality of their campaign organizations (i.e., whether or
not they use paid consultants, high-tech polling, legal
counsel) (Herrnson 1992), and to how aggressively candidates
pursued campaign contributions (Grenzke 1989,259).

In

addition to these factors, other research has shown that
candidates who experienced fundraising success early in
their campaigns were able to generate greater contributions
than their opponents (Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994,465).
Thus, certain candidates (e.g., incumbents, white
candidates), who pursue funds aggressively, are expected to
be advantaged in terms of how much money they can raise for
their campaigns.

In addition, research on the dynamics of

fundraising has indicated that early money has a positive
effect on fundraising conducted at later points in
campaigns.
Thus, I expect a number of factors to influence
variation in candidates' ability to raise money for their
campaigns.

Incumbency, candidates' political experience,
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number of opponents, candidates• race, and fundraising
effort, all are expected to influence the ability of
candidates to raise money.

Candidates who are successful in

raising funds early also are likely to experience
fundraising success as their campaigns progress.

Below I

present descriptive data on fundraising differences among
candidates in city council elections.

Findings
Average contributions by Type of candidate

In this section I present data that show variations in
candidates' fundraising.

Understanding these basic

differences is important because it helps inform hypotheses
tested later in the chapter and because it helps to
establish a context within which to analyze these questions.
Figure 7 shows average contributions for incumbents,
challengers, and candidates for open seats in each of the
three election years. 4

As expected, incumbents dominate all

other candidates in terms of how much money they can raise
for their campaigns.

Moreover, incumbents are the only

candidates who have experienced steady increases in their
fundraising totals.

Between 1987 and 1991, average

incumbents' contributions grew, in constant dollars, by 17.5
percent {$48,986 to $57,562), and from 1987 to 1995 average

4

All analyses in this paper include only candidates who
faced opposition.
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incumbents' receipts grew by more than 50 percent.
The same cannot be said for nonincumbents.

Virtually

no change in average contributions for challengers occurred
in these elections.

From 1987 to 1991, average challenger

contributions grew by $126 (1%), and between 1987 and 1995,
average challenger contributions increased by $1,644, from
$17,246 to $18,890 (9.5%).

The story is somewhat different,

however, for candidates running in open seat races.

While

the differences between 1987 and 1995 are small (5%), these
candidates are able to generate significantly greater
amounts of money for their elections than are challengers. 5
In general, these elections are more competitive, compared
to elections involving incumbents, 6 thus stimulating public
and media interest, and campaign dollars.

On average,

candidates in open seat races also have more political
experience than those who challenge incumbents. 7

These

descriptive findings are consistent with the literature that
has examined other legislative elections (Jacobson 1980),
and consistent with what one might expect based on limited

5

Unreported analysis indicated that these differences
were significant.
6

The percentage of candidates from open seats who were
forced to compete in runoff elections was 35 percent in the
time period, compared to 26 percent for incumbent
candidates.
7

53 percent of candidates in open seat elections had
some type of political experience, compared to only 37
percent for challengers.
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Figure 7. Fundraising Differences,
Chicago City Council Candidates
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research on local fundraising.
There are clear fundraising differences between
candidates, a factor that ultimately affects candidates'
ability to wage competitive campaigns.

Incumbents are able

to raise the most funds, while those candidates in the most
difficult political situations (challengers) raise the
least.

While knowing average differences among candidates

is important, it is also important to understand when
candidates are most active in terms of fundraising.
Candidates who are able to raise large amounts of money in
the weeks before the election should be able to advertise
themselves and their campaigns better than those who are
unable to raise such funds.

Moreover, timing is important

because voters are more likely to pay greater attention to
campaigns as the election date approaches.

Below I present

descriptive data on candidates' average daily receipts at
various time points in the 1991 and 1995 election cycles.

Pun4raisinq Patterns
Because candidates are required to file periodic
reports disclosing their campaign fundraising activity, it
is possible to understand at what point in their campaigns
candidates most actively pursue funds and how this might
vary among candidates.

After meeting a $1,000 threshold in

either contributions or expenditures, candidates for the
Chicago city council are required to file campaign finance
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disclosure reports.

Candidates file two semi-annual reports

each year, as well as pre-election reports thirty days in
advance of an election.

Because I have limited this study

to the twelve-month period beginning July 1 of the year
prior to the election, I have three time points for all
candidates, one covering campaign activity through December
31; another from January 1 to a date thirty days prior to
the primary election; and a third report covering activity
from the end of the pre-election report through June 30. 8
Candidates who compete in runoff elections are required to
complete a fourth report, which they file with state
authorities thirty days prior to the runoff.
Because reporting periods vary in length, it was
necessary to create a standard measure for contributions.
This was done by dividing total contributions received
during the reporting period by the number of days in the
period, to derive an average daily contributions total. 9

By

standardizing this variable, it is possible to make
comparisons concerning the relative amount of fundraising
8

This third period is not a legal reporting period.
Instead, I subtracted the amount of revenue reported in the
January reporting period from the semi-annual report ending
June 30, to determine the amount of fundraising activity by
candidates in the period following the first pre-election
report.
9

For 1991, the periods (in days) were: 7/1/90-12/31/90
(184 days); 1/1/91-1/27/91 (27 days); for runoff candidates
only, 1/28/91-3/3/91 (35 days); and 1/28/91-6/30/91 (154
days). For 1995, the periods were: 7/1/94-12/31/94 (184
days); 1/1/95-1/29/95 (29 days); for runoff candidates only,
1/30/95-3/5/95 (36 days); and 1/30/95-6/30/95 (153 days).
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activity for each candidate during each reporting period.
The following reporting periods were analyzed for the 1991
election:
1. Semi-annual report: 7/1/90-12/31/90
2. Pre-election report: 1/1/91-1/27/91
3. Pre-election report (runoff candidates only): 1/28/913/3/91
4. Semi-annual (less first pre-election report): 1/28/916/30/91
The following reporting periods were analyzed for the 1995
election:
1. Semi-annual report: 7/1/94-12/31/94
2. Pre-election report: 1/1/95-1/29/95
3. Pre-election report (runoff candidates only): 1/30/953/5/95
4. Semi-annual (less first pre-election report): 1/30/956/30/95
This descriptive analysis will permit some understanding of
the internal dynamics of fundraising, when it occurs most,
and how it varies across candidates.

It will also show how

much money runoff candidates are able to raise for their
general election campaigns.
Figure 8 shows average daily campaign contributions for
three classes of candidates in the 1991 elections:
incumbents, challengers, and those running in open seat
elections.

As one may have guessed, incumbents hold a

distinct advantage over their opponents (challengers) in
terms of total funds raised, and also
open seat candidates.

raise far more than

Incumbents raise more money than

their opponents, on average, in each of the reporting
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periods shown.

During the period ending December 31, 1990,

incumbents averaged $123.56 per day in contributions.

By

contrast, challengers averaged only $30.16 per day in
contributions.

At the end of the pre-election reporting

period, incumbents averaged $376.68 per day in
contributions, while challengers, although improving their
average daily contributions total, lagged far behind
incumbents at only $112.57 per day.

During the third

period, which includes the month prior to the election and
three months after the election in which one would expect
less fundraising activity (at least for those not
participating in April runoff elections), incumbents raised
$201.62 per day, compared to challengers who raised $56.75
per day.
Candidates for open seats, like challengers, have
limited fundraising success during the six month period
prior to the election year, averaging only $39.42 per day in
total contributions.

Open seat candidates, however, pick up

the pace considerably (vis-a-vis those who challenge
incumbents) as the

election day approaches, averaging

$240.01 per day in contributions during January.

They also

do better than challengers in the third period shown,
averaging $91.45 more than challengers in average daily
contributions.
The pattern for the 1995 aldermanic elections is nearly
identical to that seen in 1991 (see Figure 9).

The only

193

Figure 8. Fundraising by Chicago
City Council Candidates, 1991
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real differences are in the totals reported by open seat
candidates.

In general, they reported slightly lower

average totals than in 1991 ($76.77 in the first period;
$216.52 in the second period; and, $167.28 in the third
period).

Incumbents and challengers reported nearly

identical amounts in both elections.
Because they are required to file an additional preelection report of campaign contribution activity, an
analysis of runoff candidates' reports paints a more
accurate picture of the ebb and flow of campaign money
during the election year.

This is because runoff candidates

are required to file a report thirty days prior to the April
election, and thus their second pre-election report covers
the month in which the primary election occurs.

Figure 10

shows average daily contributions for incumbents,
challengers, and open seat candidates who ran in 18
aldermanic runoff elections in 1991.
The data indicate that candidates are busiest raising
money during the month of February.

This is clearly what

would be expected as candidates race to finish first in the
primary and as the demand for money intensifies.

Incumbents

lead other candidates during the period from January 28 to
March 3, averaging $593.17 per day in contributions.

Open

seat candidates and challengers also raise impressive
amounts of money, averaging over $300 per day during this

195

Figure 9. Fundraising by Chicago
City Council Candidates, 1995
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Figure 10. Runoff Fundraising,
Chicago City Council Candidates, 1991
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month.

Second, the top open seat and challenger candidates

make dramatic improvements in their ability to raise money,
increasing their average daily totals from only $50 per day
to over $300 per day in the span of three months.

This is

most likely a reflection of two factors: a) time

committed

to fundraising vis-a-vis other campaign activities, and b)
success in primary elections.

Third, while incumbents

raise, on average, approximately $300 more than
nonincumbents during the month of February, this is most
likely a sign of electoral desperation than electoral
strength.

The inability to raise significantly greater

amounts of money than challengers during the first two
reporting periods might be why they are forced into runoff
elections in the first place.

They are able to generate

funds as the election approaches in February, but this may
not be enough to avoid the April runoff election to retain
their seats on the council.
The 1995 data for runoff candidates {see Figure 11)
also show that candidates are most involved in fundraising
during the month of the primary election.

Unlike the 1991

elections, however, the data indicate that among runoff
election candidates, those in open seat contests were the
ones raising the most money.

In fact, the 1995 data show

that open seat candidates raised similar amounts of money as
did incumbents forced into runoffs in 1991.

Challengers in

runoff elections also were able to eclipse their incumbent

198
opponents in terms of average daily receipts.
surprising as the 1995 data may be, they are most
likely due to the fact that among the 22 candidates in 11
runoff elections, several of the challengers, and many of
the candidates in open seat races, had high degrees of preelection name identification and political experience.

Of

the six runoff candidates for open seats on the council,
four (Jesse Granato and

c. Victoria Almeida in the First

Ward; Janet Oliver-Hill in the Fifth Ward; and Vilma Colom
in the Thirty-Fifth Ward) had some political experience,
either as candidates themselves, or as staff members to
incumbent aldermen.

Two of these candidates, Almeida and

Oliver-Hill, were the incumbent Democratic committeeman in
their wards at the time of the election.
similarly advantaged.

Colom was

Having run once before for citywide

office, she was also the beneficiary of substantial support
from powerful alderman and ward committeeman Richard Mell
from the neighboring Thirty-Third Ward.
Among challengers, Geraldine Laury was endorsed by the
Second Ward Democratic Organization and also is the sister
of former alderman, now congressman, Bobby Rush.

In the

Southeast Side Tenth Ward, former state representative and
incumbent ward committeeman Clem Balanoff squared-off
against the incumbent Alderman John Buchanan.

Hal Baskin in

the Sixteenth Ward, who faced incumbent Shirley Coleman,
received substantial pre-election news coverage for being
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Figure 11. Runoff Fundraising,
Chicago City Council Candidates, 1995
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not only a one-time felon, but also allied with 21st Century
vote, a political action committee founded by gang leaders
on the city's South Side.

Walter Burnett in the Twenty-

Seventh Ward received similar exposure and also had the
benefit of being endorsed by Cook County Recorder of Deeds
Jesse White, his employer at the time of the election.
Finally, in the city's Thirty-Ninth Ward, Anthony Fornelli,
who faced incumbent Margaret Laurino, most likely benefited
from his experience and contacts in the legal profession, as
well as from his experience in civic affairs as a member of
the Chicago Plan Commission.

Clearly, 1995 saw the

emergence of several highly qualified nonincumbents, and
patterns in fundraising reflected this fact.

While one

cannot generalize from the patterns established in the 1995
runoff elections, it is instructive to see that highly
qualified candidates can be effective in the fundraising
arena, even against incumbents.
The data and anecdotal evidence for the 1995 runoff
elections indicate that candidates are quite active during
the

month of February raising money in order to make

contacts with voters that they hope will translate into
votes on election day.

Comparing the results from 1991 and

1995 runoff elections, one is struck by the ability of
nonincumbent candidates in the more recent election to
generate revenue for their campaigns.

As discussed, this is

most likely due to the fact that these candidates were
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politically-involved and politically-connected prior to
their campaigns, advantages that apparently paid dividends
in terms of their ability to finance their campaigns.

The Bbb and Plow of Campaiqn Dollars: A SUllllary of Pindinqs

Challengers clearly have the hardest time raising money
for their campaigns, as is evidenced by their relatively low
average daily totals shown in each of the three reporting
periods in 1991 and 1995.

This is most likely a reflection

of strategic behavior on the part of those contributing
money to campaigns.

Because the odds of unseating

incumbents are long, and because most contributors prefer to
back winners, contributions flow more readily to incumbent
candidates.

It is also very likely that due to the lack of

political experience of challengers (see Chapter Four), they
find it difficult to make and sustain the kinds of contacts
in the business and political communities to help them raise
money for political campaigns.

Because open seat candidates

have more political experience than other nonincumbents in
general, and because their ability to compete seriously for
office is enhanced by not having to face incumbents, these
candidates are able to raise considerably more funds than
challengers during each reporting period.
Although these descriptive data tell an important part
of the story, it does not allow one to rule out alternative
hypotheses.

Incumbency may be a very important predictor of
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candidates' ability to raise money.

Based on the evidence

presented thus far one might guess that this would be the
case.

It may also be the case, however, that black and

Hispanic candidates find raising money more difficult than
white candidates, or that fundraising is a dynamic process
influenced by early contributions.
related to electoral competition.

Fundraising may also be
In order to explore these

possibilities, I test multivariate models of campaign
fundraising.

A Hodel to Explain Campaign Fundraisinq

A number of variables are expected to influence
candidates' ability to raise money.

Some of these factors

relate to candidate attributes (such as race or political
experience), while others relate to candidates' electoral
circumstances.

Because incumbents typically win reelection,

and because contributors are usually pragmatic in their
donating practices (i.e., they give to likely winners) (BoxSteffensmeier and Dow 1992,624), I expect significant
fundraising differences to exist between incumbents and
nonincumbents.

To account for this, I have included a dummy

variable coded 1 for incumbents and o for nonincumbents.

In

general, I expect incumbency to be a positive and

significant predictor of total campaign contributions.
In addition to incumbency, I expect candidates' race or
ethnicity to be an important predictor of contributions
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received.

Because candidates draw contributions from their

own wards primarily, and because racial and ethnic
minorities run in wards with lower levels of personal
income, I expect minority candidates to report fewer

contributions than white candidates who run in more affluent
wards.

To control for this possibility, I have included a

dummy variable for candidates' race.

I also expect total contributions to be related to the
amount of time or effort (in months) that candidates devote
to fundraising.

Using a combination of when campaign

committees were created and when candidates filed their last
reports, I was able to estimate the amount of time
candidates devoted to raising money for their campaigns
during the period under study.

Because incumbents'

committees exist from one election to the next, they were
all credited with 12 months of fundraising activity.
Nonincumbents typically create their committees much closer
to the primary election10 and therefore the amount of time
they engage in fundraising is much shorter and varies more
extensively than for incumbents.

Unlike state and national

politicians who employ professional campaign consultants and
organizations, local candidates in Chicago are more likely

10

Throughout this chapter I use the term primary when
referring to aldermanic elections. Technically, these
elections are not primaries because candidates can win their
seats by getting more than 50 percent of the vote. Runoff
elections are held between the top two vote-getters when no
one candidate receives a simple majority.
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to rely on personal campaigning.

This is not to say,

however, that they are not serious or professional in their
attempt to win off ice.

One measure of their devotion and

professionalism as it relates to their campaigns is the
amount of time they allocate to fundraising.
Candidates' fundraising also should be related to the
amount of competition they face on election day.
Competition is measured according the amount of resources
opposition candidates can mobilize in support of their
efforts.

Opposition spending, for example, should affect

candidates' fundraising, as this is a visible sign of the
quality of opponents' campaigns and should elicit a response
on the part of others to increase the intensity of their own
fundraising.

Because of this I expect that as opposition

spending increases, candidates will try to keep pace by
increasing their own fundraising. 11
Number of opponents also is included as a measure of
electoral competition.

Because the overall amount of money

available in wards for campaign contributions is likely to
be limited, I expect greater numbers of opponents to have a

negative effect on candidates' total revenues.

With more

candidates seeking money from the same pool of funds, each
additional candidate in the race should have a negative

11

0pposition spending is the sum total of all spending
by one's opponents.
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effect on any one candidate's ability to generate revenue. 12
Number of opponents is simply the number of candidates in
the race, minus one.
The dependent variable is candidates• total campaign
fundraising (minus in-kind gifts), which was taken from
candidates' campaign finance disclosure reports filed with
the state.

Fundraising is measured at two points in time.

The first time period is the one ending December 31 of the
year prior to the election, and the second period is the one
ending June 30 of the election year. 13

Although there are

other reporting periods, I focus on these two time periods
because this is when most fundraising activity takes place.
I test separate models for each period, expecting that
fundraising will be influenced by different variables at
different points in campaigns.

Independent variables

include incumbency, candidates' race or ethnicity, number of
opponents, fundraising effort, previous contributions,
challenger quality, and opposition spending.

The results of

my analysis are presented below.
In all cases, total contributions for each candidate

12

0f course, candidates can raise money throughout the
city, but most tend to generate revenue within their wards
(see the Lewis, Gierzynski, and Kleppner (1995), pages iii) .
13

I have not analyzed the 1987 elections because the
nature of candidates' campaign finance disclosure reports
prohibits one from determining how much money candidates
raised in the six month period ending the year prior to the
election and in the first six months of the election year.
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were converted into constant dollars (1995=100) and divided
by 1,000 to simplify interpretation of regression
coefficients.

Candidates who did not file reports were

coded as raising no money for their campaigns.

Because the

vast majority of candidates were either incumbents or
challengers (85%), I focus primarily on these candidates.
examine the 1991 and 1995 election years separately for
different groupings of candidates.

The unit of analysis is

the candidate and ordinary least squares regression is used
to analyze the data.
Table 18 presents results from an analysis of
incumbents and challengers who ran in the 1991 election.
The results from the first time period are somewhat
surprising.

Incumbency, expected to be the strongest

predictor, is not significant in this time period.

By

contrast, what appears to matter most is the amount of time
(in months) candidates devote to fundraising.

Candidates

who devote more time to fundraising raise more money than
those who devote less time.

Judging from the size of the

coefficient, candidates produce about $911 each month they
raise funds during this part of the election cycle.

The

coefficients for candidates' race and number of opponents,
while in the predicted direction, are not significant, and
the variable denoting candidates' ethnicity (Hispanic) is
neither significant, nor in the predicted direction.
The results from the model predicting fundraising in

I
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TABLB 18

Factors Influencinq Fundraisinq by Chicaqo City council
candidates in the 1991 Blectiona

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

First Reporting
Period 1

Second Reporting
Period2

Incumbent

4.713
(3.455)

20.248***
(5.737)

Black

-2.750
(2.932)

-7.227
(5.255)

Hispanic

2.182
(5.084)

-11.175
(9.099)

Number of Opponents

-.977
(1.013)

-2.292
{l.824)

Fundraising Effort

.911**
(.305)

Previous
Contributions

.695***
( .169)

Opposition Spending

-.164
( .116)

Intercept
Adj. R2

F-value

10.723***
(3.241)
.23
7.628***

14.655*
(6.365)

.41
13.575***

Number of cases
111
110
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
Period ending December 31, 1990.
2
Period ending June 30, 1991.

*P = .os.
**P = .01.
***P = .001.
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the subsequent time period are presented in the second
column.

The dependent variable is total contributions as of

June 30 of the election year.

To this model I have added

two variables: candidates' total contributions at the end of
the first time period, to determine whether or not raising
money is a dynamic process that builds on early fundraising
success, and total opposition spending, as one measure of
electoral comepetition (the other being number of
opponents).

This model excludes the fundraising effort

variable because it is constant for most candidates during
this period. 14
These results indicate that the model explains 41
percent of the variation in candidates' fundraising.

The

coefficient for the incumbency variable shows that
incumbents realized a $20,000 advantage over their
challengers in this period of the 1991 election cycle.

In

addition to incumbency, each $1,000 of contributions in the
first period is matched by approximately $700 in the second
period.

Thus, as hypothesized, the most important

predictors are incumbency and previous contributions.
of these indicators measure candidate viability.

Both

Incumbents

are clearly favored to win elections and therefore are able
to attract large sums of money.

14

Similarly, candidates who

There were a few instances when candidates did not
get credit for 6 months of fundraising in the second time
period but, in general, there is very little variation on
this variable.
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are able to raise money early in campaigns demonstrate their
seriousness and ability to win elections.

Other findings

show that the coefficients for candidates' race, ethnicity,
and number of opponents, while in the predicted direction,
are not significant.

Also, contrary to my hypothesis,

opposition spending exerts a negative, but insignificant
effect on candidates' fundraising.
Table 19 shows results of identical models tested on
the 1995 aldermanic elections.

Overall, the model for the

first reporting period explains 53 percent of the variation
in candidates' fundraising.

Contrary to 1991, in the first

reporting period the incumbent dummy variable is a positive
and significant predictor of fundraising.

The size of the

coefficient suggests that incumbents raised about $17,000
more than the average challenger in this election.
Candidates' race also is highly correlated to fundraising.
Black candidates, on average, raised about $14,000 less than
white candidates.

If one assumes that campaign funds are

generated locally (within wards), then ward socioeconomic
status (on average lower for black candidates than for white
candidates) might be important in determining overall
contributions. 15

This, in conjunction with the fact that

the overwhelming number of black candidates run in majority
black wards (only 3% of all black candidates ran in non15

Indeed, this is what the Chicago Urban League found
in their study of campaign finance in Chicago city council
elections (see pages 22-24 of their report).
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TABLB 19
Factors Influencinq Pundraisinq by Chicaqo City council
candidates in the 1995 Blections

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Incumbent
Black

First Reporting
Period1
16.587***
(3.458)

Second Reporting
Period2
20.277***
(5.867)

-14.373***
(3.418)

-8.862
(6.041)

Hispanic

-8.778+
(4.592)

-.912
(7.089)

Number of Opponents

-1.549
(1.403)

-3.040
(2.221)

Fundraising Effort

.459
(.342)

Previous
Contributions

.775***
( .161)

Opposition Spending

.018
( .113)

Intercept
Adj. R2
F-value

20.951***
(3.775)
.53
22.830***

18.709*
(8.296)
.62
13.575***

Number of cases
96
96
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
Period ending December 31, 1994.
2
Period ending June 30, 1995.
+p = .10.
*P = .05.
***P = .001.
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majority black wards), might explain this finding.

By

contrast, the coefficient for Hispanic candidates, while in
the predicted direction (negative) is considerably smaller
and significant only at the .10 level.
The findings for the second time period are very
consistent with the same model presented in Table 18.
Incumbency is the strongest predictor, suggesting that
incumbents enjoyed a $20,000 advantage over challengers in
the 1995 election.

In addition to incumbency, fundraising

early in the campaign cycle also is a strong predictor of
later fundraising success.

For each $1,000 raised in the

period ending December 31, $775 was raised in the subsequent
time period.

The other variables in the model, while not

significant, are in the predicted direction.

In general,

the model performs very well with an Adjusted R2 of 62
percent.
As expected, the findings presented in Table 18 and
Table 19 show that incumbency is a very strong predictor of
campaign fundraising.

These findings are consistent with my

hypotheses and the descriptive data presented above.

The

only case where incumbency was not a significant predictor
of fundraising was during the first period of the 1991
elections.

It is possible to speculate that incumbents felt

more electorally-secure during this election, than they did
in 1995.

For example, in 1995 incumbents were running under

new ward boundaries and therefore may have been more

212

concerned with raising money earlier in the process in order
to reach "new" ward voters.

In 1991, they did not face this

sort of pressure, as ward boundaries were last changed in
1986.

That black candidates had a more difficult time

raising money in 1995 than in 1991 when compared to white
candidates is more difficult to speculate on.

It is

possible that increased fundraising by incumbents (a
majority of whom are white) exacerbated differences between
black and white candidates generally, to produce the
significant differences found in the first time period for
1995.
In the second time period, incumbency status and
previous contributions were found to be significant
predictors of fundraising.

Both of these findings suggest

that contributors to local political campaigns make
pragmatic decisions about which candidates to support.
Incumbents are very likely to win their elections and,
therefore, receive more in contributions.

Incumbents also

have relationships with contributors that most challengers
must develop from scratch, a distinct disadvantage for
challengers who typically emerge fairly late in the campaign
process.

These findings also support the hypothesis that

candidates who prove that they can raise money early in the
campaign season reap fundraising advantages over those who
are less successful.

That candidates benefit from their

fundraising success early in campaigns also suggests that
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there is a dynamic to fundraising unseen in descriptive
data, one which suggests that fundraising is a dynamic
process.

Both of these findings are consistent with

conclusions reached by scholars who have studied other
legislative elections (see Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994).
While incumbents raise significantly greater amounts of
money than challengers, it is unclear what factors explain
fundraising differences among challengers.

Because the

ability to raise and spend money is closely connected to
election outcomes, and because challengers have the most
difficult time getting elected, it is important to
understand what variables might affect challengers'
fundraising.

Below I present results from regression models

designed to predict challengers' fundraising in the 1991 and
1995 elections.

Challenqers• Fundraisinq

In predicting challengers' fundraising I again look at
the 1991 and 1995 elections separately.

I also divide the

fundraising process into two periods which, together,
encompass the six months before the start of the election
year and the first six months of the election year.

While

the dependent variables in this analysis are the same as
those tested above, I have added a new predictor variable.
In place of incumbency I substitute a variable measuring
challenger political quality.

In all other respects, the
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models developed to predict challengers' fundraising are
consistent with those tested above.
As much of the literature on legislative elections has
shown, higher quality challengers give incumbents their most
difficult reelection battles (Bond, Covington and Fleisher
1985; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson and Kernell 1983;
Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994,471).

One of the reasons that

they give incumbents tough reelection fights is because
their political experience enhances their ability to raise
money.

For example, challengers with state legislative

off ice experience or ones with previous experiences as staff
members to elected officials are expected to generate more
revenue for their campaigns than challengers without this
political background.

They are expected to know the

fundraising "ropes" somewhat more extensively than
inexperienced challengers and to benefit accordingly.

Thus,

I have coded challengers according to the amount of
political experience they had at the time of their
elections, using the measure of challenger political
experience outlined in previous chapters.

I expect a

positive and significant relationship between challenger
political experience and fundraising.
The findings in Table 20 show results of challengers'
fundraising in the 1991 elections.

The first column shows

results from the model predicting fundraising in the first
period.

The model explains 31 percent of the variation in
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challengers' fundraising.

Candidate political experience,

contrary to my hypothesis, is unrelated to fundraising
success during the early part of the campaign.

Number of

opponents and fundraising effort, however, are significant
and the signs of the coefficients are in the predicted
direction.

The coefficient for number of opponents

indicates that each opponent decreases challengers total
contributions by approximately $1,500.

Greater attention to

fundraising by challengers can offset this somewhat.
Challengers are able to generate approximately $1,000 each
month they are involved in raising money.
The second column shows results of challengers'
fundraising in the second fundraising period under
examination here.

The findings indicate that challengers'

fundraising in this period is primarily a function of early
campaign contributions.

For every $1,000 in contributions

they bring in during the first period, they raise slightly
over $1,200 in the subsequent period.

In contrast to the

results for the first period, number of opponents is
seemingly unimportant for predicting fundraising in the
second period.

Challenger political quality, race or

ethnicity, and opposition spending also appear unrelated to
challengers' fundraising.
The findings for the first reporting period in 1995
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TABLB 20
Factors Influencinq Fundraisinq by Chicaqo City council
Challenqers in the 1991 Blections

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Candidate Quality

First Reporting
Period1
1.047
{ 1. 480)

Black

-1. 099

Second Reporting
Perjod2
2.153
{2.061)

{2.173)

-2.713
{3. 002)

Hispanic

-3.617
{3.538)

-2.470
{4.920)

Number of Opponents

-1.487*
(.690)

-.879
(.988)

Fundraising Effort

.964***
{.197)

Previous
Contributions

1.232***
{.137)

Opposition Spending

.072
{. 061)

Intercept
Adj. R2

F-value

11.473***
{2.317)
.31
8.615***

4.132
{3.753)
.58
20.251***

Number of cases
85
84
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
Period ending December 31, 1990.
2
Period ending June 30, 1991.
*P = .05.
***P = .001.
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mirror those for the 1991 election, with one exception {see
Table 21).

In this model, challengers' race is related to

how much money they can raise for their campaigns.

During

this part of the 1995 election, black challengers raised
approximately $6,500 less than white challengers.
consistent with the analysis of all candidates.

This is
When

incumbents are dropped from the model, the difference
between black and white candidates decreases.

One might

inf er from this that even larger differences exist between
black and white incumbents.

In addition to candidates'

race, the amount of time challengers put into fundraising
is, once again, significant and in the predicted direction,
although the effect of effort is somewhat less than in 1991.
This finding indicates that it may be beneficial for
candidates to begin raising money well in advance of the
election in order to build a fundraising base and to
generate momentum for their campaigns.

The other predictor

variables

challenger quality, number of opponents, and

ethnicity

are in the predicted direction, but are not

significant.
The findings for the second half of the 1995 election
cycle also are similar to those in 1991.

This model

explains 59 percent of the variation in challengers'
fundraising.

In 1995, however, challenger political

experience is significantly more important than in 1991.
one unit change in quality produces about $5,400 in

A
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TABLB 21
Pactors Influencinq Pundraisinq by Chicaqo City council
Challenqers in the 1995 Blectiona

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

First Reporting
Period1

Second Reporting
Period2

Candidate Quality

1.380
(1.415)

5.429*
(2.189)

Number of Opponents

-1.254
(.943)

-1.967
(1.404)

Black

-6.471**
(2.406)

-1.563
(3.882)

Hispanic

-5.050
(3.142)

5.995
(4.427)

Fundraising Effort

.752***
(.201)

Previous
Contributions

1.084***
(.162)

Opposition Spending

.044
(.067)

Intercept
Adj. R2
F-value

14.126***
(2.588)
.39
9.901***

6.205
(5.306)
.59
17.568***

Number of cases
71
71
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression
coefficients. standard errors are in parentheses.
1
Period ending December 31, 1994.
2
Period ending June 30, 1995.
*P = .OS.
**P = .01.
***P = .001.
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additional campaign revenues (significant at .05).

The

greater significance of quality in this election reduces the
effect of early money, although this variable is still
highly significant.

The coefficient suggests that for each

$1,000 in revenues generated early in campaigns, challengers
raise almost $1,100 during the subsequent period.

Indeed,

early money appears to be more important for challengers
than for incumbents, as one might expect.

The results from

Table 18 and Table 19, which included incumbent candidates,
showed that early money had a significant effect on later
fundraising, and that for each $1,000 in prior
contributions, candidates received $695 and $775 in 1991 and
1995, respectively.

Excluding incumbents from the analysis,

one sees the size of the coefficient for previous
contributions increases dramatically for challengers (to
$1,232 in 1991 and $1,084 in 1991 and 1995, respectively).
It is most likely that incumbents have much less need for
funds than do challengers and that, if forced into serious
contests, they can raise the money they need fairly quickly.
Challengers do not enjoy such a luxury and, as this analysis
shows, they clearly benefit from their ability to
demonstrate fundraising success early on in their campaigns.

candidates• Pundraisinq and the Effect of Early Money:
A Summary of Findings
As expected, candidates' fundraising is largely a
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function of incumbency, financial success early in
campaigns, and amount of time devoted to this campaign
activity.

Incumbents enjoy enormous advantages over

challengers, a finding that was shown in both descriptive
and inferential data analysis.

The effect of early money is

greatest for aldermanic challengers who typically must raise
name identification with voters quickly to be competitive
against their more widely-known and better-funded
incumbents.

The ability to raise large amounts of money

early in campaigns sends signals to the political and
financial community that challengers might be able to
compete well against incumbents.

Without this fundraising

advantage it is impossible for challengers to overcome the
enormous advantages, both political and organizational, that
keep incumbents nearly invulnerable to defeat or strong
challenges.

Because they start at such high funding levels

and because residents and political leaders within their
wards are already well aware of their records in off ice,
incumbents do not reap the same fundraising advantages from
early money as do challengers.

In fact, intense fundraising

during the reporting period ending December 31, probably
sends a negative signal to potential contributors that the
incumbents are in political trouble.

Candidates who spend

more time (in months) raising money are typically more

successful than those who spend less time on this activity.
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Discussion
This chapter has sought to determine which factors are
most important in predicting candidates' campaign receipts.
It started with the assumption that campaign fundraising is
important not only because of the time devoted to it by
candidates, but also because of the link between campaign
spending and candidates' vote share.
The descriptive data indicated that incumbents and
candidates in open seat races are able to generate the
largest sums of money for their campaigns (although the
differences between what incumbents raise and what open seat
candidates raise are vast).

The differences between

incumbents and the men and women who challenge them,
however, is even larger, a finding that was shown in
multivariate models to be statistically significant.
campaign fundraising activity also varied depending on the
time period in which candidates were working.

As the data

from the analysis of the various reporting periods
indicated, candidates were most actively involved in
fundraising during the first two months of the election
year. 'This applied to both the 1991 and 1995 elections.
In general, the multivariate models showed that
incumbency and the ability to generate funds early in
campaigns are the most important predictors of campaign

contributions.

The amount of time candidates devote to

fundraising also is a consistent predictor of fundraising
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totals.

To a lesser extent, candidates' race is an

important variable.

Black candidates, in general, raise

less money than white candidates.

Hispanic candidates also

received less than whites in contributions but, in general,
the differences were not significant.

Because of intense

racial concentration within wards, however, these findings
about candidates' race may have little overall significance
for political representation in Chicago's city council.
Very few black or Hispanic aldermanic candidates run against
white candidates.

In the vast majority of elections, they

faced candidates of their own racial grouping. 16

The

comparative fundraising disadvantage experienced by black
and Hispanic candidates does, however, have implications for
citywide office.

Unless slated by the Cook County

Democratic party in citywide races, black and Hispanic
candidates may be forced to run high-tech campaigns,
requiring significant amounts of revenue, without a
fundraising base.

These conditions likely give white

candidates for citywide office significant advantages in
advertising their campaigns and stimulating interest in
their candidacies.
The findings also suggested that persistence pays off

16

This is not to say that non-majority race candidates
do not win in Chicago city council elections. Chicago's

Fifth Ward, a majority black ward following the 1981
redistricting {Fremon 1988,48), elected a black alderman for
the first time in 14 years. However, there are no black or
Hispanic incumbents representing majority white wards.
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when it comes to raising campaign money.

Those candidates

who devoted more time to fundraising generated more in total
contributions than those who made less of an effort.

In

addition to amount of time candidates put toward raising
money, candidates who experienced fundraising success early
in their campaigns were the same candidates to experience
success later in their campaigns.

This finding indicated

that fundraising in these elections was a dynamic process
influenced by candidates' effort and early campaign
receipts.
More generally, the findings showed that there was a
momentum to fundraising, as was evidenced by the
relationship between early fundraising totals and later
contributions.

Candidates and their campaigns build a

certain amount of momentum as elections approach, momentum
that often translates into winning and losing.

This finding

was especially important for challengers.
This chapter has presented the third of three analyses
chapters dealing with the politics of city council elections
in Chicago.

The final chapter attempts to summarize the

study's major findings and implications for our
understanding of competition for local office.

It also

relates these findings to other research and attempts to
draw some conclusions about how this research fits into the
broader study of elections.

CHAPTER VI
UllDBRSTAJIDIBG CITY COUllCIL BLBCTIOBS: THB CASB OP CHICAGO

This study has evaluated factors associated with
electoral competition in local politics by focusing on four
different dimensions of city council elections in Chicago:
variables that affect election outcomes, the advantages of
incumbency, candidate emergence, and campaign fundraising.
The findings indicate that much of the electoral process in
city council elections is affected by incumbency, not only
in terms of predicting candidates' vote share, but also in
terms of when candidates decide to run for office.

In

addition, while incumbency is not significantly related to
overall levels of fundraising, its effect is seen in more
subtle ways.

For example, incumbents enjoy large

fundraising advantages over nonincumbents and, in general,
are better able than nonincumbents to respond to opposition
spending by generating funds of their own.
I undertook this study because in contrast to the
literature on congressional and state legislative elections
that is rich and diverse, very little is known about many of
these areas of inquiry on the urban level.

This final

chapter presents a summary of the study's major findings and
places these findings into a broader theoretical framework.
224
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In so doing, I will explain how my research fits into and
complements the literature on urban politics.

The Chicaqo City Council Elections Project

To examine the different aspects of local elections
that I focused on, I developed a data set on approximately
700 candidates who ran for the Chicago city council in
regularly-scheduled elections held between 1979 and 1995.

I

chose Chicago as the setting for this study for a number of
reasons.

First, in each election a large number of

individual candidates sought to win a seat on the city
council.

For example, in 1995 approximately six candidates,

on average, ran in each ward of the city.

Because the

number of individual candidates seeking seats on the council
is large, there is fairly stiff competition for these posts,
a prerequisite for any study of this nature.
Second, I chose Chicago because of its election
structure.

In many respects Chicago is representative of

other large cities that currently employ nonpartisan ballots
with district election systems, or ones that are moving
toward district election systems because of court-ordered
changes. 1 Because of its district election format, Chicago
offered an opportunity to test some of the claims made in
similar studies of city council elections in jurisdictions
1

Dallas is an example of a large city required by
federal courts to adopt a district election system (see
Christensen 1995,148).
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that use at-large election systems. 2
Third, Chicago is an important place to study because,
unlike other cities, it has strong party organizations in
many of the city's 50 wards.

Chicago is unique in this

regard because its ward-based Democratic party organizations
have, in many respects, withstood the pressures of official
nonpartisanship, which have hurt local parties in other
cities (see Welch and Bledsoe 1988).

Although not as strong

as they once were, ward organizations still play an
important role in city politics.

As a result, I have been

able to gauge the strength of local party structures, and
their role in elections, over a period of years.
For these reasons, Chicago is a useful place to study
city council elections.

City council elections dynamics

also tend to be a fairly under-researched subject in city
politics.

For this reason, much of my work borrows from

models of congressional elections.

With this in mind, I

summarize the study's major findings below.

Sumaary of Major Findings
Factors That Affect Election outcomes

The first question that I asked was: what factors

2

Cincinnati, for example, uses an at-large election
format, although its ballot structure is nonpartisan like
Chicago's (see Lieske 1989). Due to the limited number of
studies that have been done on this topic, it was important
to test some of the theories put forth in the Cincinnati
study in a different electoral environment.
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affect election outcomes?

For the purpose of this study,

election outcomes were measured in terms of candidates' vote
share.

Vote share is a standard way to measure election

outcomes and permits one to compare the effects of different
variables on the dependent variable, controlling for
differences in district-by-district voter turnout.
In order to explain variation in candidates' vote share
I used data on their background characteristics, such as
their race or ethnicity and amount of political experience
they had prior to their campaigns for office.

I also

included different measures of candidates' political
resources.

This included such variables as campaign

spending, media endorsements, and party organization
support.

I also controlled for the competitive context of

their elections by taking into account both the number of
opponents each candidate faced on election day and total
opposition spending.
The findings indicate that incumbents have a decided
electoral advantage over nonincumbents.

In general, the

typical incumbent enjoys a 20 point advantage over
nonincumbents in terms of vote share.

While the direction

and significance of the coefficient was not surprising, it
was somewhat startling to see how large a role incumbency
plays in predicting election outcomes.

Other political

resources are important as well, although their impact is
not as large as that of incumbency.

campaign spending,
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media endorsements, and support from ward political
organizations play an important role in deciding which
candidates receive the largest share of the vote, suggesting
that the ability to get one's name before voters and to
receive political legitimation from outside sources are keys
to success in these elections.
The competitive context also plays a role in
determining candidates' vote share as election outcomes are,
in part, a reflection of the number of individual candidates
vying for each seat.

Although less theoretically important,

this aspect of local elections should be controlled for in
future studies, unless the elections under examination
involve only two candidates.

The Incumbency Advantage

Because incumbents hold a sizable advantage over
nonincumbents, it was important to explore the underlying
cause(s) of that advantage.

This was done by focusing

specifically on incumbents' vote share and the margin of
difference between incumbents' vote share and that of their
closest competitor.

In predicting incumbents' vote share

and incumbents' vote margin, I tried to distinguish
variables related specifically to incumbents, from other
variables shown to predict election outcomes generally.
example, I expected that institutional positions (e.g.,
committee chairmanships) might be one factor undergirding

For
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incumbent electoral strength.

I also expected seniority,

challenger quality, scandal, whether or not the incumbent
was appointed to off ice or had run in at least one election
before, and redistricting to affect incumbents' vote share
and vote margin.

The findings indicate, however, that

incumbents' electoral strength is statistically unrelated to
all these factors, with the exception of challenger quality,
which, in the case of predicting vote share, is only
moderately significant.

None of the other predictor

variables are significant, contrary to my expectations.
The factors that explain incumbents' advantage are the
same ones that explain candidates' advantage in the first
place.

Factors such as spending, media endorsements,

organization support, number of opponents, and opposition
spending, all are significantly correlated to incumbents'
vote share and vote margin.

Recall, however, that

organization support was not included in the model designed
to explain vote share of all candidates. 3

Its inclusion and

significance in models explaining incumbents' vote share and
vote margin therefore indicates that a major reason why
incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage is due, in part, to
this variable.

Party organizations do play a critical role

in Chicago aldermanic elections.
3

This is shown for

Analyses related to Chapter Three showed a high degree
of multicollinearity between incumbency and organization
support. Because of this multicollinearity, I excluded the
organization support variable from the model predicting
candidates' vote share (see Table 5 and Table 6).
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incumbents and for nonincumbents alike.

candidate Baerqence

This part of the analysis focused on the environmental
circumstances that predict when candidates run for off ice
and that predict when high quality nonincumbents run for
office.

I hypothesized that factors such as redistricting,

ward-level historical factors {i.e., whether the ward had a
history of machine politics), ward demographics, and nature
of the election {i.e., open seat/non-open seat) would affect
the quantity and quality of candidates running in these
elections.

In addition to addressing this issue, I also

attempted to explain challenger emergence and challenger
quality.
In general, ward-level historical factors, size of the
ward's black population, and whether or not the election
involved an incumbent are the best predictors of both number
of candidates running in each ward and the emergence of
quality nonincumbents.

Two of these factors -- machine ward

and open seat/non-open seat

were viewed as contextual

factors capable of influencing perceptions of one's
prospects for victory.

Based on the evidence, I argue that

candidates, in general, are calculating and strategic when
they decide to enter city council campaigns and that their
behavior is not random.

For example, fewer candidates

choose to enter races that involve incumbents or that take
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place in machine wards.

The quality of the most experienced

nonincumbent also is affected by the presence of an
incumbent on the ballot and whether or not the ward has a
history of strong machine politics.
I then examined incumbents' challengers.

In this

analysis I also sought to uncover the politicalenvironmental circumstances that would compel candidates to
challenge incumbents, looking for evidence of strategic
behavior on the part of these individuals.

I hypothesized

that challengers would emerge when incumbents appeared weak,
using such factors as redistricting, committee positions,
incumbents' seniority, cash-on-hand, previous election vote
percentage, whether or not incumbents' were appointed to
off ice, and ward demographic factors as predictors of both
strength and weakness.

I also examined whether or not

incumbents• involvement in scandal at the time of the
election,

had any bearing on challenger behavior.

In general, the findings indicate that number of
challengers is unrelated to any of the variables designed to
measure incumbents' weakness or strength.

However, a second

model indicates that incumbents who are appointed to off ice
before running in their first election to the seat did, in
fact, attract more challengers than incumbents who had won
the seat at least once before.

Thus, challengers appear to

be making strategic calculations to run against appointed
incumbents.
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I also looked at the quality of incumbents' strongest
challengers in these wards, utilizing the same model.

The

findings indicate incumbents' previous vote share does make
a difference in the quality of candidates that emerge to
face incumbents.

As this number increases, the quality of

incumbents' strongest challenger decreases accordingly.
Although somewhat less striking than the findings for
nonincumbents generally, the research suggests that
challengers do behave strategically when they decide to run
against incumbents.

Number of challengers is, in part, a

function of the extent to which incumbents are entrenched in
office.

Incumbents just appointed to office, who have not

competed in real elections for their seat, attract more
challengers.

Similarly, high quality challengers are

deterred somewhat by incumbents' previous election vote
share.

This measure indicates to politically- experienced

challengers just how electorally strong incumbent are in
their district.

Caapaiqn Pun4raiainq in City council Elections
The third major area of interest in this research dealt
with campaign finance.

Specifically, I focused on factors

that explain candidates' ability to raise revenue for their
election bids.

In addition to studying factors that explain

variations in fundraising, I also examined the timing of
contributions to better understand the ebb and flow of
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fundraising during the course of the campaign itself.
Descriptively, the findings indicate that incumbents
enjoy enormous fundraising advantages over their challengers
and that they outraise those candidates who run in open seat
elections as well.

Data also show that candidates are

intensely involved in fundraising during January and
February of the election year.

Thus most candidates are

busiest raising money for their campaigns in the weeks
immediately prior to election day and not all year long.
Incumbents' fundraising advantages are seen more
definitely by examining results of multivariate regression
models.

As the models show, incumbency is clearly the most

powerful predictor of fundraising.

Other factors such as

fundraising effort, candidate's race, number of opponents,
and candidate quality are often strong predictors of total
contributions as well.

In addition to these factors,

candidates who raise money early in the electoral process
are more effective at raising funds later in the process,
suggesting that there is a certain momentum to fundraising.
This is even more important in light of the fact that
candidates are busiest raising money for their campaigns in
the few weeks prior to their elections.

Fundraising is not

a well-ordered process where candidates build their base of
revenue and then set out to reach as many voters as they can
prior to election day.

Their ability to raise money

develops over time and reflects, in large part, early
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financial success.

Chicago city council Blectiona and the
Broader Study of Local Politics
Pactors that Affect Election outcomes

Throughout this research I have argued that the
literature on city council elections is incomplete,
especially when compared to the literature on congressional
and state legislative elections.

This is unfortunate

considering that the number of city councils in the United
States far exceeds the number of other legislative
institutions.

In addition to their presence in most

incorporated places, city council members are required to
make policy decisions that affect areas of everyday
importance to citizens.

Understanding how these individuals

attain power on the local level is therefore an important
theoretical question.
Scholars have approached the study of city councils in
a variety of ways.

Some have examined how structural

features of local government {e.g., nonpartisan ballots, atlarge elections) affect the representation of racial and
ethnic minorities and the representation of women on city
councils {Alozie 1992; Bullock and MacManus 1991; Engstrom
and McDonald 1981, 1982; Welch and Karnig 1979).

Others

have examined patterns of racial bloc voting in city council
elections, in attempts to understand the variables that
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affect voter choice (Herring and Forbes 1994; Vanderleeuw
1990, 1991).

A third group of scholars has examined city

council elections from the perspective of factors that
affect the ability of candidates to attract votes on
election day (Lieske 1989; Merritt 1977; Raymond 1992
Sheffield and Goering 1978; Stein and Fleischmann 1987).
The number of studies falling into this category is
considerably smaller than the number of studies found in the
other two areas that I have identified.
The research presented in the preceding chapters
clearly falls into this third category.

Indeed, it directly

builds on the work of Joel Lieske (1989), who studied
factors affecting outcomes in Cincinnati city council
elections held between 1969 and 1977.

Because his study

represents the most exhaustive of its kind in the urban
politics literature, I pay particularly close attention to
it now.

He found that size of candidates' political

following, newspaper and partisan endorsements, and racial
identification of the candidates were the most important
variables predicting total votes received (Lieske 1989,163165).
More generally, Lieske articulated a "legitimacy"
theory of local election outcomes.

He suggested that

candidate vote totals were a result of their perceived
acceptability to the public.
one's political following.

The most important factor was
Lieske (1989,168) argued that
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incumbents and candidates who had run for off ice once before
retained "75 percent of all voters who backed them in their
most recent try for elected office."

Because incumbents

have the largest political following, they enjoy the largest
advantage in council elections.

Nonincumbent newcomers (for

the most part unknown to the public), by contrast, benefited
most from newspaper and partisan political endorsements.
In many respects, my findings mirror those of Lieske's.
Although I did not measure political following directly, I
have found incumbency to be the most significant predictor
of election outcomes in these contests.

The value of

incumbency, as was shown in Chapter Four, is largely related
to the ability of incumbents to secure partisan endorsements
and to mobilize a large segment of the voting population in
their favor.

One might speculate from this finding that

incumbents retain a sizable portion of their support in
their constituency from one election to the next, an
argument that is similar to the one made by Lieske.

I have

also found that newspaper and partisan endorsements play a
critical role in predicting electoral success.

Thus, many

of the same factors shown to predict election outcomes in
at-large Cincinnati also are at work in a district-based
election system such as Chicago.
In some ways, however, my findings are inconsistent
with those of Lieske's.

For example, the only background

characteristic that I found to be important in predicting
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election outcomes was political experience 4 and, generally,
these findings were inconsistent across election years.
The relationship between other background characteristics
such as occupational status and vote share were so weak in
bivariate analyses that they did not warrant inclusion in
the multivariate models of election outcomes.
The different findings on the value of particular
background characteristics between Chicago and Cincinnati,
however, are most likely related to structural features of
city council elections in each city.

One might naturally

expect candidates' occupational status (such as being
attorneys or businessmen) to be more influential in at-large
elections than it is in district elections.

Indeed, the

literature on this topic suggests that upper-status
candidates (a category into which attorneys and businessmen
would fall) do perform better in these contests than other
candidates because of their greater ability to mount viable
citywide campaigns (Welch and Bledsoe 1988).
In addition to these factors, the findings on Chicago
city council elections indicate a much more significant role
for campaign spending in predicting election outcomes,
holding constant other important predictor variables.

In

this regard, my findings are much more consistent with those
4

Lieske did not consider candidates' political
experience, choosing instead to examine such factors as
educational training, occupational studies, and political
resources such as endorsements from newspapers and party
organizations.
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of the Chicago Urban League in their study of the 1991
Chicago aldermanic elections and other research on local
election outcomes (see Arrington and Ingalls 1984).
Knowing precisely how spending affected outcomes in
Cincinnati city council elections is unclear because Lieske
(1989,163-167) excluded campaign spending from his
multivariate model, despite there being highly significant
bivariate correlations in his initial analysis. 5

Direct

comparison to his findings, therefore, is difficult.

I have

shown that spending is important in a city with districtbased elections, a finding that one might not have expected
considering that it is easier in districts for candidates to
canvass voters door-to-door (which requires less money) than
it is in at-large contests.
Finally, the fact that the racial characteristics of
candidates are unimportant in predicting outcomes also is
related to structural features of Chicago politics.

While

candidates' race does matter in at-large elections (see also
Herring and Forbes 1994), it is relatively unimportant in
Chicago, a city with intense racial segregation and numerous
uniracial wards.

Because there are few mixed race wards in

Chicago, voters generally choose from a list of candidates
who share each other's racial or ethnic identification.
This fact of Chicago politics forecloses the possibility of
racial bloc voting in city council elections.
5

See Lieske (1989, 158) Table 1.

In addition,
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many of the minority candidates who run in Chicago city
council elections also happen to be incumbent aldermen, a
factor that lessens the effect of candidate's minority
status.
In general, however, I conclude that the similarities
between my findings and those of other scholars far outweigh
the differences.

Incumbents dominate local election

outcomes and political resources that lend legitimacy to
candidates (such as media and party endorsements) do improve
vote share.

campaign spending also is critically important

in determining the outcomes of these contests.

Below I

discuss how my findings regarding incumbency advantage,
candidate emergence, and political fundraising add to or
enhance existing theory in these areas of the literature.

The IncUIDbency Advantage

In this part of the analysis I explored factors
underlying the incumbency advantage in city council
elections.

Because no one has really examined this issue as

it relates to local elections, I turned to the literature on
Congress to inform the analysis.

Attempts to quantify the

incumbency advantage on the congressional level, however,
have reached mixed conclusions.

Some have suggested that

the incumbency advantage is based in the system of
congressional perquisites, institutional power, and the
ability to provide personal services to constituents (Fenno
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1973; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974a).

Others have argued that

changing patterns in mass behavior have insulated incumbents
from competition because voters make their choices on who
they know rather than on political partisanship (Ferejohn
1977).

still others have questioned the entire notion of

incumbency advantage, arguing instead that incumbents are as
vulnerable to def eat now as they have been in the past
(Jacobson 1987; but see Bauer and Hibbing 1989).
My findings on this subject do not lend themselves to
any firm conclusions.

In fact, because city councils are,

in important ways, unlike the U.S. Congress, it was
difficult to isolate institutional factors that might
explain the incumbency advantage.

First, aldermen do not

have the same kinds of staff resources upon which they can
build powerful constituency service operations and to build
apolitical bonds with ward residents.

They are, of course,

expected to run errands for constituents and many are quite
effective at this part of their job.

However, trying to

understand constituency operations on the local level is a
difficult task that would most likely require personal
interviews with incumbents.

Second, because council

elections are nonpartisan, changes in voters' perceptions of
political parties was necessarily removed as an alternative
explanation for the incumbency advantage.
As a proxy measure for the ability of incumbents to
service constituency needs, I included a dummy variable for
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whether or not incumbents were committee chairmen at the
time of their election.

I hypothesized that incumbents who

held committee chairmanships at the time of their election
would be better able than those who did not hold such
positions to direct city resources into their wards or to
claim credit for particular ward improvements.
indicate that this is not the case.

The findings

Whether or not

incumbents are committee chairmen at the time of their
election has no bearing on their electoral performance.
Instead, other factors far outweighed the importance of
institutional power on incumbents vote share.

Incumbents

vote share is explained by spending, opposition spending,
media and party endorsements and number of opponents.
How do these findings affect existing theory in this
area of the literature?

In some ways they confirm the idea

that city councils are weak local institutions.

If

incumbent aldermen cannot use the institutional resources
available to them to improve their electoral positions, it
means either that the institution is weak or that people
outside the institution are paying very little attention to
the policy-making role of aldermen.

It may also be

reflective of the fact that voters in Chicago expect
aldermen to pay closer attention to ward interests and
running errands for constituents, than to policy-making in
general.
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candidate Bllerqence
Due to a lack of research on the urban level about the
influence of environmental factors on candidates• decisions
to run for off ice, I also relied heavily on the
congressional elections literature to inform this part of my
analysis.

In examining this question I did not focus on how

formal agents within the political process (for example,
parties or interest groups) affect candidates' decisions to
enter the political fray, but rather how the political
context affects the kinds of races candidates choose to
compete in and how context affects the behavior of
politically experienced candidates.
The literature has shown that candidates in other
legislative elections decide to run based on perceptions of
their ability to win (Bond, Covington and Fleisher 1985;
Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Squire 1989).

For example,

political challengers make choices about when to challenge
incumbents based on objective measures of incumbents' base
of support in their districts or states, such as national
political tides or local political conditions.

In applying

this theory to local elections, I have found that candidates
for local off ice also take into consideration objective
conditions in the political environment that might affect
their chances of winning.

As mentioned above, more

candidates enter open seat races and, of those candidates,
there is a greater likelihood that they will be more
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politically-experienced than candidates who challenge
incumbents.

Those candidates who do run against incumbents

are more likely to challenge ones who were recently
appointed to office, rather than those who have been in
off ice longer and who have won a previous election.

In

addition, high quality challengers appear to base their
decisions to run for office on incumbents' previous election
vote share, an important summary measure of the strength of
incumbents' electoral position in their ward.
In this regard, my findings support the notion that
aldermanic candidates in Chicago are strategic in their
political behavior.

However, in a departure from the

congressional elections literature, the findings presented
above on candidate emergence also indicate that district
demographics play an important role in predicting when
candidates' run for office.

A larger number of candidates,

and a larger number who have political experience, run in
wards with high concentrations of black residents.

I have

argued that this is a uniquely urban political phenomenon
that has been affected by mayoral politics, the rise of a
new political party (the Harold Washington Party), and
success in ward redistricting battles.

All of these factors

are reflective of broader changes in Chicago politics.
Instability and change, especially in black areas and black
wards of the city, manifest themselves in city council
politics.

With little change taking place in white areas
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and white wards of the city, the same type of political
dynamic is not present.

Caapaiqn Pun4raisinq in City council Elections

Very little is known about campaign fundraising in
local politics.

What is known comes from studies conducted

by public interest groups such as the Urban League.

Due to

paucity of studies in this area of inquiry (especially on
the local level), the findings that I have presented on
campaign fundraising greatly enhance our understanding of
this issue.
Like the previous three topic areas that I examined, I
have also looked to the literature on other legislative
elections to inform this part of my analysis.

The findings

on Chicago city council elections suggest that fundraising
dynamics in this city are very similar to dynamics found in
other legislatures.

Overall, incumbents have a distinct

fundraising advantage over nonincumbents.

Candidates for

open seats raise the second highest amounts of money and
challengers, like challengers elsewhere (see Jacobson 1980),
raise the least amount of money for their campaigns, despite
having the greatest need for funds.

This most likely

reflects the shortage of quality candidates who emerge to
challenge incumbents (being inexperienced they probably have
fewer money-raising contacts), and decisions by contributors
to give to likely winners (incumbents).

Also candidates who
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are able to raise money early in their campaigns are the
ones who achieve fundraising success later in their
campaigns. 6

This is very consistent with Krasno, Green and

Cowden's (1994) recent findings.

In these respects, money

raising dynamics on the local level closely resemble
dynamics on the national level.
The significance of the fundraising effort variable
reflects the "amateur" character of local politics.

The

more sophisticated candidates begin raising money earlier in
the process, with the knowledge that money increases the
likelihood of electoral success.

They gear their campaign

operations in this direction and experience greater
fundraising as a result.

Greater fundraising permits them

to spend more and to make contact with larger numbers of
voters.

Success in fundraising helps produce success on

election day.
The findings on campaign fundraising in Chicago also
reflect the peculiar nature of local politics.

The negative

sign of the regression coefficient for black candidates is
indicative of the fact that most candidates raise money not
from political action committees, like we see in Congress
and state legislatures, (see Jacobson 1992; Redfield 1995),
but within their communities (Lewis, Gierzynski, and
Kleppner 1995).
6

Because community economic status varies

Because of a small number of cases, I did not test
this assumption for candidates running in open seat
contests.
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dramatically throughout Chicago (white wards are generally
more affluent than black wards), fundraising also varies
between candidates on the basis of their race.

council Blections and the study of Local Politics: A SUllllary
The research presented above on city council election
dynamics has, on the one hand, provided additional empirical
evidence for claims made by others who have examined factors
affecting council election outcomes.

Most notably, I have

shown that many of the factors used by Lieske (1989) to
predict council election outcomes in that city, also were
useful in predicting Chicago aldermanic election outcomes.
In the three other areas of local elections that I have
examined, however, I have extended the urban politics
literature by applying models developed in studies of other
legislative elections (e.g., Congress) to city council
elections.

My findings show that there are many

similarities in the nature of city council elections in a
large city such as Chicago and those of national legislative
elections.

For example, incumbents enjoy enormous electoral

advantages over their challengers.

Second, nonincumbent

candidates, for the most part, consider the broader
political environment and how it might affect their chances
for victory before running for office.

Third, many of the

same factors that influence patterns in fundraising in
national elections play a large role in explaining variation
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in fundraising on the local level.

Discussion: Putting Chicago Into Context
Much of what we have come to understand about city
councils is based on studies done in the early 1970s on 87
communities in the Bay Area of Northern California.

Those

findings suggested that councils are, for the most part,
composed of individuals who are unmotivated by political
concerns and who want to serve their communities in the
capacity of volunteers {Prewitt 1970,210-212).

Because

these cities were fairly homogeneous in terms of population
and because they had similar governmental forms,
generalizations were inherently difficult.
Recent studies have begun to fine-tune this
understanding of city councils.

Bledsoe {1993,176), for

example, argues that while there are those in city councils
who are motivated by civic duty, there are others who are
motivated by the "thrill of political competition, the sheer
enjoyment of politics, and the possibilities of seeking
higher political prizes in the future."

Bledsoe {1993,176-

178) also identifies city councilors who are motivated by
other factors such as serving their particular neighborhood,
political partisanship, single issues, or self promotion.
Clearly, there is wide variation in the kinds of individuals
who seek local office and in their motivations for so doing.
One of the factors that might affect the political
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environment in cities is size and diversity of the
population.

Larger and more diverse cities are likely to

produce larger councils, which are required to address a
larger number of issues than councils in smaller, less
diverse cities.

In order to address the greater volume of

issues and to manage demand from the political environment,
councils in large cities are often established as full-time
institutions. 7

They also are likely to create the kinds of

internal mechanisms (e.g., standing committees) to deal with
environmental pressures that are placed on them (Pelissero
and Krebs N.d.) and to be expected to respond to
constituency concerns over public policy matters
(Clingermayer and Feiock 1993, 1994).

Clearly, these kinds

of city councils are more similar to legislatures on other
levels of government, than they are to city councils in
smaller, homogeneous cities.
Understanding city councils through the lens of the Bay
Area studies therefore may not be very informative when
examining cities such as Chicago.

The findings presented

throughout this research, and the findings from other
recently published studies, provide support for this idea.
Although I have only examined the individuals who seek to
serve on the council, it is clear that these people do not
ignore political considerations in their attempts to win
7

Although the Chicago city council is technically a
part-time legislature, it functions more like a full-time
council.
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off ice.

All told, candidates spend sizable amounts of money

making political appeals, a campaign activity that becomes
more intense as elections approach.

That politically-

experienced candidates run for the Chicago city council
suggests that the dynamics and expectations about the
councilor's job in that city are considerably more political
than conventional wisdom might suggest.

In addition,

candidates also make calculated and sophisticated decisions
about when to run for off ice to increase the likelihood of
their own success.

These findings indicate that political

motivation and political practice are very much a part of
big city politics, unlike what we might find in cities with
smaller, homogeneous populations, and reformed political
structures.
In what way are these findings generalizable?

To the

extent that the research presented above is generalizable,
it is to other cities with large populations, nonpartisan
ballots, and ward or district-based elections.

Because the

findings on the factors affecting election outcomes in
Chicago are quite similar to those of other cities such as
Cincinnati, one might also be able to make claim that they
will apply in large cities generally, despite whatever
differences might exist between them in terms of election
structure.
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Th• Rature of coapetition in City Council Blections

City council election dynamics are determined in large
part by incumbency and money.

Incumbency determines who is

advantaged in these contests and it determines in large
measure the number and quality of candidates who decide to
run in particular wards.

Incumbency also affects campaign

fundraising which, due to its linkage to campaign spending,
is a critical feature in Chicago city council elections.
The outcomes of Chicago politics also are determined in
large part by political party organizations.

Candidates

supported by their ward's Democratic party are considerably
more likely to win, than candidates who rely largely on
their own political organizations.
The implications of these findings for competition in
Chicago city council elections are many.

If one desires a

local political system where all candidates have an equal
opportunity to inform voters about their campaign ideas and
that ensures regular turnover among elected officials,
several reforms might be offered.

Equalizing candidates'

ability to inform voters would require some means of
equalizing spending between candidates, because spending
represents the primary means by which candidates make
contacts with would-be constituents during election
campaigns.

Equalizing spending would probably require some

form of public financing of campaigns, systems that are
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already in place in some large cities. 8
Instituting limits on expenditures might also improve
the ability of underfunded candidates to compete.

By

capping spending, you reduce the need for candidates to
continually seek funds.

This, however, might have the

unintended consequence of decreasing the ability of
challengers to compete against incumbents, who are much more
widely known in their constituencies than are challengers.
Likewise, limiting contributions may force candidates to
appeal to a larger segment of the community for funds but,
like spending limits, may simply limit the ability of
challengers to overcome incumbents' name identification
advantages.
Ensuring electoral turnover could be accomplished
rather easily through term limitations.

By limiting the

terms of incumbents, turnover in office is assured.

These

reforms -- public financing of campaigns, spending and
revenue limits, and term limitations -- face serious
difficulties in Chicago, where political culture and history
would indicate that it is less
than other localities.

susceptible to reform ideas

In addition, a system that

advantages incumbents is unlikely to be changed by the ones
benefiting.

The one element of political reform that

Chicago has adopted (nonpartisanship of council elections)
8

New York and Los Angeles are examples of two large
cities that have adopted public financing plans. See Lewis,
Gierzynski, and Kleppner (1995,31-38).
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has not eliminated the role of party organization in city
politics.

Indeed, this is still one of the major factors

that affects competition in these elections, especially in
terms of who wins.

Actions of government, however, can have

little effect on the presence or absence of political
organizations within particular districts.

The only agent

that might decrease the advantage secured by candidates
backed by the Democratic party is a viable alternative
structure, namely a strong opposition party capable of
matching the ability of the established organization to getout-the-vote
candidates.

and to spread the word in support of chosen
In Chicago, the Republican party has never had

a very strong presence and the independent political
movement has largely succeeded in taking control of the
Democratic party in many wards. 9

conclusion
While this study has examined four critical aspects of
city council elections -- factors that affect election
outcomes, the incumbency advantage, candidate emergence, and
fundraising -- it has only done so for one city.

Future

studies should test these hypotheses in other cities that
have different political systems and different political
histories.
9

It might be the case that smaller cities with

Historically, Democrats in Chicago have been
distinguished on the basis of whether or not they were
aligned with the machine or if they were independent.
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less diverse populations and at-large elections exhibit none
of the patterns found in Chicago.

It might be that these

findings are generalizable only to similarly situated city
councils.
Future studies also should seek to explain the
incumbency advantage in greater detail.

Less quantifiable

variables such as constituency services or favors, the
ability to claim credit for district projects, and
participation in previous elections may have cumulative
effects on voters that shape their perceptions of
incumbents' work and that heightens incumbents' name
identification.

It might be that intensive interviewing of

members and staff would be necessary to understand more
clearly the incumbency advantage.
Future research also should examine more extensively
issues related to campaign finance in city politics.

On the

urban level, scholars have not paid much attention to these
topics.

This may have to do with the fact that city

councils are generally perceived as weak institutional
actors in city government.

Regardless, the political

process is fundamentally unlike the governing process, and
such things as city council campaigns, city council
elections, campaign finance, and candidate strategy warrant
more attention than they have been given.

This study

represents a contribution to that wider understanding of
city council elections.
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